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ABSTRACT
DESIGNING MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
February 2008
CHRISTOPHER M. MARCOUX, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas
Multilateral environmental agreements have exploded in number in the thirty-five
years since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNC’HE)
in Stockholm. Over the same period, there has been a considerable resurgence in the
popularity of institutional approaches to the study of international relations (IR). This
dissertation evaluates the different explanations for institutional design that are provided
by three leading theoretical approaches to IR: realism, rational institutionalism, and
constructivism.
This dissertation argues that there are three critical elements of institutional form
that any theory of institutional design must explain: membership, delegation, and
flexibility. Membership encompasses two related concerns: first, who may participate in
a given agreement, and, second, who must participate for an agreement to succeed.
Delegation is understood in terms of its structure and substance: what resources and
authority are delegated to third parties, and to what specific ends? Institutional flexibility
can take three forms. Adaptive flexibility allows members temporarily to suspend
participation in specific circumstances, transformative flexibility allows members to alter
vi
the terms of cooperation over time, and interpretive flexibility provides discretion to
members in implementing agreement-related obligations.
After reviewing recent literature on institutional design, the dissertation derives
hypotheses from realist, rational institutionalist, and constructivist theory concerning
each of these three elements of institutional form. These hypotheses point to the
importance of five explanatory variables, distribution problems, enforcement problems,
hegemony, the number of relevant states, and scientific uncertainty/knowledge.
These hypotheses are tested against a database of international environmental
agreements compiled by the author and based in part on the recently published
International Regimes Database (1RD). Membership rules are found generally to reflect a
norm of non-exclusion. Delegation is highly circumscribed among surveyed agreements,
and is predicted primarily by the distribution of power among negotiating states. Finally,
modest exceptions to reduce transaction costs notwithstanding, institutional flexibility is
dramatically undersupplied compared to the expectation of rational institutionalist theory.
The dissertation concludes by suggesting how these findings are relevant to ongoing
theoretical debates, as well as policy debates concerning the reform of specific
international environmental agreements and institutions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There has been a substantial increase in the number of international institutions in
the last half-century, inspiring considerable scholarly attention to their design and
effectiveness. Scholars have been interested in the nature of international institutions,
their design, their role in global politics, and their effectiveness. These debates have
largely centered around two views. Institutionalists emphasize the importance of
institutions (or regimes more broadly) in mitigating the effects of anarchy and enhancing
the prospects for cooperation among states while others, primarily realists, view
international institutions as used by states only when it suits their self-interests (Mitchell
and Hensel 2007).
The competition between these two views is reflected in the scholarship that
addresses institutional design. This work explores such questions as how states choose
the structure of the institutions that they negotiate, define the membership rules for those
institutions, and what sort of authority they delegate to them. It also seeks to understand
how issues of power, interests, and knowledge affect institutional design. These
questions are interesting both on their own merits, and because they provide theoretical
leverage on the question of institutional effectiveness. Institutional design, then, is in
many ways at the heart of the study of international institutions.
Although there is wide agreement among IR scholars that international
institutions have grown in number over the past thirty years, there is no consensus among
IR scholars concerning exactly what international institutions are (Duffield 2007).
Previous studies of international institutions, when they have offered a definition at all,
have tended to rely on parochial definitions of institutions. Rational institutionalists often
conceptualize institutions as rules, while constructivists often conceptualize institutions
as norms (Duffield 2007). A major problem with this practice is that incommensurable
definitions of institution make it difficult, if not impossible, for scholars from different
theoretical approaches to talk to one another, forming a scientific community (Duffield
2007; Ostrom 1986). This study gets around this problem by operationalizing
“international institutions” as explicitly negotiated multilateral agreements
1
. Such
agreements may entail formal rules. They also may reflect or promote international
norms. By focusing on negotiated agreements, this study will be able to leverage three
major theoretical approaches to international relations (institutionalism, realism, and
constructivism) to study institutional design.
The Value of Institutional Design
The topic of institutional design traditionally has drawn attention from scholars in
political science (e.g., Goodin 1996), public administration (e.g., Hult and Walcott 1989),
international relations (e.g., Koremenos et al 2001a), organization theory (e.g., DiMaggio
1988). and economics (e.g., Schotter 1981 ), and is likely to continue to attract attention as
international actors continue to grapple with managing globalization. Studies have
addressed several dimensions of institutional design from a number of theoretical
perspectives (Koremenos et al 2001a; Raustiala 2005; Goldstein et al 2000). Still,
institutional design is not universally regarded as a proper focus of attention. Some
scholars have argued that the study of the design of international institutions is less
1
This study focuses on multilateral environmental agreements in particular, which have been largely
neglected in the scholarly literature on institutional design.
2
important than the study of institutional effectiveness. Specialists in environmental
politics are particularly prone to this view since they are interested primarily in
environmental outcomes; institutions are a means to that end, and are not as important in
their own right (Mitchell 2003; Susskind 1994). Another group of scholars, while
acknowledging the importance of institutional design, argues that institutional design is
comparatively well-understood and therefore researchers should instead focus on
explaining institutional effects (Martin and Simmons 1998; Duffield 2003).
While understanding institutional effects and effectiveness are crucial components
in the study of international agreements, organizations, and regimes, both of these
criticisms are premature and misplaced. It is impossible to fully understand the effects of
institutions without understanding what they are and how they come to be. In other
words, institutional effectiveness cannot be understood fully without a theoretical
understanding of design; we cannot understand or evaluate indicators of effectiveness
without linking outcomes to political actions. The study of institutional design is also
necessary because it provides insight into how states interact and the nature of their
relationships.
The Study of Institutional Desmn
Institutional design has been a recurring theme in research on international
cooperation from the early functionalist work (e.g., Mitrany 1976), through game-
theoretic approaches in the 1980s and 1990s, to rationalist approaches in recent years
(Katzenstein, et al 1998). Early approaches tried to explain the significance of
institutions by paying attention to their formal, legal design, while game-theoretic
approaches attempt to explain institutions as equilibrium solutions to generic problems of
3
international cooperation. Recent rationalist approaches have tried to complicate the
assumptions of both of those understandings, looking for patterned behavior while
understanding the complexity of international interactions.
One research program, introduced in a Summer 2000 special issue of
International Organization
,
has examined why states sometimes cooperate through the
negotiation of formal treaties rather than informal cooperation. It conceptualizes
international cooperation as being more or less “legalized,” depending on cooperative
arrangements’ obligation, precision, and delegation (Goldstein, et al 2000). International
agreements vary across each of these variables. The myriad possible combinations of
these three variables yield two polar ideal types of international cooperation - “hard law”
and “anarchy” - and a broad spectrum of legal forms arrayed on a continuum between the
two.
This research program draws on liberal, rational institutional, and constructivist
theories to explain the legalization of international cooperation. “Legalized institutions,”
according to this research program, “can be explained in terms of their functional value,
the preferences and incentives of domestic political actors, and the embodiment of
particular international norms” (Goldstein, et al 2000, 396). After elaborating the
theoretical concept of legalization, members of the legalization project illustrate their
conceptual framework in a number of empirical settings, concentrating primarily on
institutional economic relations. Though the authors claim to demonstrate the usefulness
of “legalization” in understanding international cooperation, they generally do not
develop formal hypotheses concerning the causes or consequences of legalization.
Rather, their main goal is to establish a framework for future research (Kahler 2000).
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Though the legalization project undoubtedly has been influential, it has also come
under criticism from a number of corners. Constructivists have criticized it for adopting
a narrow understanding of international institutions and cooperation (Finnemore and
Toope 2003). Rational institutionalists have criticized its theoretical imprecision and
difficulty to operationalize (Koremenos 2005b). Finally, other international legal
scholars have criticized the legalization framework as being an inaccurate representation
of actual state practice.
Kal Raustiala (2005) exemplifies this last criticism, arguing that the notion that
states vary cooperative agreements along a spectrum of legalization is inconsistent with
their actual practice. Instead of calibrating institutional designs, Raustiala argues, states
make a series of dichotomous choices, such as whether to make an agreement in the form
of a contract or a pledge and whether or not to provide mechanisms for enforcement
(Raustiala 2005, 582). The design of individual agreements thus should be understood as
a function of a series of tradeoffs.
Finally, a third line of recent research on institutional design - and the one that
provides a point of departure for this project - is the rational institutionalist research
program on the “rational design of international institutions” (Koremenos, et al 2001a).
Scholars working in this research program start from the basic presumption that states
create international agreements and institutions to further their own goals, and design
them accordingly. These scholars observe that existing institutions vary greatly along a
number of dimensions: size and openness of membership, internal decision-making
procedures, extent of centralized authority, and the extent to which the specific terms of
cooperation are flexible. The key explanatory variables of institutional features identified
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by this research program include ( 1 ) the presence of distribution problems, (2) the
presence of enforcement problems, (3) the number of relevant states, (4) asymmetries
among relevant actors, and (5) the extent of uncertainty surrounding an issue.
(Koremenos, et al 2001a, 773-779).
The rational design project advances sixteen “conjectures” derived from prior
neoliberal institutionalist research regarding the impact of these explanatory variables on
particular institutional designs (cf Conybeare 1984; Keohane 1982, 1984; Olson 1965;
Smdal 1985a, 1985b; Stein 1983, 1990; Ziim 1993). Though a key advantage of the
rational design framework is its emphasis on specific, falsifiable hypotheses, the only
systematic test of these conjectures to date remains the very preliminary use of eight case
studies in the Autumn 2001 special issue of Internationa! Organization. The authors of
the rational design project claim to find strong, though not complete, support for the
majority of their conjectures (Koremenos, et al 2001b).
The rational design project also has been criticized from a number of comers. Its
variables are chosen entirely from the canon of neoliberal institutionalism (Wendt 2001;
Pierson 2004). Though it claims to examine the significance of asymmetries among
actors, the rational design framework does not adequately take account of the role of
power in shaping international cooperation (Gruber 2000). Likewise, it does not
adequately account for the explanatory value of norms and knowledge (Duffield 2003).
Finally, many of its conjectures are vague, failing to explicitly specify causal mechanisms
and, thus, precluding the rational design framework from distinguishing rival
explanations with similar expectations (Thompson 2005).
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Though ‘external’ criticisms of the rational design project are important, many of
its limitations follow from shortcomings in its research design. Poor case selection in the
original volume (Koremenos, et al 2001a) presents several problems for the rational
design project. First, some of the cases are primarily formal extensions of rational design
hypotheses, rather than empirical tests. These do not constitute tests of rational design
because they start by assuming the presence of the very hypothesized relationships in
question. A second, more severe, limitation follows from the near-exclusive focus on
institutions regulating international trade. These may be sufficiently distinctive that it is
difficult to make valid generalizations to institutions in other issue areas (e.g., security,
environmental protection). Third, the previous research from which the rational design
hypotheses were derived also focused mainly on the design of international trade
agreements. Thus, the rational design project ends up testing its hypotheses using the
same data that generated the framework in the first place. Fourth, the rational design
project did not consider sufficient cases to test all of the proposed hypotheses. For
example, none of the cases in the original volume test their hypothesis that the scope of
an institution increases with the number of relevant parties.
Finally, although one may sympathize with the rational design project’s desire to
avoid a “three-cornered fight” between realism, rational institutionalism, and
constructivism, the project’s exclusive focus on rational institutionalist explanations
further limits its explanatory power. Unable to engage alternative explanations in
anything but an ad hoc fashion, the rational design project can do little more than
establish congruence between its expectations and observed evidence. Since it does not
consider whether other explanations better fit the data, and it is sketchy about the causal
7
mechanisms underlying its own hypotheses, the rational design project is incapable of
finding convincing evidence, either for or against its conjectures.
More recently rational design conjectures have been tested against a larger body
of evidence. Koremenos (2005a) examines hypotheses concerning institutional flexibility
in a large-N study of sunset clauses in international agreements. Similarly, Koremenos
(2007) uses a large-N design to study states’ decision to incorporate dispute resolution
mechanisms in international agreements. Although these studies represent a step forward
for the rational design project, a number of problems remain. Recent large-n work on
institutional design fails to distinguish between bilateral and multilateral institutions,
despite the fact each type involves distinctive consequences for design. Furthermore, the
narrowness of recent studies precludes them from identifying possible interactions in the
design of agreements, which was a potential strength of the original, comprehensive
framework.
The Design of International Aureements
This project aims to improve the study of institutional design in a number of
ways, including breadth, depth, and method. This project, in contrast to those before it.
derives and tests hypotheses from each of the three major current approaches to
international cooperation: realism, rational institutionalism, and constructivism. It adopts
a more comprehensive approach than many of the studies that have preceded it, choosing
to focus on a number of causal factors over three design variables, rather than narrowly
researching a single design variable and/or a single causal factor. The third improvement
that this project brings, and perhaps its most substantial contribution, is a large-n
empirical test of institutional design hypotheses. It pairs this large-n empirical test with
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case studies to analyze the causal chains that statistical analyses predict. Finally, this
project’s empirical test is focused on multilateral environmental agreements, an area of
substantive interest to scholars and policymakers alike.
Evaluating Competing Hypotheses of Institutional Design
While theory-building can proceed from a single theoretical perspective, theory-
testing is better performed with alternative hypotheses and explanations in mind.
Although this project was originally inspired by the rational design project, it quickly
became evident that the question “if not rational design, then what?” needed to be
addressed in a more systematic way than simply conjecturing possible alternatives in a
conclusion. Instead, this study tests hypotheses derived from the rationalist paradigm
against hypotheses derived from the realist and constructivist paradigms. Rather than
simply asking how states further their interests, it tests the relative weight of power,
interests, and knowledge in states’ choices of agreement design. This is meant to help
determine not only which theory is “right,” but also, when more than one theory provides
explanatory leverage, suggest how the causal mechanisms might interact.
Comprehensive Analysis of Causes and Effects
Another way that this study broadens the explanatory value of studies of
agreement design is that it addresses more than one dependent variable. I derive
hypotheses from the realist, rationalist, and constructivist paradigms specific to
institutional membership, delegation, and flexibility. While other projects also derive
hypotheses for more than one dependent variable, most of those projects either do not
involve empirical tests or only test the hypotheses about one dependent variable (e.g.,
Koremenos 2005a; 2007). Such studies miss the opportunity to explore the possibility of
9
multiple responses to specific problems. By using an array of dependent and independent
variables, this study hopes to get the broadest look yet at agreement design.
The Importance of Empirical Tests
Most of those empirical tests of institutional design hypotheses are case studies,
and do not include either cross-case analysis or an exploration of alternative hypotheses.
This study endeavors to be the first that tests institutional design hypotheses across a
large number of institutions. Statistical tests discern patterns of design choices over a
large number of settings, asking not only what is theoretically predicted but what states
actually choose. This provides a link between the formal models which are theory-driven
and the case studies which do not cover a large number of designed institutions. Only a
large-n statistical test can provide insight into the question of whether or not institutions
(generally) are actually designed, to what degree, and how.
This study pairs large-n statistical tests with case studies to evaluate the causal
chains predicted by the statistical tests. As Andrew Bennett notes, “there is a growing
awareness among the practitioners of each of the leading methods in political science -
formal modeling, statistics, and case studies - of the great potential for complementarity
among these methods” (2002, 1 ). Stephen Van Evera explains, “more tests are better
than fewer, strong tests are better than weak” (1997, 29). The addition of case studies to
this project serves both functions; it provides more tests, and, using the diplomatic
histories of specific negotiations, it strengthens the tests' conclusions in light of particular
cases. This methodological choice intends to further research in institutional design by
Goldstein and Freeman's (1990) study of reciprocity in international cooperation is exemplary in this
regard
10
gaining insight into the degree and type of agreement design generally, patterns of
design, and specific applications of design principles,
MEAs: Studying the Design of Environmental Agreements
In addition to broadening the scope of the study of institutional design and
strengthening its tests, this study focuses on an area of agreement design likely to be of
particular theoretical and practical interest. Broadly, international agreements can be
classified as related to economics, human rights, security, and the environment. This
study focuses on environmental agreements.
This focus on environmental agreements is for a number of reasons. First, it is an
area of institutional design that has been understudied. Existing large-n studies have
focused primarily on other sorts of institutions (e.g., alliances or trade agreements); the
analysis in those studies can be compared with the analysis in this one to understand the
effect of institution type on the design of institutions. Second, until recently, there has
been a paucity of large-n data on environmental agreements and regimes. That is
beginning to change, with the continued development of the International Environmental
Agreements project (Mitchell 2003-2007) and, more recently, the publication of the
International Regimes Database (1RD). The 1RD makes available for the first time a
large-n dataset of environmental regimes covering variables on a number of aspects of
problem structure and institutional design (Breitmeier, Young, and Ztirn 2006). This
study draws from IRD data to build a dataset suitable for testing hypotheses concerning
membership, delegation, and flexibility in MEAs. Third, existing datasets which include
environmental agreements fail to distinguish between bilateral cooperation and more
complex multilateral negotiations. Because bilateral agreements far outnumber
multilateral ones, existing empirical studies tell us very little about the design of
multilateral environmental agreements. This is unfortunate because the highest-profile
environmental issues and institutions on the international agenda today are inescapably
multilateral.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are one of the major mechanisms
of international environmental governance, specifying the particular obligations
governments have accepted regarding issues of environmental protection. The creation
of such instruments has grown rapidly in the thirty-five years since the 1 972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm. According to
the International Environmental Agreements Database, 257 of the more than 800 MEAs
were concluded during the 1990s alone (Mitchell 2003-2007). Some of these agreements
are well-known, even among non-specialists: the ongoing clashes between the United
States government and European governments over climate change has put the Kyoto
Protocol at the center of international attention. Twenty years ago, it was the United
States pushing for international cooperation, as states negotiated the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In addition to these high-profile agreements,
states have also cooperated to manage international marine resources, global commons,
international fishing resources, international rivers, and the like. The dataset this study
uses covers agreements spanning a wide range of issues.
Project Overview
In an attempt to study the design of these MEAs, this study begins by reviewing
previous work in the area and its conceptual foundations. It then lays out the hypotheses
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to be tested and the methods to be used. These preliminary materials are followed by
three chapters, testing hypotheses on mechanisms for membership, flexibility, and
delegation. The study concludes by evaluating its results in terms of the questions if, and
how, MEAs are designed by states.
Chapter 2, ‘Theorizing Institutional Design’, begins by reviewing the
development of the rational institutionalist literature on international cooperation,
explaining the theoretical origins of current rational institutionalist research on
institutional design. Next, it discusses alternative approaches to institutional design,
drawn from realist and constructivist literatures on international cooperation, explaining
the points of departure that lead these approaches to have different expectations
concerning institutional design.
Chapter 3, ‘Designing MEAs: Hypotheses, Data, and Methods’, begins by
defining and explaining the main explanatory variables used in this study: distribution
problems, enforcement problems, number, hegemony, and uncertainty. Next, it defines
the three dependent variables examined in this study - membership, delegation, and
flexibility - and describes hypotheses for each drawn from institutionalist, realist, and
constructivist literatures on international cooperation. Having set forth the framework for
this study. Chapter 3 then discusses the data used to evaluate these hypotheses, as well as
the analytic methods used to do so.
The next three chapters comprise the empirical heart of this project. Chapter 4,
‘Elements of Institutional Design: Membership’, examines the design of membership
rules in MEAs. It argues that institutional membership varies along two broad
dimensions: in the negotiation of any MEA, states must decide which parties may
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participate in a cooperative arrangement, and which parties must participate for
cooperation to take place. Next, Chapter 4 describes a number of indicators of
membership design and provides descriptive statistics concerning membership design
among surveyed agreements. Third, it evaluates the hypotheses concerning membership
rules set forth in Chapter 3, finding that surveyed agreements were generally open,
perhaps following a norm of non-exclusion, and second, that enforcement problems (e.g.,
worries of free-riding) lead negotiators to design more specific and more demanding
conditions for entry into force. Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in light of the
negotiation of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (and
subsequent Protocols) and the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer (and the 1987 Montreal Protocol).
Chapter 5, “Elements of Institutional Design: Delegation’, examines influences on
delegation in MEAs, addressing questions such as why states sometimes look for
‘outside’ help in implementing agreements; which factors encourage or discourage states
to delegate authority to independent parties; how much authority do states delegate; and
what specific functions do states entrust to such parties? Chapter 5 begins by identifying
a number of dimensions of delegation in MEAs. Next, it describes those dimensions and
provides descriptive statistics concerning delegation in the agreements surveyed in this
study. It then evaluates the hypotheses concerning delegation set forth in Chapter 3,
finding that states generally delegate administrative power to (newly created or existing)
independent organizations, but also that states generally do not delegate significant levels
of resources or discretion. Chapter 5 also finds that states regularly delegate specific
functions in response to certain conditions (e.g., enforcement problems). Finally, these
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findings are discussed in light of two specific cases dealing with transboundary hazards:
the 1979 LRTAP Convention and the 1989 Basel Convention.
Chapter 6, ‘Elements of Institutional Design: Flexibility’, examines the role that
institutional flexibility plays in the design of MEAs. In doing so, it addresses a number
of questions. What is institutional flexibility? What options are available to negotiators
to make agreements flexible? What factors influence negotiators to seek flexibility?
Which forms of flexibility serve which purposes? To answer these questions, this chapter
first defines institutional flexibility. Next, it describes the institutional flexibility found
among surveyed agreements. Third, it evaluates hypotheses concerning institutional
flexibility described in Chapter 3. Finally, this chapter discusses these findings in light of
two specific cases.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this study by drawing together the many strands of
analysis that this study has produced. First, it summarizes the study’s results presented in
Chapters 4-6, and identifies patterns in those results. Next, it reverses this study’s
perspective, adopting an “effects of causes,” or “x-centered” approach in order to delve
more deeply into the question of which explanatory variables are meaningful for design
(Gerring 2007). Building on this. Chapter 7 examines which aspects of agreements,
among the many possibilities suggested by rational institutionalism, realism, and
constructivism, negotiators actually design and which are artifacts of custom or habit. It
concludes by exploring and demonstrating productive avenues for future research on
institutional design in MEAs.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIZING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Proponents of rationalist, realist, and constructivist research programs in IR have
all developed approaches to understanding the design of international institutions. The
most developed of those research programs - and the primary inspiration for this project
is the rational institutionalist approach. The rational institutionalist approach regards
treaties and other institutions as rationally designed contracts that vary in predictable
ways depending on the underlying cooperation problems they address (Thompson 2005).
After setting the stage by describing the problem of ‘cooperation under anarchy’, this
chapter explores the rational institutionalist approach in detail. It then discusses
alternative approaches to the design of MEAs drawn from realism and constructivism.
Sections addressing these theories explain the basis for their critiques of the
institutionalist approach, and the points of departure which lead realists and
constructivists to understand institutional design differently. The final section of the
chapter discusses the analytical and predictive differences between rational
institutionalist, realist, and constructivist approaches to MEAs.
The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy
The question of the extent of cooperation likely under anarchy is a central debate
among scholars who study international institutions, and is central to this study as well.
Many scholars of international relations agree that the international system is “anarchic"
(Waltz 1979; Oye 1985). Where they diverge is in their understanding of the content and
meaning of that anarchic system for states and their interactions with each other
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Structural realism argues that anarchy is constitutive, and states’ responses to anarchy are
endogenous. In this interpretation, anarchy compels states that wish to survive to question
other states’ intentions, seek offensive capability, think strategically, and look for
opportunities to obtain relative gains. In such an atmosphere, structural realism argues,
states do not cooperate because they seek or aspire to the creation of mutual benefit, or to
make the world a better place. Instead, when states cooperate, they are doing so out of
fear.
Rational institutionalist approaches to institutional design and function developed
in response to a major empirical puzzle confronting realism. As Martin and Keohane
describe, institutional theory “began with observation of a persistent anomaly in
neorealist theories” ( 1999, 5). Neorealists argued that engaging in extensive and
persistent forms of cooperation would be contradictory to states’ interest and infrequent
in their policy choices (Martin and Keohane 1999, 5). However, states do “engage in
deep, persistent patterns of cooperation. In addition, they constructed] institutions to
sustain and enhance these patterns of cooperation” (Martin and Keohane 1999, 5;
Keohane 1984). In response to this empirical anomaly, early rational institutionalists
“sought to show that international institutions provided a way for states to overcome
problems of collective action, high transactions costs and information deficits or
asymmetries” (Simmons and Martin 2002, 195).
Constructivist approaches provide yet another perspective on the meaning of
international anarchy. If realism emphasizes the importance of anarchy and power, and
rational institutionalism foregrounds the strategic pursuit of material gain in an anarchic
world, constructivism focuses on the influence of ideas and norms in global politics. In
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constructivist theory, ideas and norms can serve as informal “rules” which create states of
rule and governance even in a formally anarchic system (Onuf 1989, 7). The difference in
these theories" approaches to anarchy and states' behavior therein forms the foundation
for their different approaches to the study of institutional design.
Rational Institutionalist Approaches
Rational institutionalism seeks to understand the creation, existence, and function
of international institutions, which they define as “persistent and connected sets of rules
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape
expectations” (Keohane 1989, 3). Inspired by work in the field of economics, rational
institutionalists developed a research program exploring the design and function of these
rules, constraints, and expectations. Deriving its analytic framework from the New
Institutional Economics (NIE), IR's rational institutionalism connects concepts of
bounded rationality, transaction costs, contract theory, and game theory.
New Institutional Economics
Although a self-conscious field of “New Institutional Economics” did not appear
until the 1970s (Williamson 1975), its origins can be found in Ronald Coase's work on
“the nature of the firm” (Coase 1937). While neoclassical economics had assumed
transactions to be costless, Coase introduced the idea that there are “costs of negotiating,”
involved in negotiating, doing business, arranging institutions, and engaging in
cooperation ( 1 937, 390). NIE took up this argument in its emphasis on the impact of
“transaction costs” (Williamson 1979). Transaction costs are the cost of a negotiated
exchange. According to Furubotn and Richter, these costs “arise in connection with the
exchange process, and their magnitude affects the ways in which economic activity is
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organized and carried out. Included within the general category of transaction costs are
search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and
enforcement costs” (2005, 36). Along with recognizing the existence of transaction
costs, NIE scholars saw that actors’ rationality is bounded. By bounded rationality, these
scholars mean that economic actors are “intendedly rational but only limitedly so” (Simon
1957).
The combination of transaction costs and bounded rationality led NIE scholars to
find fault with neoclassical economic theories’ understanding of contracts. While
traditional economic theories saw contracts as a complete expression of the terms of the
agreement between the parties, NIE scholars questioned the possibility of complete
contracts. A complete contract, in simple terms, expresses all terms of the agreement
between parties and accounts for all possible contingencies in the performance of the
agreement. Given the complexity of world politics, the uncertainty of the future, and the
incompleteness of states' trust for each other, such a complete contract is impossible in
international (economic and political) relations.
NIE scholars argue that while incomplete contracting is unavoidable, it is possible
to mitigate its effects on actors' ability to cooperate through the creation of institutions
which provide information about other actors, predictable patterns of negotiation, and
information about the reliability and credibility of transacting parties. Institutionalists in
IR considered the implications of these observations for agreements in global politics.
The Adaptation ofNIE to International Relations
Realization that transaction costs exist in international relations inspired IR
scholars to think about the implications of NIE for the study of international regimes and
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institutions. Part of “regime theory,” this new research program in international relations
asked questions about the difficulties in forming international agreements, the challenges
to success of a formed agreement, and the relationship between agreements in global
politics.
Coase (1960) demonstrated that Pareto-optimal solutions were attainable in
situations of decentralized bargaining among independent actors, even in the presence of
externalities. For Keohane, the analogy to international cooperation was clear. The
international system is anarchic insofar as it lacks centralized authority. Furthermore, it
is a decentralized system in which actors - i.e., states - possess formal sovereignty.
However, the analogy is not perfect. As Keohane (1984, 87) acknowledges:
In the first place, Coase specified three crucial conditions for his conclusion to
hold. These were: a legal framework establishing liability for actions,
presumably supported by government authority; perfect information; and zero
transaction costs (including organization costs and the costs of making side
payments). It is absolutely clear that none of these conditions is met in world
politics.
Although the structure of the international system does not meet the conditions
required for Coase’ s theorem, Keohane argues that one can understand the conditions
necessary for international cooperation to occur by reasoning backwards from it. If
rational states recognize that potentially beneficial cooperation is being thwarted by
uncertainty and transaction costs, they may reasonably be expected to create institutions
with the functional capabilities to reduce uncertainty and lower transaction costs. As
Keohane (1984, 87-88) puts it, “inverting the Coase theorem allows us to analyze
international institutions largely as responses to problems of property rights, uncertainty,
and transaction costs.”
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According to IR institutionalists, rational states see that international anarchy can
inhibit cooperation, even when it is in the interest of all parties involved. In response to
this understanding, states may come to see a need for international institutions to redress
the “market failures” of the international system (Keohane 1982, 151 ). Institutions are
created by rational forward-looking actors, in anticipation of the market-correcting
functions that they will serve.
Collaboration and Coordination in Rational Institutionalism
IR institutionalists frequently turn to the tool of game theory, also used in the
NIE, to develop systematic theories to explain the existence, form, and function of
international institutions. A game-theoretic approach recognizes that, even though
actors’ interactions are continuous, “they will tend to face generic types of cooperation
problems over and over again” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 743; Lake and Powell 1999).
Institutions frequently address problems that can be fit into generic typologies.
Stem ( 1983) provides one of the clearest early examples of this approach. By
examining a succession of 2x2 game matrices, Stein demonstrated that, in many cases,
actions that are individually rational for the actors involved lead to results that are
collectively suboptimal. International regimes, he argued, are “created to deal with the
collective suboptimality that can emerge from individual behavior” (Stein 1983, 123).
According to this line of argument, there are essentially two types of cooperation
problems that regimes may be created to solve, and such regimes will require different
institutional forms to be effective depending on the underlying structure of the
cooperation problem that they address. “Regimes established to deal with the dilemma of
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common interests differ from those created to solve the dilemma of common aversions.
The former require collaboration
,
the latter coordination’'' (Stein 1983, 128).
The paradigmatic example of a dilemma of common interests is the “security
dilemma” (Herz 1950) that plagued attempts at arms control during the Cold War.
Specifically, Stein characterizes the SALT agreements as a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)
game, wherein the US and USSR had a common interest in limiting arms, but also a
strong interest in avoiding military inferiority. Stein (1983, 129) argues that “arms
control agreements are highly institutionalized, for these regimes are highly concerned
with compliance and policing. They must define cheating quite explicitly, insure that it
be observable, and specify verification and monitoring procedures.” Thus, from an
institutional design standpoint, regimes addressing collaboration problems should use
relatively precise rules, and should incorporate mechanisms for monitoring and
verification.
In contrast, regimes addressing dilemmas of common aversion are (once
concluded) self-enforcing (Stein 1983, 130). Thus, they have less need for enforcement
mechanisms, and will tend to be less institutionalized than collaboration regimes.
However, although coordination requires relatively little institutional capacity to sustain,
it may nevertheless be difficult to reach in the first place. Agreement to avoid one
outcome need not translate into agreement in support of another. When several
cooperative outcomes are possible (i.e., when the coordination game contains multiple
equilibria), distributional conflict may ensue concerning which to choose - a point
developed further by Krasner (1991).
Cooperation under Anarchy
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The coordination-collaboration distinction had a lasting effect on the
development of rational institutionalist theory on international cooperation, framing work
well into the 1990s (Keohane 1994; Martin 1992a). However, scholars soon recognized
the limits of the one-time, two-player models on which it was based. Accordingly, the
next significant refinements to rational institutionalism involved considering the effects
that the number of parties and iterated interactions over time have on international
cooperation (Axelrod 1984).
Kenneth Oye incorporated both of these insights in an influential reformulation of
rational institutionalism. In this statement, there are three variables along which
cooperation problems - and institutional solutions - vary: payoff structure, shadow of the
future, and number of parties (Oye 1985). The variable 'payoff structure’ rests largely on
the typology of games described by Stem (1983). Shadow of the future refers to parties'
(expectation of) continued interactions. This is significant because repeated interactions
make possible strategies of reciprocity, and reduce uncertainty through reputational
effects (Oye 1985, 14). Finally, and most directly relevant for the "rational design”
approach, the third variable concerns the consequences for cooperation of multiple
parties. Building on earlier work by Olson ( 1965; 1971) and Russett and Sullivan ( 1971 ),
Oye ( 1985, 18) argues that “the prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of
significant actors rises.” This is true for three reasons. First, owing to the heterogeneity
of state interests, the probability of fully common interests (i.e., harmony) decreases as
the number of parties increases. Second, as the number of parties increases, so too does
the probability that one or more parties will have a relatively small shadow of the future
with respect to the issue under negotiation, further hampering cooperation. Third, as the
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number of parties increases, strategies of reciprocity become more complicated, and
enforcement problems (e.g., free riding) become more salient (Oye 1985, 18-20).
Various institutional design strategies are available for dealing with these three
issues. States may alter payoff structures by increasing the scope of cooperation through
issue-linkage. Likewise, issue-linkage may be used also to lengthen states’ shadow of the
future. Finally, if the number of parties inhibits cooperation, states may restrict
participation or decompose problems to decrease the number of parties relevant to a
given negotiation (Oye 1985, 9-20).
From the Game Theory of International Politics to Rational Design
A number of factors led rational institutionalist scholars to move away from the
use of typologies of cooperation problems, common to the earlier literature, and toward
the disaggregation of individual mechanisms and formation of specific, testable
hypotheses concerning institutional design. Two are particularly relevant to the present
discussion. The first was increasing dissatisfaction with the use of games as a metaphor
for international cooperation. The second involved the identification of important
interaction effects among structural variables, which threatened conventional
understandings of key concepts such as ‘coordination’ and ‘the shadow of the future'.
Early on, scholars warned of the dangers of facile application of game models to
international politics (e.g., Snyder and Diesing 1977). According to this criticism,
reliance on metaphors drawn from game theoretic concepts (e.g.. Prisoners’ Dilemma,
Stag Flunt, Chicken, etc.) inappropriately shift focus away from empirical puzzles in
international relations.
We do not improve a metaphor simply by translating it into a game matrix. Glib
assertions that “Issue Vis Prisoners’ Dilemma,” or that the “Cuban Missile Crisis
was a game of Chicken,” efficiently convey a metaphor, but do not make the
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metaphor more plausible or take much advantage of the power of game theory.
Typically, such statements simply restate what we already know . . . Real rigor
requires tightening the correspondence between the metaphor and the issue at
hand(Snidal 1985b, 30).
All too often in practice, scholars proceeded from game theoretic metaphor first, without
paying close enough attention to empirical matters, Smdal (1985b, 40-41 ) points out that
“what has happened cannot serve as an explanation of why it happened. Simple-minded
uses of the ‘revealed preference’ approach , , . lead to circular reasoning from the choices
made by actors back to their preferences.” Ultimately, however, the difficulty was that
games were difficult to apply in anything other than a metaphorical manner. Writing
fifteen years later, Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin observed that the primary difficulty
with this method of analysis “lies in accurate ex ante specification of games. Empirical
researchers wanting to test functional explanations often find it difficult to determine
precisely what games are being played without observing the outcome of state
interaction” (Simmons and Martin 2002, 196).
The second problem is that simple game models obscure the actual range of
choices available to states in negotiating agreements. For example, the single, optimal
solution portrayed by a Prisoners’ Dilemma game simply does not accord with actual
negotiating practice (Koremenos, Lipson, and Smdal 2001a). The simplifying
assumptions of earlier game theoretic models also obscure interactions among key
variables. First, many ‘benign’ coordination problems actually entail significant
distributional conflict. As Stein (1983) observed, the fact that states share a least favored
outcome does not mean that they will agree on a specific, favored outcome. Although
rational institutionalism traditionally has not identified power as a significant explanatory
variable, empirical analyses of such distribution problems have shown that they may be
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very relevant to explaining institutional outcomes under such circumstances (Krasner
1991). Similarly, rational institutionalists traditionally have assumed that a sufficiently
long shadow of the future is necessary to sustain cooperation (Oye 1985). Yet, longer
agreements - especially those involving enforcement mechanisms - often spur
distributional conflict over the initial terms of an agreement. Thus, a longer shadow of
the future is not a reliable indicator of successful cooperation (Harris and Holmstron
1987; Fearon 1998; Koremenos 2005a).
As a result of these difficulties, current scholarship has shifted away from the use
of general models of cooperation in favor of disaggregated variable-based explanations.
The “legalization” research program, for example, focuses attention on the factors
influencing three specific variables of international agreements: obligation, precision, and
delegation (Goldstein et al 2000). Shortly afterwards, the “rational design” research
program introduced a highly disaggregated, variable-based framework for studying the
design and form of international institutions (Koremenos et al 2001a). The authors of the
“rational design project explicitly acknowledge the shortcomings of prior game-theoretic
approaches.
Unfortunately, such general models of international institutions are well beyond
the reach of current 1R scholarship. Our initial conjectures were guided by
tightly derived models. But those tended to be partial models of fairly specific
circumstances that we had to adapt in a looser fashion to “derive” more general
predictions about international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal
2001b).
Accordingly, the rational design research program proceeded by identifying the
explanatory variables behind earlier game theoretic work on international institutions,
and hypothesizing the independent effects of each on the design of international
institutions.
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The Rational Design of International Institutions
The “Rational Design of International Institutions” project (Koremenos et al
2001a; 2001b; Koremenos and Snidal 2003) represents a state of the art in rational choice
institutionalism. The scholars working on the rational design project start from a basic
rational choice presumption that states use international institutions to further their own
goals, and they design them accordingly (Koremenos et al 2001a, 762). They observe
that existing international institutions vary greatly along a number of dimensions,
including: size of membership and membership criteria, scope of the substantive issues
that they address, internal decision-making procedures, extent of centralized authority
delegated to them by member states, and the extent to which they possess formal
organizational structure (Koremenos et al 2001a). The key independent variables
identified by this research program include the presence of distribution problems, the
presence of enforcement problems, the number of actors involved in negotiations, the
degree of asymmetry among them, and the presence of uncertainty (concerning
preferences, policy effects, and the state of the world) (Koremenos et al 2001a). Drawing
on prior neohberal institutionalist research on institutional design (cf. Conybeare 1984;
Keohane 1982, 1984; Martin 1992b, 1993; Olson 1965; Snidal 1985a, 1985b; Stein 1983,
1990), the rational design project presents sixteen “conjectures,” (Koremenos et al 2001a,
797) which are listed below in Table 2. 1
.
To date, very few empirical tests of these conjectures have been conducted. Even
the most comprehensive of these remains very preliminary: the “rational design” special
issue of International Organization included eight case studies that touched on several of
the hypotheses listed above. Based on these cases, the authors claimed to have found
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strong, though not complete, support for the majority of their conjectures (Koremenos et
al 2001b). More recently, Koremenos (2005a) has tested refined hypotheses concerning
the use of “sunset clauses” as a form of institutional flexibility, drawing on prior work by
Harris and Holmstrom (1987) on the duration of contracts. Nevertheless, empirical
evidence for the majority of rational design hypotheses remains scant.
Table 2.1 Rational Design Conjectures
Ml Restrictive MEMBERSHIP increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
M2 Restrictive MEMBERSHIP increases with uncertainty about (others’) preferences.
M3 MEMBERSHIP increases with the severity of the distribution problem.
5 1 SCOPE increases with the number of relevant parties.
52 SCOPE increases with the severity of the distribution problem.
53 SCOPE increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
Cl CENTRALIZATION increases with uncertainty about (others’) behavior.
C2 CENTRALIZATION increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
C3 CENTRALIZATION increases with the number of relevant parties.
C4 CENTRALIZATION increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
V 1 Individual CONTROL decreases with the number of relevant parties.
V2 Asymmetry of CONTROL increases with asymmetry of parties.
V3 CONTROL increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
FI FLEXIBILITY increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
F2 FLEXIBILITY increases with the severity of the distribution problem.
F3 FLEXIBILITY decreases with the number of relevant parties.
In addition to limited empirical testing, the rational design project suffers from a
number of theoretical blind spots, and has been criticized from a number of directions
(Wendt 2001; Duffield 2003; Pierson 2004). Its variables are chosen entirely from the
canon of neohberal institutionalism. The project does not take account of the possible
role of power asymmetry as an explanatory variable in institutional design (cf Gruber
2000). Likewise, it does not adequately account for the possible explanatory power of
norms or ideas (Duffield 2003). Finally, its reliance on correlative evidence prevents it
from explaining causal mechanisms, and thus from distinguishing rival explanations with
similar expectations (Thompson 2005).
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Assessment
Most of the rational design project’s limitations follow from shortcomings in its
research design. These limitations can be grouped into three general categories: ( 1
)
failure to theorize possible interactions between the independent variables used. (2) poor
case selection, and (3) failure to engage alternative explanations in any systematic
manner.
The rational design project’s nearly exclusive focus on bivariate relationships
constitutes a significant limitation of the approach. The authors of the rational design
project admit the possibility of significant interactions among their independent variables
and acknowledge that because problem structures may permit multiple ‘rational’
institutional solutions, it is difficult for them to specify ex ante which specific solution
will be selected (Koremenos et al 2001a). The project’s authors recognize this
shortcoming, and propose that it be addressed by future work (Koremenos et al 2001a).
The case selection produced four further limitations of the rational design project,
First, some of the cases are primarily formal extensions of rational design hypotheses,
rather than empirical tests of rational design hypotheses. A second, more severe,
limitation derives from the near-exclusive focus on institutions regulating international
trade. These may be sufficiently distinctive that it is difficult to make valid
generalizations about institutions in other issue areas (e.g., security institutions,
environmental institutions). Third, because much of the authors’ previous research has
focused on the institutional management of international trade, it is legitimate to worry
that the rational design project has tested its hypotheses on many of the same cases used
to generate them in the first instance. Fourth, the rational design project did not consider
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a number of cases sufficient to test all of their proposed hypotheses. Indeed, the rational
design project's empirical test was completely silent regarding one of their most central
hypotheses (S2: SCOPE increases with NUMBER).
Finally, although one may sympathize with the project’s desire to avoid a “three-
cornered fight” (e.g., between realism, liberalism, and constructivism), the rational design
project’s exclusive focus on neoliberal, rational choice hypotheses limits its analysis. It
can test for the presence of certain, specified (rational, functional) hypotheses in a
number of cases, but it is unable to engage alternative explanations in anything beyond an
ad hoc fashion In fact, it may be the case that institutional design is conducted within
parameters set by normative/ideational and power-based factors (Duffield 2003).
Therefore, any truly persuasive account of institutional design must take account of the
possible influence of state power, as well as the power of shared norms and beliefs, on
the design of international institutions and agreements.
Realism
Realist scholars challenge rational institutionalists’ belief that such institutions
may permit states to overcome the security concerns intrinsic to an anarchic international
system that, in their view, strongly favors self-help. They do not deny the existence of
cooperation in global politics. As Gneco explains, “scholars in the realist tradition have
long recognized that cooperation is an important feature of world politics.” (Grieco 1993,
729). Rather, they challenge rational institutionalists’ understanding of the nature of
international cooperation and institutions. Early realist work on institutions focused on
the existence of institutions as a product of hegemony (Gilpin 1971, 1975, 1981;
Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976, 1985, 1991). This focus was later broadened to
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include the effects that the security dilemma has on cooperation (Jervis 1978; Van Evera
1985), economic cooperation inspired by military alliances (Gowa 1989), the effects of
changes in the balance-of-power on chances for international cooperation (Mearsheimer
1990), power balancing and military alliances (Aron 1973, Mogenthau 1948; Snyder
1990; Walt 1987, 1988). More recently, realists have engaged institutionalists on their
own turf, arguing that institutions are created for functional reasons, but to further power
politics rather than efficient exchange (Drezner 2007; Gruber 2000).
John Mearsheimer summarizes contemporary realists’ position on the
effectiveness of institutions;
institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers.
For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily
on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably
reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have
significant independent effects on state behavior. However, realists recognize
that great powers sometimes find institutions - especially alliances - useful for
maintaining or even increasing their share of world power ( 1995, 82)
It is from this vantage point that realists derive their understandings of institutional
creation, design, and function. Realist theories of institutional design and function include
hegemonic stability theory, research on how relative gains concerns shape and constrain
cooperation, and the strategic use of institutions for coercion - all of which offer
alternatives to the rational institutionalist theories described above.
Hegemonic stability theory
Hegemonic stability theorists argue that only a single predominant power (i.e., a
‘hegemon’) has the capacity and interest to provide international public goods
(Kindleberger 1973). When there is a power in the international system great enough to
supply an institution or public good completely by itself, it may do so. The function of
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institutions is to facilitate the hegemon’s distribution of such goods. Because
possibilities for genuine cooperation are limited, when there is not hegemony institutions
will not exist. They can only be sustained through hegemonic imposition.
Most current studies using the hegemonic stability hypothesis separate benign and
coercive hegemons (Ikenberry 2004; Miller 2000; Gruber 2000). The notion of benign
hegemony, developed from the work of Kindleberger (1973), explains that hegemons,
pursuing their own interest, establish institutions which benefit all members of the
international community. A benign hegemon, “functioning as the dominant member of a
privileged group, supplies institutional arrangements to others as collective goods”
(Osherenko and Young 1993). As Haas summarizes:
The benign version, presented by Robert Keohane and Charles Kindleberger, is
based on a presumption that many cases of international cooperation are positive-
sum games, and that all states may benefit from cooperation, even though they
are leery about initially participating, out of fear of non-reciprocity. In this
benevolent view of leadership, the hegemon pursues its own long-term
objectives; however, because of the nature of the issue, all benefit from such
arrangements. (Haas 1990, 41 ).
A coercive hegemon, in contrast, “exercises structural power to impose institutional
arrangements favorable to itself, regardless of the consequences to others” (Osherenko
1993). In Krasner’s ( 1976) and Gilpin’s ( 1975, 1981, 1 987) expositions, hegemons take
advantage of their power in order to obtain short-term gains.
Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner , . . argue that because outcomes depend
entirely on the leadership of a dominant party and that party’s willingness to
compel other parties to comply, coordinated arrangements will occur in terms
favorable to that party. Coordinated policies will reflect the short-term interests
of the hegemon, rather than the more generous, longer-term ones proposed by
Keohane and Kindleberger (Haas 1990, 42).
It is difficult to derive specific expectations concerning institutional design from
the theory of hegemonic stability. Especially if the theory is interpreted as applicable to
particular hegemons at particular moments in international history, it is difficult to derive
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hypotheses concerning specific rules without ex ante specification of hegemonic
interests. Since specification of state interests lies outside the scope of this project, it is
necessary to be modest when inferring implications for institutional design. What can be
said is that some degree of interdependency is a necessary condition for hegemonic
creation of institutions. If a hegemon can achieve its ends fully through unilateral action,
it certainly will do so. If it cannot, the benefit of including other states is twofold. First,
although the hegemon ultimately will be responsible for maintaining the institution! s), it
may attempt to pass costs onto other states. Second, hegemonic creation of institutions to
provide public goods, such as a stable global economy, necessarily involve coordination
with other state governments. Therefore, one can expect that institutions of hegemonic
stability will incorporate inclusive membership rules.
Relative Gains: Extending Realism to Study International Institutions
Realists’ understanding of coercive or malign hegemons’ role in the zero-sum
game of international relations informs their later emphasis on the importance of relative
gains in institutional design, function, and participation. Joseph Gneco has played a
central role in developing realist approaches to institutional design and function.
Grieco contends that realists see the world fundamentally differently than do
institutionalists because they use a “thicker” sense of anarchy. Rational institutionalists’
understanding of anarchy is “thin,” focused on the lack of formal supranational authority
in international relations. Realists use a thicker sense of anarchy than do rational
institutionalists, emphasizing that the lack of supranational authority means states have
no form of recourse other than self-help to secure their survival and security. Thus, states
are acutely concerned with and highly attuned to their relative power in the international
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system, as this power is the only means by which they can achieve their national
interests. On the basis of their interpretation of international anarchy, realists have
developed two major propositions to oppose liberal understandings of international
cooperation (Gneco 1990, 4):
First, realists argue that states are preoccupied with their security and power; by
consequence, states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and they
often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests. Second, realists
claim that international institutions can mitigate the inhibitory effects of anarchy
on the willingness of states to cooperate only marginally (Grieco 1990, 4).
These propositions predict that cooperation will happen substantially less often than
liberals contend and with substantially less success in most issue-areas.
Relative Gains: A Realist Research Program on Institutions
Rational institutionalists claim that, even granting the realist assumption of
international anarchy, institutions could still exist and function to the mutual benefit of all
participants. At the crux of the debate was the issue of whether rational states’ self-
interest is understood in relative (realist) or absolute (institutionalist) terms. The sine qua
non of international relations for realists is power, and power is an inherently relational
concept. According to Grieco, “for realists, the emergence of the problem [with
cooperationj is predicated upon the prospect of gains that are unequal and lead to a
change in relative position among partners” (1993, 730).
Grieco characterized realist theories of institutional cooperation as understanding
states as “defensive positionalists” while liberals see states as “rational egoists” ( 1990.
28). He explains:
Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance.
However, realists do not believe that anarchy causes states to be rational egoists,
but instead to be defensive positionalists. Realists consequently argue that states,
in addition to their concerns about cheating, worry that their partners might gain
more than they from their joint endeavors (Grieco 1990, 28).
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According to Gneco, liberals underestimate the degree to which “states are
fundamentally concerned about their physical survival and their political independence”'
(Grieco 1990, 10). Concern for their survival leads states to defend their existence and
security first and treat all other concerns as secondary. Because of this, states are
concerned exclusively with relative gains. Grieco explains the logical link:
Defensive state positionalism, in turn, generates a relative-gains problem for
cooperation: a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its
commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise
mutually positive gains favor partners (Grieco 1990, 10).
“Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international
cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievement
of gains” (Grieco 1990, 28). Grieco contends that rational institutionalism ignores the
substantive content of anarchy (states’ fear for survival and relative power) in favor of the
procedural content of anarchy (the need to create governing structures for enforcement),
so is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter” (Grieco 1990, 28). As a result,
“from a logical viewpoint, realism offers a more complete understanding than
neoliberalism of the effects of anarchy on states and, by consequence, the problem of
international cooperation” (Grieco 1990, 29). “Hence, realists have argued that states
must overcome two barriers to cooperation; the problem of enforcement and the problem
of relative gains” (Grieco 1993, 729). Concern with these two barriers shapes realist
approaches to institutional design and function.
From Hegemonic Stability and Relative Gams to Realist Institutional Design
Realist hypotheses modify and compete with the specific suppositions of rational
institutionalists to varying degrees. Hegemonic stability theorists who characterize
hegemons as benign do not fundamentally challenge many institutionalist understandings
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of existing institutions, but they do claim that the creation of those institutions necessarily
requires the existence of a hegemon and that those institutions will incorporate inclusive
membership rules. Hegemonic stability theorists who characterize hegemons as coercive
expect that institutions will be designed to favor the hegemon’s interests, regardless of
consequences for other participating states. While it is impossible to predict the specific
content of these rules without the ex ante specification of hegemonic interests, it is fair to
claim that since coercive hegemons are instituting arrangements in their self-interest,
other, less powerful states will often lack an interest in complying with institutions
designed to favor the hegemon. Because less powerful states have less interest in
compliance, enforcement provisions will figure heavily in the design of international
institutions.
Relative gains theorists extend the challenge. Joseph Grieco advances several
direct realist alternatives to liberal hypotheses about institutional design. First, he
explains that all attempts at international cooperation are governed by "the need for self-
help sufficiency” which “leads states to value autonomy and independence” (Grieco
1993, 734). The concern for independence “causes states to be wary about cooperation
because they may become dependent on their partners” (Grieco 1993, 734). To the extent
that an institution is a threat to autonomy and security, states will not participate, This
concern hinders cooperation, except in situations where states see cooperation as
necessary to survival, such as alliances (Grieco 1993).
In addition to this overarching concern, realists put forth specific hypotheses
about the properties of institutional design. In answer to the liberal hypothesis that
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restrictive membership increases with severity of enforcement problems and the
uncertainty about preferences (Koremenos et al 2001a), realists hypothesize that if a state
is uncertain about which partners would do relatively better, the state will prefer
more partners, for larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that relative
gains advantaging (what turns out to be) better-positioned partners could be
offset by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with (as matters
develop) weaker partners” (Grieco 1990, 228).
Further, uncertainty about relative gams of participants decreases the likelihood that an
agreement will be reached at all. As Grieco explains, “uncertainty about one’s partners,
according to realists, is a vitally important cause of state concerns about relative gains.
Instead, the condition of insecurity - at least
,
the uncertainty ofeach about the other 's
future intentions and actions - works against their cooperation” ( 1 979, 1 05)” ( 1 993,
733).
In contrast to the institutionalist expectation that issue scope will increase with the
severity of the distribution or enforcement problem because of the potential of gams from
issue linkages and exchange (Koremenos 2001a), realists see issue linkage as a possible
threat to cooperation. According to Grieco:
Realism, again, offers a very different proposition. Assume that a state believes
that two issue-areas are linked, and that it believes that one element of this
linkage is that changes in relative capabilities in one domain affect relative
abilities in the other . . . the state would then believe that cooperation would
provide additional capabilities to the partner . in linked issue-areas.
Cooperation would therefore be unattractive to this state in direct proportion to
its belief that the two issue areas were interrelated (Grieco 1988a, 506).
In sum, realists believe that cooperative agreements employing issue linkage either
implicitly or explicitly increase the chance that a state’s counterparts may realize relative
gains. Therefore, agreements employing issue linkages are more difficult to conclude and
international cooperation will tend to be narrow.
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Finally, in contrast to the liberal hypothesis that fear of cheating is mitigated by
iterative, longer-term arrangements, realists propose that “if two states are worried or
uncertain about the relative achievement of gains, then each will prefer a less durable
cooperate arrangement, for each would want to be more readily able to exit from the
arrangement if gaps in gains did come in favor of the other” (Grieco 1988a, 510). To the
extend that longer-term agreements are reached, realists expect that their design will
emphasize flexibility arrangements, including periodic renegotiation, and, especially
escape clauses if states fear that others are going to obtain relative gains.
Although the “relative gains” debate featured prominently in international
relations theory in the late 1980s, into the 1990s, it has since been overtaken by a new
wave of realist scholarship, which has shifted focus away from macro-level theories of
cooperation toward more precise, middle-range mechanisms influencing cooperation,
mirroring recent developments in rational institutionalist theory. For example, Gruber
(2000) maintains the traditional realist emphasis on power-based explanations of
international politics. However, he moves beyond a strictly structural approach,
characteristic of much prior realist work in the field, to pay attention to the domestic
determinants of international politics.
Though this seems strikingly similar to liberal theory, which focuses on the
processes by which domestic interests inform foreign policy (e.g., Moravcsik 1997),
Gruber emphasizes the importance not of specific domestic interests but, rather, of power
distributions within states. In this view, the leaders of great powers create international
institutions not just to secure favorable international cooperation but also to bind their
domestic successors, who may have diverging preferences.
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Insofar as certain actors in the international system have what I have termed go-
it-alone power, one should not be surprised to find these actors establishing
supranational governance structures for the express purpose of locking in or
“congealing” their distinctive tastes and preferences (Gruber 2000, 89).
If there is powerful domestic opposition to the proposed international cooperation, great
power leaders may select permissive amendment rules, to increase the probability that
successors with divergent preferences will continue to work within the original
institutional framework, rather than withdraw or dismantle it. Conversely, if such
opposition is absent, leaders will make arrangements more inflexible. For the same
reason, leaders may employ issue linkage to enlarge the domestic constituency for the
proposed regulation.
Although it is not possible to evaluate these hypotheses here - domestic politics
and preferences lie outside the scope of this study - it is possible to adapt them to the
international realm. In Gruber’s view, much international cooperation does not reflect
institutional bargaining (Young 1989a) but, rather, is imposed as afait accompli by an
“enacting coalition” with “go-it-alone” power (Gruber 2000, 6-7). Thus, even if less
powerful states would prefer not to cooperate, they nevertheless may choose to do so,
because they regard exclusion from great power institutions as worse. The international-
level variable in this hypothesis, clearly, is the degree to which the enacting coalition
possesses the power to impose institutional arrangements.
Extending Gruber’s analysis of domestic politics, one may infer that as the
number of states needed to impose an international institution increases, so too does the
likelihood of significant domestic opposition in at least one state. Therefore, larger
enacting coalitions will lead to institutional designs that favor issue linkage and
permissive amendment rules. This is the case because great powers seeking to impose
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cooperation on favorable terms will not form larger enacting coalitions than is necessary,
in order to maximize the benefits they receive from the agreement.
However, as Gruber (2000) concedes, not all international cooperation is
imposed. Picking up where Gruber’s analysis leaves off, other contemporary realists
have focused on the role of power in multilateral diplomacy. Drezner’s (2007) recent
research on the determinants of global regulatory outcomes is exemplary in this regard.
Drezner regards two variables as particularly important for understanding the institutional
form that a global regulatory will take: the divergence of interests among great powers,
and the divergence of interests between great powers and the other states whose
participation the great powers desire. High levels of conflict among great powers as well
as between great powers and other states will lead to “sham standards;” High levels of
conflict among great powers, with low conflict between great powers and other states will
lead to “rival standards;” low conflict among great powers and high conflict with other
states will produce “club standards;” finally, low conflict both among great powers and
between great powers and other states will lead to “harmonized standards” (Drezner
2007, 72).
These types of cooperation imply distinctive institutional forms. Sham standards
entail institutions with inclusive membership criteria, ambiguous rules, little delegation of
authority, and little or no use of monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. These are
designed primarily to address domestic audiences; they permit governments “to claim the
de )ure existence of regulatory coordination” when deeper cooperation is impossible or
undesirable. Rival standards are produced when the primary conflict of interest is among
great powers only, Under these conditions, great powers will design inclusive
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membership rules as they seek to expand their number of allies and, thus, their control
over policy. Drezner (2007, 80) points to the International Whaling Commission (after
1986) as an example of rival standards in international cooperation. Club standards,
which arise when great powers are united, but conflicts of interest exist with other,
smaller states, are similar to Gruber’s case of imposed cooperation. In these cases, “the
combined market size of a great power concert will induce most recalcitrant states into
shifting their standards” (Drezner 2007, 75). However, there will be a constant
temptation for the most disadvantaged states to defect from cooperation, creating a
“Prisoners’ Dilemma aspect [to] enforcement” (Drezner, 2007, 75). Therefore,
institutions created under these conditions will emphasize mechanisms for monitoring
and enforcement. Finally, harmonized standards are created when there is little conflict
of interest among any of the states. These require very little monitoring, enforcement, or
dispute resolution. On the other hand, such arrangements will set forth specific rules, and
will feature inclusive membership rules.
Assessment
Notwithstanding Koremenos’s (2005a) claim to the contrary, this section has
shown that it is possible to derive a number of specific realist hypotheses concerning
institutional design. Realist work on relative gams suggests that states will choose
inclusive membership rules when such concerns are salient. Moreover, realists’ concern
about the possibility of free riding suggests that states will choose strict conditions for
entry into force when enforcement concerns are present. Second, realists’ concern with
the preservation of state sovereignty suggests that there is little room for delegation in
multilateral agreements, although realists do expect states to delegate resources as
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necessary to support specific functions (e.g., monitoring) when enforcement problems are
salient. Finally, with respect to institutional flexibility, realists expect that agreements
imposed by a hegemon will permit little discretion in rule implementation, and will
include only modest flexibility mechanisms. Conversely, agreements created through
bargaining among roughly equal powers will feature higher levels of institutional
flexibility.
Constructivism
If realism emphasizes the importance of anarchy and power, while rational
institutionalism forefronts the strategic pursuit of material gains, constructivism focuses
on the influence of ideas and norms in global politics. Loosely, constructivism is a
theory of the social construction of the political world. Though there are many diverse
research programs in constructivist IR, “all strands of constructivism converge on an
ontology
>
that depicts the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful
structures and processes” (Adler 2002, 100).
Many IR scholars credit the introduction of a constructivist approach to
international relations to the work of Friedrich Kratochwil ( 1989) and Nicholas Onuf
(1989), and the popularization of constructivism to Alexander Wendt ( 1992). There is
some truth in this popular narrative about constructivism’s birth and development, but its
roots are much more diverse (Adler 2002) and can be seen in the earlier scholarship on
international cooperation, such as Karl Deutsch’s (1957) work on security communities
and Ernst Haas’ “neofunctionalist” approach to European integration (1958) and
international organization (1964).
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Constructivist Approaches to International Cooperation
As mentioned above, there are many distinctive research programs in IR that may
be described as ‘constructivist’, and it is beyond the scope of any single work to
incorporate all of these approaches. Therefore, this section highlights two that are
especially relevant for this study. The following section focuses on these approaches’
implications for institutional design.
Ernst Haas (2001, 26) has identified three main schools of constructivism in the
study of IR: “norms and culture” constructivism, “soft rationalist” constructivism, and
“systemic” constructivism. The ‘norms and culture’ school subsumes two strands of
theorizing. One examines the creation, spread, and explanatory power of intersubjective
norms in international politics (e.g.. Keck and Sikkink 1998); the other examines the
influence of global culture on international cooperation and institutional form (e.g.,
Meyer et al 1997). The ‘soft rationalist’ school agrees with rational institutionalism that
political actors act instrumentally to further their interests, but argues that such rationality
is always bounded. ‘Soft rationalist’ scholars go beyond rational institutionalists in at
least two ways. First, they explicitly theorize the source of interests (e.g., consensual
knowledge) rather than take them as given; second, they theorize processes by which
actors' interests change, such as by learning (Haas and Haas 1995). The ‘systemic’
school includes work that is predominantly state-centric, and that explains international
politics in terms of state identity (e.g., Wendt 1994). Finally, to the three schools of
constructivist theory identified by Haas, we can add a fourth: sociological
institutionalism. This approach pays particular attention to the ways in which
bureaucratic and organizational culture influences the behavior of international
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institutions. In comparison to rational institutionalism and realism, which treat
international institutions primarily (though not exclusively) as dependent variables (i.e.,
as outcomes of international politics), sociological institutionalism examines the power of
international institutions as agents in international politics (see, e.g., Barnett and
Finnemore 1999; 2004).
This study focuses on the ‘norms and culture’ approach and the ‘soft rationalist’
approach because they yield testable hypotheses concerning institutional design that are
compatible with the design of this project. In contrast, systemic constructivism requires
knowledge of state identities, which lie outside the framework of this study. Likewise,
although sociological institutionalists have generated many provocative hypotheses
concerning the behavior of international institutions, these are analytically distinct from
those central to this project. Recent applications of sociological institutionalism and
organization theory “systematically exclude questions of agency, interest, and power”
which are central to the problem of institutional design (Checkel 1998, 341 ).
Norms, Culture and Institutional Design
As described above, the ‘norms and culture’ school of constructivism subsumes
two separate strands of theorizing. One focuses attention on the power of intersubjective
norms to shape institutional outcomes. The other focuses on the power of culture to
shape political institutions.
Norms of Multilateralism
One ‘norm and culture' approach is Ruggie’s (1993b) account of multilateralism
as a form of cooperation based on certain principles of ordering relations among those
states. These principles “specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions without regard
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to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in
any specific occurrence” (Ruggie 1993b, 11). In practice this means that multilateral
arrangements will give all interested parties the opportunity to participate, that all
participating parties should benefit, and that multilateral decisions will be made using
consensus procedures (Ruggie 1993b, 11-14). To the extent that notions of
multilateralism have a decisive, constitutive influence on institutional design, institutions
will reflect general norms of universality, impartiality, and legitimacy.
World Culture
One research program within the ‘norms and culture’ school argues that world
culture is becoming increasingly globalized and, as a result, political institutions in
different cultural contexts are becoming increasingly homogenized. According to John
Meyer (2000, 233-4), “globalization means the expanded flow of instrumental culture
around the world. Put simply, common models of social order become authoritative in
many difference social settings.” Without the prior specification of the substantie content
of ‘world culture', this argument does not yield specific, testable hypotheses concerning
the form of specific institutions. However, if this claim is correct, it does follow that one
should expect to see an ever-increasing degree of isomorphism among international
institutions and agreements.
Learning and Institutional Design
Constructivists who emphasize the significance of social learning provide another
source for hypotheses concerning institutional design. As Haas and Haas define it,
“learning is a political process whereby ‘consensual knowledge’ is applied by
policymakers to change their policy projects” ( 1 995, 259), To the extent that
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policymakers view learning as necessary, they will value design characteristics conducive
to learning. We may derive hypotheses for institutional design by employing a
functionalist logic for organizational learning and institutional design. As Haas and Haas
describe.
Learning by and in the 10 is not possible unless there is an unimpeded flow of
ideas and information ‘upwards’ from universities, think tanks, national
bureaucracies, and advocacy groups. Such groups serve as an early warning
system of potential challenges to the organization as well as a conduit of new
responses. (Haas and Haas 1995, 263).
Because learning requires consensual knowledge, one would expect organizations
intended to be capable of learning to exhibit design characteristics conducive to
developing consensual knowledge. Specifically, one would expect institutions to have
open membership rules, and consensual decision making processes. One would expect a
level of delegation sufficient to support the information gathering functions necessary to
support knowledge development. Finally, other things equal, one would expect
institutionalized agreements in a learning environment to exhibit a scope based on the
complexity of the issue being governed.
The literature on social learning also directs our attention to the significance of
crises in triggering learning processes. Specifically, the perception of crisis by political
leaders and negotiators is important because such events help to produce what Kingdon
(1984, 203) has termed “policy windows" that facilitate getting an issue onto the
international agenda. It also is important in driving policymakers' demand for
information in formulating a response to the crisis. Thus, by influencing the international
agenda, focusing policymakers’ attention, and driving demand for information, crises
play a central role in learning processes. As Peter Haas (2001, 11581) describes:
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New ideas will be solicited and selected only after crises, for crises will alert
politicians to the need for action and , . . about their interests and options. Crises
will trigger agenda setting and the search for new information.
Thus, in addition to paying attention to the presence of consensual policy knowledge - or
uncertainty - this study will take account of the role of crises in driving learning
processes.
Assessment
This section has described four broad approaches to constructivism in the study of
IR, two of which are particularly relevant to this study. It then showed how those two
approaches contain hypotheses concerning the design of multilateral agreements and
institutions. First, it described the "norms and culture’ school of constructivism. This
approach subsumes two research programs that yield general hypotheses concerning
institutional form and design. One examines the significance of the norm of
multilateralism; the other examines how the globalization of culture affects institutional
form.
The norm of multilateralism has several implications for the design of
international institutions. The commitment to “generalized principles of conduct”
characteristic of multilateralism entails "‘an indivisibility among the members of a
collectivity” (Ruggie 1993b, 1 1 ). Based on this, we should expect that multilateralism
entails norms of non-exclusion and impartiality, and accordingly that multilateral
agreements will feature inclusive membership rules, and equality of participation with
respect parties’ control over the agreement or institution.
The ‘world culture' approach, by contrast, does not yield general hypotheses
concerning specific design features (e.g., membership rules). However, it does expect
that increasingly globalized cultures will produce increasingly similar institutions. Over
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time, then, this approach expects to find increasing isomorphism among multilateral
agreements.
Finally, the ‘soft rationalist’ school directs attention away from full instrumental
rationality, toward the significance of uncertainty and knowledge in actors’ calculation of
interests. It also directs attention to specific processes and mechanisms by which these
preferences may change. Key explanatory variables here include, among others, the
existence of a shared perception of crisis, presence of epistemic communities and their
access to negotiators and political leaders.
Conclusion: Evaluating Theories of Institutional Design
This chapter has described the intellectual development of contemporary
theoretical accounts of international cooperation, with particular focus on institutional
design. It examined three approaches - rational institutionalism, realism, and
constructivism - and explained how each of these approaches may yield different
predictions concerning the design and form of MEAs.
Each theoretical approach provides different predictions concerning the design
and form of MEAs, but these predictions are not taken here to be exclusive. Rational
institutionalist approaches expect interest-based bargaining aimed at absolute gains.
Realist considerations expect interest-centered negotiation aimed at positionality and
relative gains. Constructivist approaches predict that institutional design will be reliant
on questions of intersubjective norms and knowledge. Chapter 3 constructs specific
hypotheses based on these varying expectations. Given the complexity of global political
situations, it is possible and even likely that all approaches have something to contribute
to institutional design or that different approaches better explain different aspects of the
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design and form of MEAs. Given this possibility, this study tests the relevant hypotheses
individually as well as in their function as representatives of their respective theoretical
approaches. It hopes to construct a model of the relevant influences on institutional
design coming from each approach, or spanning across approaches.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING MEAS:
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS
This chapter proceeds in four stages. The first describes the three dependent
variables emphasized in this study - membership, delegation, and flexibility - as well as
the several manifest indicators used for each. It also summarizes the hypotheses, drawn
from realist, institutionalist, and constructivist literatures, which correspond to each
dependent variable. The second sets forth the five explanatory variables used in this
study, and describes the specific indicators used for each of them. The third section
describes the data that were used to test these hypotheses, which were partly derived from
the International Regimes Database (IRD), and partly coded by the author. Finally, the
fourth section reviews the specific methods and procedures used in this study to evaluate
hypotheses on institutional design in light of the empirical evidence described in this
chapter. Appendix 1 provides specific information on the data source for each indicator
and indicates whether data regarding the indicator was drawn from the International
Regimes Database (IRD) or another source.
Dependent Variables
Analysts of institutional design have identified a number of dependent variables
along which international agreements and institutions vary. For example, Koremenos et
al (2001a, 763) identify ‘"membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of
tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements.” Kal Raustiala
(2005, 581 ) focuses attention on the “legality,” “substance,” and “structure” of
agreements.
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Given that it simply is not possible for any single study to examine every
potentially interesting aspect of institutional design, this study focuses on the following
three elements of institutional form: membership, delegation, and flexibility. These three
were selected because they relate to the aspects of institutional form over which
negotiators have enough control to engage in strategic design of international agreements
in response to specific problems, and thus much of the theoretically interesting variation
in the design of MEAs.
Membership
Some of the most fundamental decisions in designing a multilateral environmental
agreement concern whether or not the agreement should be multilateral, and if so what
states should be included. Negotiators who choose to develop a multilateral agreement
face the question of whether to include any state desiring to participate or to restrict
membership to states that meet certain criteria. Geography provides one such criterion:
multilateral environmental agreements can be specific to a local resource (e.g., the Rhine
River Convention and agreements), a regional one (e.g. the several Baltic Sea
agreements), or be open to all because they deal with a global resource (e.g., the
Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change).
Yet it would be a mistake to claim that the scope of membership in multilateral
environmental agreements follows directly from the scope of the issue being addressed
Some agreements are open to states that are neither directly responsible for, nor victims
of, the environmental problem at hand The United States, for example, is a party to the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) despite not being a
victim of European acid rain Likewise, membership in the International Whaling
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Commission is open to non-whaling states. Participation in other agreements, such as the
1959 Antarctic Treaty, is more restricted.
In fact, membership criteria in multilateral environmental agreements vary
significantly along a number of dimensions. Participation in multilateral agreements can
be open or restricted. Agreements that restrict membership do so on a variety of grounds.
Some restrict membership only to “relevant” states, by some definition. Others restrict
membership on geographic, political, or economic grounds. Some agreements are
restricted to original contracting states, while others permit states to accede at a later date.
Some agreements establish different categories of membership. Agreements may require
universal ratification to enter into force, or they may establish an alternate minimum
threshold of participation. In summary, the variable ‘membership’ captures whether an
agreement is universal or whether participation is restricted; by what criteria membership
is restricted; and the conditions for an agreement’s entry into legal force membership
concerns.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Membership
Rational institutionalists accord primary significance to enforcement problems in
explaining variation in membership criteria. They agree that if enforcement is
problematic, negotiators must find some way to restrict an agreement's benefits to
members of the agreement if states are to have any incentive to participate. As Mancur
Olson ( 1965, 16) puts it, “large organizations that are not able to make membership
compulsory must also provide some noncollective goods in order to give potential
members an incentive to join.” Similarly, Koremenos et al (2001a. 23) draw from the
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economic literature on “club goods” to support their claim that the likelihood of
restrictive membership increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.”
There are a few difficulties in applying this expectation to multilateral
environmental agreements, however. Trade regimes and military alliances provide types
of benefits that nonmembers can be excluded from receiving. In contrast, many
environmental goods are not easily excludable. Though different parties may accord
different significance to the issues of biodiversity loss and climate change, it is not
possible to design agreements that would exclude nonmembers from enjoying the
benefits of stable climate or biodiversity.
One way to resolve the analytic difficulty presented by the public nature of many
environmental problems is to control for problem type when evaluating the hypothesis
that use of selective membership criteria in multilateral environmental agreements
increases with the salience of enforcement problems. This study classifies multilateral
environmental agreements according to the type of collective good that they address:
public goods, common pool resources, or shared natural resources (Breitmeier et al 2006;
see also Barkin and Shambaugh 1999 and Sandler 2004). Unfortunately, collective goods
type alone does not provide enough information; the three types include non-excludable
as well as excludable goods. Therefore, this study focuses on whether or not a
multilateral agreement specifically provides excludable individualized benefits (e g.
technological or financial transfers).
The first rational institutionalist hypothesis is:
• IM 1 . Negotiators facing enforcement problems will provide excludable benefits
only when also employing restrictive membership criteria
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This dynamic is present in agreements establishing military alliances, which provide an
excludable good (security) and restrict benefits to members.
It would be misleading, however, simply to claim that restrictive membership will
correlate positively with enforcement problems. Rather, rational institutionalism is
agnostic about the use of restrictive membership absent enforcement problems; there is
no particular reason to believe that the absence of enforcement problems, by itself, causes
negotiators to select inclusive membership criteria.
Enforcement Problems and Entry into Force
Rational institutionalists agree with realists that entry into force conditions are an
important feature of multilateral agreements. However, they relax the Realist assumption
that states will respond to enforcement problems and relative gains concerns by requiring
universal - or nearly universal - participation. Rather, institutionalists see a potential for
entry into force conditions to serve as a “tipping point” in multilateral environmental
cooperation. Scott Barrett (2003, 260) provides a clear statement of this process:
The way to do this is to require . . . the agreement to come into force only if a
minimum number of countries has ratified the agreement; otherwise, signatories
may act as they please. This way, becoming a signatory to the treaty becomes a
(weakly) dominant strategy for every country; a country cannot lose by signing,
but it will gam provided enough others sign . ,
.
[OJnce enough others sign, it will
be in the interests of every country to sign. A kind of bandwagon will have been
created.
States that would like to ratify an agreement and participate - but only if enough others
do as well - are thus free to do so. They are assured that they will not have to comply
with the agreement until it enters into legal force, and that the agreement will not enter
into force until a sufficient number of states have ratified This insight yields the second
rational institutionalist hypothesis and its different emphasis than the Realist counterpart.
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• IM2. When facing enforcement problems, negotiators will set
specific conditions for entry into force, and states will not promise
to comply with an agreement prior to its entry into legal force.
Given enforcement problems, states will not promise to act prior to entry into force.
Rather, they will agree to participate in an agreement only if they are protected from
unreciprocated cooperation by a meaningful minimum participation threshold, expressed
as a condition for entry into force.
Realist Hypotheses on Membership
Realist hypotheses concerning the role of membership criteria in the design of
multilateral environmental agreements center on the problems of relative gains in
international cooperation, and the problem of free riding (Grieco 1990, 28).
Relative Gains
While both the power-maximizing (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001 ) and the defensive
positionalist positions (e.g.. Waltz 1979; Grieco 1993) are consistent with a concern for
relative gains, the claim that membership criteria can mitigate relative gains problems is
associated primarily with the latter. Whereas offensive realists understand relative gains
to be states’ paramount concern, defensive positionalists understand relative gains more
as a dampening influence on international cooperation. Defensive positionalists thus
acknowledge that states pursue other goals as relative gains concerns permit.
The strategic use of membership criteria offers one way for states to mitigate
relative gains concerns and successfully conclude multilateral agreements. In general,
the more states that are members of an agreement, the more widely the benefits of an
agreement will be spread The more widely that an agreement distributes benefits, the
less likely it is that there will be meaningful differences between individual states’ shares
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Thus, by distributing gains broadly, inclusive membership criteria may mitigate the
dampening influence of relative gains concerns on international cooperation. However,
rational, power-seeking states will not wish to distribute benefits more widely than is
necessary to permit cooperation. The first hypothesis derived from realist theory can be
expressed:
• RM 1 . Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in response to
distributional concerns.
Free Riding
The second barrier to international cooperation that Realists emphasize is the
problem of free riding. The most direct way for negotiators to resolve this problem is to
include strong monitoring and enforcement provisions in a multilateral agreement.
However Realists believe that such solutions simply shift the problem for two reasons.
First, to the extent that it is costly for some states to “punish” others, there may be a
similar enforcement problem with respect to sanctioning. Second, intrusive enforcement
provisions trigger strong sovereignty concerns, which present an obstacle to reaching
cooperation in the first place. In response to this dilemma. Realists usually stress that the
substantive terms of multilateral agreements must be self-enforcing (Susskind 1994;
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Barrett 2003).
The strategic use of entry into force provisions offers an additional way for
contracting states to address concerns about cheating or free riding. Although Article 18
of the 1 969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires states that have signed a
treaty, or otherwise expressed their consent to be bound by it, “to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and puipose of the treaty” prior to its entry into force, it does not
oblige states actually to comply with a treaty’s provisions prior to its entry into legal
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force. By making entry into force conditional on ratification by specific parties, or a
specific number of parties, negotiators can mitigate relative gains concerns arising from
the possibility of free riding. This yields the second realist hypothesis concerning
membership.
• RM2. Agreements concluded in spite of relative gains concerns will use very
strict entry into force conditions.
As will be explained below, this claim is relevant for rational institutionalists as
well as defensive positionalists, like Grieco and Waltz. The difference is primarily one of
emphasis; defensive Realists would argue that agreements concluded against a
background of relative gains concerns will tend to require very high, if not universal,
participation. Rational institutionalists, who are concerned more with absolute gains, will
be less skeptical of lower - if still judicious - entry into force conditions.
Constructivist hypotheses on membership
One strand of recent constructivist research on international cooperation
emphasizes the significance of issue framing on agenda setting and policy choice (see, for
example, Schon and Rein 1994; Payne 2001; Fischer 2003). In this study, the indicator
‘SHOCKNEG’ captures the degree to which the negotiating agenda was driven by the
presence of external shocks and successful issue framing by nongovernmental actors, as
opposed to the instrumental interests of the negotiating parties.
This distinction reflects another line of constructivist research on institutions: the
contrast between rule-following and utility-maximizing contrast popularized especially
by March and Olsen ( 1989; 1996; 1998). The implication for this study is that the more
negotiations are driven by external shocks or perceptions of crisis, the more likely
institutional design is to follow a logic of appropriateness. Likewise, the more that
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negotiations are driven internally - i.e., they are driven largely by the instrumental
interests of negotiating states - the more likely institutional design is to follow a logic of
consequences. Specifically, when negotiators are responding to an external shock or a
perceived crisis, they will be significantly less likely to impose strict conditions on
membership or on an agreement’s entry into legal force. Rather, they will seek to
conclude and implement an “appropriate” agreement as soon as possible. This yields the
first constructivist hypothesis on membership.
• CM1 . Negotiators responding primarily to external shocks or perceived crises
will be less likely to choose restrictive membership or strict entry into force
conditions.
A second strand of research on international cooperation and international law
takes a dynamic view, exploring the implications of different institutional pathways to
cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2004). Constructivist accounts of international
cooperation, especially, have focused on the institutional benefits of the ‘convention-
protocol’ approach to international environmental law. In this model, negotiators seek to
include as many states as possible, as early as possible, to build the broadest possible
political support for future, more substantive policy making. Substantive policy
measures are negotiated separately, in protocols or amendments to the original
framework convention. Two well-known examples of the convention-protocol approach
are the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion and the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.
This convention-protocol strategy is especially appropriate for situations in which
scientific uncertainty and/or lack of political will forces negotiators to make tradeoffs
between scope of participation and depth of agreement When such tradeoffs are
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inevitable. Constructivists argue that maximizing early participation, at the expense of
agreement depth, is preferable to maximizing agreement depth at the expense of
participation. This is because the former approach permits normative socialization
among convention members, ideally paving the way for deeper cooperation in the future.
In contrast, emphasizing agreement depth before resolving uncertainty or distributional
concerns runs the risk of calcifying opponents’ understanding of their preferences, thus
hindering social learning as well as future attempts to broaden participation. This yields
the second constructivist hypothesis concerning membership.
• CM2. Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially (over depth of
cooperation, if necessary).
Hypotheses on the design of membership rules are summarized in Table 3.
1
Table 3.1 Hypotheses Concerning Membership
Source Theory Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
IM1 Negotiators facing enforcement problems will restrict
membership when providing excludable benefits.
Rational
Institutionalism
IM2 When confronted with enforcement problems, negotiators
will set specific conditions for entry into force, and will not
require states to promise to comply with an agreement
prior to its entry into legal force.
Realism RM1 Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in
response to distributional concerns.
Realism RM2 Agreements concluded in spite of relative gains concerns
will use very strict entry into force conditions.
Constructivism CM 1 Negotiators responding to perceived crises will be less
likely to restrict membership or use strict entry into force
conditions.
Constructivism CM2 Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially
(over depth of cooperation, if necessary).
59
Operationalizing Membership
Membership rules are fundamentally related to the issue of participation in
international cooperation. Negotiators can use membership criteria strategically in two
primary ways when designing multilateral environmental agreements. First, membership
criteria can be used to enlarge or restrict the set of states that are eligible to participate in
the agreement. Second, negotiators can select a minimum level of participation necessary
for an agreement to enter into legal force. Table 3.2 shows the indicators used to
represent each of these dimensions of membership.
Table 3.2 Indicators ofMembership
Indicator Measurement Description
MEMCRIT Nominal What criteria govern eligibility for membership?
(e.g., geographic, economic, political, etc.)
RESTRICT Dichotomous
(0-1)
Is membership in an agreement restricted?
(yes/no)
ELIGIBLE Ratio How many states are eligible for membership9
NRATIFY Ratio How many states must ratify an agreement for it to enter
into legal force?
PCTRATIF Ratio What percentage state parties must ratify an agreement
for it to enter into legal force?
EIFCOND Dichotomous
(0-1)
In addition to a minimum number of ratifications, does
the agreement include substantive conditions for entry
into force? (yes/no)
ACTEARLY Dichotomous
(0-1)
Did states promise to comply with an agreement prior to
its entry into legal force? (yes/no)
BENEXCLU Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement provide excludable benefits?
(yes/no)
NSTNEGOT Ratio How many states actively participated in the negotiation
of the agreement?
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The first three indicators correspond to membership criteria. MEMCRIT is a
nominal measure of the conditions for membership in multilateral environmental
agreements (e.g., geographic location, activity in regulated issue area, or unrestricted).
RESTRICT is a dichotomous indicator that reflects whether membership in an agreement
is restricted. ELIGIBLE estimates the number of states that meet the criteria for
membership in an agreement.
The next four indictors correspond to criteria for entry into force. NRATIFY
indicates in absolute terms the number of ratifications necessary for an agreement to enter
into force. PCTRATIF expresses this threshold as the proportion of negotiating states
whose ratification is needed for an agreement to enter into force. EIFCOND indicates
whether additional criteria must be met, beyond a minimum number of ratifications, for
an agreement to enter into force. Finally, ACTEARLY is a dichotomous indictor that
reflects whether states promised to comply with agreement rules prior to entry into force.
The last two indicators are included because they are necessary to evaluate
specific hypotheses concerning membership. BENEXCLU is a dichotomous indicator
that reflects whether an agreement provides potentially excludable benefits.
NSTNEGOT simply reflects the number of states actively participating in the negotiation
of an agreement. It is vital for the standardization of measurements across different
agreements. For example, it is impossible to judge the ‘strictness’ of an agreement's
entry into force conditions by considering only the total number of ratifications necessary
for entry into force. This study resolves this problem by using NSTNEGOT to control
for the number of potential members.
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Delegation
In this study delegation refers to the degree to which states negotiating a
multilateral agreement formally confer functional responsibilities, resources, and
programmatic authority on a third party - i.e., an intergovernmental organization, an
expert committee, a tribunal, or some entity other than another state. Although the
specific term is borrowed from the 2000 special issue of International Organization on
“Legalization and World Politics” (reprinted as Goldstein et al 2001 ), the underlying
concept has played a primary role in a number of published studies of institutional form.
Close analogues include the rational design project’s variable, “centralization”
(Koremenos et al 2001a), and the concept of agreement “structure” (Raustiala 2005, 605).
According to Abbott et al (2000, 1 7), “delegation means that third parties have
been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes;
and (possibly) to make further rules.” Among these, Abbott et al (2000, 32) identify two
dimensions of significant variation in delegation: dispute resolution and rule making.
The most highly delegated forms of dispute resolution involve creating or delegating to
formal judicial bodies (e.g., courts, tribunals, or other arbitral institutions) possessing
general jurisdiction over activities covered by an agreement, and binding decision making
power. Abbott et al (2000a, 32) list a number of other institutional forms, in order of
descending degrees of delegation:
• Establishment of formal courts possessing general jurisdiction and binding
decision making authority (highest delegation)
• Establishment of formal courts with limited, or strictly consensual
jurisdiction;
• Use of binding ad hoc arbitration;
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• Use of nonbinding arbitration;
• Provision of mediation services;
• Providing a forum for institutionalized bargaining;
• Pure political bargaining (least delegation)
Within the “legalization” framework advanced by Goldstein et al, delegation is
closely related to, and interacts with, “precision” (Abbott et al 2000a, 31 ). Vague and
indeterminate rules permit greater discretion in interpretation and application than do
specific and determinate ones. By itself, such imprecision reflects low legalization; states
remain free to interpret the very rules that were meant to govern them. Imprecise
agreements may nevertheless be highly legalized when the power to interpret rules is
delegated to a third party. While this study does not follow the legalization project in
considering precision as a “top-level” variable of institutional design, it will account for
precision as necessary to evaluate specific hypotheses concerning delegation - as it did
with membership
The second dimension of delegation described by Abbott et al (2000a, 32) is rule
making and implementation. Abbott et al (2000a, 32) summarize variation along this
dimension in descending order of delegation:
• Binding rules, with centralized enforcement provisions;
• Binding rules, with consensual enforcement and withdrawal provisions;
• Binding rules with decentralized enforcement;
• Coordination of standards;
• Monitoring and publicity of compliance;
• Confidential monitoring;
63
• Normative or aspirational statements;
• Forum for negotiating
In summary, delegation captures; (a) the extent to which the parties to a
multilateral agreement have transferred political authority to a third party, and (b) the
specific kind of political authority that they have transferred. Thus, the significance of
delegation for theories of international cooperation will follow, in large part, from those
theories’ understanding of the significance and power of state sovereignty to shape
institutional outcomes.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Delegation
Rational institutionalists consider multilateral agreements as contractual
arrangements between sovereign actors. Yet, as many rational institutionalists have
noted, multilateral treaties are necessarily incomplete contracts. It is never possible to
specify rules governing every possible circumstance that may arise, nor is it possible to
account fully for the impact of new knowledge in issue domains currently marked by
uncertainty. Since the international system remains formally anarchic - lacking any
central authority capable of securing participation in, and compliance with, a multilateral
agreement - any successful multilateral agreement must be self-enforcing. States can
never know with complete certainty the intentions and preferences of their counterparts,
further amplifying the challenge of designing multilateral contracts.
According to rational institutionalist theory, problems of incomplete contracting
can be mitigated in institutionalized settings. Thus, rational institutionalists generally
explain the existence and form of international institutions in terms of their functional
efficiency in mitigating contracting problems (e.g., Keohane 1984). They have identified
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a number of mechanisms by which delegation, in particular, is consequential for the
negotiation and operation of multilateral agreements. These mechanisms can be grouped
into two broad categories, according to their functional purpose: handling problems of
incomplete contracting (including enforcement problems) and reducing transaction costs.
Problems of Incomplete Contracting
One characteristic of incomplete contracting that is especially relevant to the
negotiation of multilateral agreements is the problem of non-simultaneous performance.
In rational institutionalist theory, this is the problem of 'credible commitments’. Abbott et
al (2000, 42) explain the credible commitment problem as occurring in situations where
“one party to an agreement must carry out its side of the bargain before other parties are
required to perform, or more generally when some parties must make relation-specific
investments in reliance on future performance by others.” Delegation of monitoring
powers and implementation review routines can mitigate this problem by reducing states'
uncertainty about whether their counterparts in a given agreement are, in fact, behaving
as promised. This yields the first hypothesis on delegation drawn from rational
institutionalist theory.
• ID 1 . Delegation increases with the severity of the enforcement problem
A second feature of incomplete contracts particularly relevant to multilateral
environmental agreements is the problem of substantive uncertainty - what Koremenos
Lipson and Smdal (2001a, 18) have termed “uncertainty about the state of the world.”
Substantive uncertainty often forces states to frame obligations vaguely, subject to
(re)interpretation as new knowledge becomes available. Furthermore, under conditions
of substantive uncertainty, states have an incentive to delegate resources to centralize
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information-gathering and distribution. Both of these mechanisms independently
support the following rational institutionalist hypothesis:
• ID2. Delegation increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
Under conditions of scientific uncertainty, states have an incentive first to delegate
power to (re)interpret rules in response to the development of new knowledge, and
second, to centralize information resources to facilitate the production and spread of
new knowledge. These theoretical expectations run in the same direction, and may
complement one another.
Reducing Transaction Costs
The second category of functional explanations for delegation in multilateral
agreements focuses on strategies to reduce transaction costs - costs specific to the
negotiation process itself. The term, “transaction cost” is not specific to any single
activity; a multiplicity of specific factors can be responsible for the expense of
negotiating and concluding a multilateral agreement. The simplest and most intuitive
source of transaction costs follows from the number of parties relevant to a given
negotiation. As the number of parties relevant to a given issue-area increases, states
find it increasingly difficult to successfully govern that issue through informal, ad hoc,
and/or bilateral agreements. Successful policy coordination is facilitated by the
creation and delegation of centralized bargaining fora This yields the third hypothesis
on delegation derived from rational institutionalist theory.
• 1D3. Delegation increases with the number of relevant parties.
Finally, transaction costs may be associated with the complexity of a given
issue-area As Pollack ( 1997, 104) explains, “institutions may be delegated
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authority to adopt regulations that are too complex to be considered and debated in
detail by the principals.” It may be more efficient for states to delegate rule making
authority to a third party than it would be to invest the resources necessary for direct
negotiation of rules in highly complex issue-areas.
One should not carry this line of argument too far, however. It does not follow
simply that delegation increases with complexity. Highly complex issues with clear
distributional conflicts, as is the case in the global climate change regime, may create
lower incentives for delegation Thus, a final rational institutionalist hypothesis on
delegation can be stated:
• ID4. When the salience of distributional conflict is low, delegation increases
with complexity.
Realist Hypotheses on Delegation
Maintaining sovereignty and autonomy is the sine qua non of any state’s foreign
policy for realist theories of international relations. States are the primary components of
the international system, and the fundamental goal of all states in world politics is to
secure their own well-being. Achieving security, in this sense, requires states to be ever
vigilant of threats to their sovereignty, since sovereignty is a constitutive element of the
state. Since delegation in multilateral agreements fundamentally challenges state
sovereignty, realists would expect to find generally low levels of delegation in
multilateral agreements. Absent a major, compelling justification, states simply will not
find it in their interests to yield sovereign control over policy. This logic yields the first,
and most primary, realist hypothesis concerning delegation:
• RD1 . Multilateral agreements in general will be characterized by no or very low
levels of delegation.
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In addition to its prevailing concern for the preservation of state sovereignty,
realist thought typically also pays close attention to the distribution of power in any given
political setting. For realist explanations of international relations, it matters greatly
whether a specific political system is dominated by a single actor (hegemon), or whether
there is a less hierarchical distribution of power.
If a hegemon is present during the negotiation of a multilateral agreement, realism
expects that the resulting institutional form will strongly reflect the hegemon’s interests.
There may still be significant delegation if it is in a hegemon’s interest. Realists expect
that agreements with high levels of delegation are characterized also by high levels of
precision because dominant states want to use international institutions as tools of
statecraft. By delimiting delegated authority within sharp confines, a dominant state
seeks to use a multilateral institution to “internationalize” its own preferred domestic
policy (DeSombre 2000).
When negotiations are driven by a number of smaller states, having grievance(s)
against a hegemon, realists doubt that any deep cooperation can occur. Any multilateral
agreement that is reached will be characterized by extremely low levels of delegation,
imprecise rules (the better for a strong, self-interested state to interpret according to its
own preferences), and sufficiently broad issue scope to permit the sort of payoffs from
weak states to the hegemon that are necessary to secure the latter’s participation (Mitchell
and Keilbach 2001 ). This yields the following realist hypothesis concerning delegation
under hegemony:
• RD2. Under hegemony, high levels of delegation will be strongly associated with
high levels of precision when a hegemon seeks to internationalize its own
domestic or foreign policy.
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Although a hegemon’s concern for sovereignty sharply constrains the use of delegation in
multilateral agreements, it is also a necessary condition for it. Realists assume that in the
absence of a dominant power, states’ overarching concern for their relative well-being
will prevent them from agreeing on any significant level of delegation in a multilateral
agreement.
Constructivist Hypotheses on Delegation
Constructivist analyses of the significance of institutions and institutional form in
international cooperation tend to ask different questions and, therefore, to seek different
answers than their rational institutionalist and realist counterparts. Constructivist studies
of institutional choice and development generally have sought to reach greater causal
depth than have their realist and institutionalist counterparts. However, if constructivist
accounts of international institutions have demonstrated a comparatively greater focus on
internal validity, they have also exhibited a relatively lower concern for external validity /
generalizability. This is hardly surprising; the notion that international relations are
governed by universal, generic rules that are independent of, and analytically prior to,
history, perception, intersubjective belief, or culture is anathema to most constructivists.
Indeed, for many constructivists, the relationship is just the opposite. Culture and
cognition precede instrumental rationality in what Legro (1996) has described as the
“international cooperation two-step.”
The following sections elaborate hypotheses concerning delegation in
multilateral agreements derived from recent constructivist work. However, it bears
noting that this study’s design refects an instrumentally rationalist approach to
explaining institutional form. Such an orientation is well suited for examining both
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realist and liberal hypotheses. However, it frames the issue of institutional form in such
a way that some constructivist hypotheses may gam only a partial purchase on the
question of design. Put differently, a self-consciously constructivist research design
would shun the sort of comparative statics approach used here in favor of a diachronic
one that allowed a greater role for history (at the expense, perhaps, of generalizability).
Legitimacy
The first constructivist hypothesis to be considered concerns the role of
legitimacy in institutional design. Here, legitimacy plays a similar role to that of
‘credibility' in rational institutionalist theory. According to one line of constructivist
work, legitimacy is conceived as a constitutive element of the broader, more generic
norm of multilateralism (Ruggie 1993b). The distinctive feature of multilateralism is
that it entails basing cooperation the consistent application of general rules to all
participants. Multilateralism, in this sense, entails a commitment to generalized rule
implementation; self-interested application of rules runs counter to the very meaning of
multilateralism. To the extent that the international agreements are negotiated
according to such a norm of multilateralism, one would expect to see generally high
levels of delegation - at least with respect to rule interpretation. On the other hand, this
argument does not necessarily entail the delegation of coercive enforcement powers.
This yields the following hypothesis concerning delegation:
• CD1 . Genuinely multilateral agreements will be characterized by generally high
levels of delegation with respect to rule interpretation and adjudication.
Knowledge
A second constructivist explanation of delegation in multilateral agreements
centers on the interplay between uncertainty and scientific knowledge in the
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international policy process. Although the epistennc community literature associates
policy-specific uncertainty with demand for expert knowledge, one cannot simply read
the presence of expert groups during multilateral negotiations as evidence that states are
seeking to delegate authority. Critics (e.g., Jasanoff 1 996) have noted that scientific
knowledge plays a much different role in cases where the political / distributional
consequences of various policy options are well-established - even if the cause(s) of
the underlying problem(s) remains shrouded in uncertainty. In such cases, expert
groups may be selected by parties to multilateral negotiations, not on the basis of
general qualifications but, rather, on the likelihood they will make specific politically-
favored policy recommendations. This yields the following hypothesis concerning
delegation in institutional design:
• C’D2. Delegation will increase when ( 1 ) expert groups participate in
negotiations by (2) supplying policy knowledge to state parties.
Hypotheses on institutional delegation are summarized below, in Table 3.8.
Operationalizinu Deleuation
Relevant indicators of delegation include whether or not a secretariat was
established and, if so, what degree of independence it enjoys from member states. Such
independence is a function not only of policy making authority but also revenue
stability.
The most basic indicator of delegation in an MEA is whether or not it
centralizes functional responsibilities in a secretariat There are various levels of
centralization of functional responsibilities. Other things equal, we can describe those
agreements that do not use any form of secretariat as demonstrating the lowest level of
delegation, those that delegate such responsibilities to an NGO or IGO as
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demonstrating greater delegation, and those that create new bodies for the specific
purpose of implementing an agreement as demonstrating the highest level of
delegation.
lable 3.3 Hypotheses Concerning Delegation
Source Theory Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
1D1 Delegation increases with the severity of the
enforcement problem.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID2 Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state of the world.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID3 Delegation increases with the number of
relevant parties.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID4 When the salience of distributional conflict is
low, delegation increases with complexity.
Realism RD1 Multilateral agreements in general will be
characterized by no or very low levels of
delegation.
Realism RD2 Under hegemony, high levels of delegation
will be strongly associated with high levels of
precision when a hegemon seeks to
internationalize its own domestic or foreign
policy.
Constructivism CD1 Genuinely multilateral agreements will be
characterized by generally high levels of
delegation with respect to rule interpretation
and adjudication.
Constructivism CD2 Delegation will increase when ( 1 ) expert
groups participate in negotiations by (2)
supplying policy knowledge to state parties.
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Centralization of functional responsibilities is only one representative measure,
however. Degree of delegation also varies within the specific functions delegated and
the capacity of the secretariat to implement or oversee programmatic activities.
Programmatic tasks typically include managing financial and/or technology transfers,
verification of compliance, monitoring, implementation review, research problem
causes and effects, and providing expert advice to member states.
The degree of delegation also varies with the capacity of the secretariat to
perform its tasks, and the independence it enjoys in making decisions. An agreement
may create an institution with broad programmatic responsibilities but fail to delegate
sufficient authority or capacity to serve these functions effectively. In addition, this
study examines the discretion delegated to agreement bodies to make policy decisions,
the source of funding for administrative and programmatic activities, and the degree to
which an agreement delegates authority to external bodies.
Table 3.4 lists the several indicators of delegation used in this study.
Table 3.4 Indicators of Delegation
Indicator Measurement Description
SECRETAR Nominal What type of secretariat did the agreement
establish (if any)?
SECINDEP Ordinal
(0-4)
How independent is the secretariat from
member states?
ADMNFUND Nominal How are administrative functions funded?
PROGFUND Nominal How are programmatic activities funded?
ENFORCE Ordinal
(0-2)
To what extent does the agreement adopt an
‘enforcement’ approach to rule compliance?
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Table 3.4 Indicators of Delegation (Cont’d)
Indicator Measurement Description
AGRSCOPE Ordinal
0-5)
Is the agreement narrow in terms of the scope
of issues it addresses?
AGRDEPTH Ordinal
0-5)
Is the agreement deep in terms of the substance
of its rules and obligations?
PROGRAMS Nominal What types of programmatic activities (if any)
does the agreement set forth?
MONPROB Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize monitoring of
problem causes and effects? (yes/no)
RESEARCH Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize research into a
problem’s causes and effects? (yes/no)
EXPERTAD Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement provide expert policy
advice to member states? (yes/no)
CMPLYMON Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize compliance
monitoring? (yes/no)
RVWIMPLM Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize implementation
review? (yes/no)
VERIFY Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize verification of
compliance? (yes/no)
FTXFER Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize the management
of financial/technological transfers? (yes/no)
REVWADEQ Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize review of
adequacy of commitments? (yes/no)
CLRNGHSE Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize problem-related
information? (yes/no)
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Flexibility
The explosive growth in the creation of multilateral environmental agreements
over the past thirty years suggests that states, and their agents, perceive definite benefits
to institutionalizing cooperation in formal international agreements. Analysts of
international cooperation and law typically point to credibility as a primary benefit of
formal agreements (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Lipson 1991). However, while credibility
of commitments helps sustain international cooperation by reducing states’ uncertainty
concerning other states’ behavior, it does not mitigate uncertainty about policy
consequences or the state of the world. It is possible that treaty-governed behavior may
produce outcomes different than those originally anticipated. New knowledge might lead
a party to reassess policy preferences. Therefore, in addition to making commitments
credible, negotiators of multilateral environmental agreements also have a fundamental
interest in preserving sufficient flexibility to deal with future contingencies. This section
discusses different theoretical explanations for the selection of flexibility provisions in
multilateral environmental agreements.
Contemporary multilateral environmental agreements respond to flexibility
concerns in a number of ways. Following Duffield (2003) and Koremenos et al (2001a),
flexibility provisions may be conceptualized as falling into one of three categories:
adaptive
,
transformative
,
and interpretive. Table 3.5, below, summarizes the three
categories of flexibility provisions.
Adaptive flexibility provisions allow states to respond to future contingencies by
suspending participation in treaty-governed cooperative arrangements. Escape clauses
are the most significant form of adaptive flexibility. These mechanisms are used by
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individual states. Transformative flexibility, in contrast, encompasses provisions for
amending an agreement, periodic renegotiation of an agreement, and ‘sunset’ (limited-
duration) provisions. These mechanisms are exercised multilaterally. Finally,
negotiators can allow for interpretive flexibility. Interpretive flexibility encompasses
formal provisions, such as reservations and statements of interpretation. However,
negotiators may also provide flexibility indirectly, by specifying rules only at a very
general - or even vague - level, and granting individual states leeway in implementing
those rules.
Table 3.5 Categories & Mechanisms of Institutional Flexibility
Adaptive Flexibility Transformative Flexibility Interpretive Flexibility
• Escape clauses • Amendment Rules • Reservations
• Sunset Provisions • Rule precision /
specificity
Different theoretical approaches to international cooperation ascribe different
significance to each of the three forms of institutional flexibility. Additionally, within
theoretical frameworks, the different forms of flexibility serve different ends. Following
is a very brief overview highlighting testable hypotheses that will be examined in the
following sections of the paper.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Flexibility
Flexibility provisions have figured prominently in recent rational institutionalist
studies of institutional design Rosendorff and Milner (2001 ) examine the power of
adaptive flexibility (i.e.,, escape clauses) to make agreements easier to reach, by
mitigating distributional conflicts Their argument builds on James Fearon's ( 1998)
claim that lengthening states’ shadow of the future can actually make international
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cooperation more difficult, not less. Specifically, if states know in advance that an
international agreement will be both lasting and enforceable, they will bargain harder
over initial terms, making an agreement more difficult to conclude. Flexibility
provisions, such as escape clauses, can mitigate the effect of such distributional concerns
by allowing states to escape negative enforcement under certain circumstances. This
yields the first rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility.
• IF1. Adaptive flexibility will increase with the use of enforcement mechanisms.
Second, rational institutionalism focuses attention on the use of flexibility
provisions to address uncertainty. In this view, the combined effect of uncertainty and
risk-aversion leads negotiators to favor flexible agreements. Koremenos (2005a, 553)
develops a formal model of agreement duration, from which she derives the comparative
statics that “as uncertainty increases, the probability that the parties will choose finite,
renegotiable agreements to adjust for shocks increases,” and “as the risk aversion of the
parties increases, the parties will choose to make each agreement in the series shorter.”
In the model, uncertainty is represented as a random adjustment, i.e. a shock
,
to the utility
each states derives from being a party to the agreement. The greater the uncertainty
surrounding an agreement, the greater the potential change to a parties' utility over time
Assuming that states tend to be risk-averse when negotiating multilateral agreements, this
yields the second rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility.
• IF2. Flexibility (particularly transformative) will increase with uncertainty.
The third rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility builds on the second by
accounting for the transaction costs surrounding the negotiation of multilateral
agreements. Essentially, the argument is that (re)negotiation costs are. to a large degree.
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a function of the number of parties participating in the negotiations. Increasing
renegotiation costs cut into negotiators' expected utility of choosing limited-duration,
renegotiable agreements. Using the same model described above, Koremenos (2005a,
553) derives the expectation that “as renegotiation costs increase, the probability that
parties will choose finite, renegotiable agreements decreases,” and “if the parties
conclude a series of renegotiated agreements, as renegotiation costs increase, parties will
choose to make each agreement in the series longer.” This yields the third rational
institutionalist hypothesis:
• 1F3. Transformative flexibility will decrease as the number of parties increases.
Realist Hypotheses on Flexibility
Previous studies of institutional design generally have not derived specific realist
hypotheses concerning flexibility in institutional design. Doubtless, this is due to realist
skepticism toward the significance of international institutions more generally (e.g.,
Mearsheimer 1995) which encourages the belief that states do not need to negotiate
flexibility provisions into the agreements they make. State sovereignty provides the
ultimate form of flexibility; in international anarchy, states are free to ignore international
agreements at any time Thus, one recent study of institutional flexibility concludes that
Realism is ultimately unsuited to explaining institutional flexibility because it cannot
explain variation in flexibility provisions (Koremenos 2005a).
Although many realists consider international institutions to be epiphenomenal to
power politics, it is nevertheless possible to formulate realist claims concerning the
design of institutional flexibility in light of the framework described above. In a
discussion of the 1987 Montreal Protocol negotiations, Elizabeth DeSombre (2000. 94)
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argues that the U.S. used unilateral threats and multilateral diplomacy in tandem in an
attempt to “internationalize” existing U.S. policy. Thus, the U.S. made clear at Montreal
that the alternative to concluding a protocol would not be ‘no agreement’ but, rather,
unilateral action by the U.S. to prohibit the import of ozone-depleting substances. By
implication, to the extent that international agreements serve coercive diplomacy, one
would expect flexibility mechanisms to be designed to serve the needs of the coercing
state (or hegemon). Transformative flexibility, in particular, appears contrary to the
interests of a hegemonic negotiators. To the extent that modification of the terms of
cooperation is necessary, perhaps for technical reasons, it would be reasonable for a
realist to expect that a hegemon would retain veto power over the adoption of potentially
undesirable amendments. Thus, we can state the following realist hypothesis concerning
flexibility:
• RF1 . Negotiations driven by a hegemonic actor will produce agreements with
little (or sharply circumscribed) transformative flexibility.
In contrast, realists have quite different expectations for flexibility in international
agreements negotiated among relative equals. In these cases, realism expects that
sovereignty concerns will have a much more decisive influence over the design of
international agreements (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 51). Specifically, realism would
expect that agreements negotiated among relative equals will guard sovereignty through
the provision of, for example, escape mechanisms, and by delegating significant leeway
to parties to interpret and implement agreement-related obligations. This yields the
second realist hypothesis concerning flexibility.
• RF2. Agreements negotiated among relative equals will feature high levels of
adaptive and interpretive flexibility
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Constructivist Hypotheses on Flexibility
Similar to the first two rational institutionalist hypotheses, the first constructivist
hypothesis views flexibility as a response to uncertainty. Unlike rational institutionalism,
however, constructivism sees institutional flexibility not as an adaptive response to
uncertainty but, rather, as a potential solution to uncertainty. Constructivist explanations
of flexibility in institutional design are thus driven by a process of social learning (e.g.,
Haas 2000). In this model, states renegotiate agreements not to adjust for inevitable,
stochastic shocks to their utility from participating in the agreement but, rather, to use
new knowledge to better understand, pursue, and possibly change, their interests. Thus,
analysts have suggested including regular renegotiation in the design of multilateral
agreements. Although questions of the effectiveness of different institutional pathways to
cooperation have recently gained prominence in the literature on international
cooperation (e.g.. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998; Abbott and Smdal 2004), the
theoretical argument for separating specific regulations from general objectives and
making them flexible dates at least to the early 1970s. Paolo Contini and Peter Sand
( 1972, 38) argued that:
[i]t may be doubted, however, whether traditional treaty techniques will prove to
be suitable for meeting the technical requirements of effective “ecomanagement”
on the global or regional scale, once international action passes from the
declaratory to the operational stage. Environmental problems characteristically
require expeditious and flexible solutions, subject to current up-dating and
amendments to meet rapidly changing situations and scientific-technological
progress.
Another strand of constructivist thought has also emphasized the benefits of
transformative flexibility in treaty design. Similar to Ku and Diehl's (2003, 3)
characterization of the “dual character of international law” as both “an operating system
and a normative system,” some constructivists have argued that normative agreement is
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necessary to support adequate international environmental policies. As Brunnee and
Toope ( 1 997, 30-3 1 ) explain:
Because there is no global community in any meaningful sense, but only
associations of states and other actors for practical purposes, in any given issue-
area normative communities must first be imagined and nurtured. Binding nonns
typically emerge when a regime has moved along the continuum from mere
coordination to at least a partial convergence of interests and values.
Therefore, in this view, it is important for multilateral environmental agreements to
secure nonnative commitment before attempting to set binding policies. A practical
consequence of this is that provisions for renegotiation will need to be designed into
agreements.
Though these two constructivist arguments are driven by different logics, they
are quite similar observationally. Both expect flexibility provisions to be common
among multilateral environmental agreements, and both understand transformative
flexibility to be the most appropriate strategy for reaching deep cooperation. They differ
insofar as they prescribe similar solutions to different design problems: one responds to
uncertainty, the other to lack of normative consensus.
• CF1. Transformative flexibility will increase with policy uncertainty.
• CF2. Transformative flexibility will increase with policy dissensus.
Constructivists have also identified a third potential source of flexibility in
multilateral environmental agreements. Previous studies on institutional design have
searched for isomorphism among institutional agreements due to the socializing influence
of international legal culture (Finnemore 1996). Koremenos (2005a) tests this hypothesis
(that agreements emulate one another) by examining whether variation in agreement
duration decreased over time. The negative result of that study, however, may be a
artifact of the way in which the hypothesis was specified Though Koremeons’s (2005a)
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results do not support the ‘homogenizing global culture’ thesis, they do not account for
the possibility that emulation occurs in smaller, more internally homogenous
communities. A possibility for future research would be to consider isomorphism,
perhaps resulting from the influence of specific legal or epistenuc communities, within
specific policy domains. 1 Such a test, while interesting, lies outside the scope of the
present study.
Table 3.6 summarizes the several hypotheses concerning institutional flexibility
used in this study.
Table 3.6 Hypotheses Concerning Flexibility
Source Theory’ Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
IF1 Adaptive flexibility will increase with the use
of enforcement mechanisms.
Rational
Institutionalism
1F2 Flexibility (particularly transformative) will
increase with uncertainty.
Rational
Institutionalism
IF3 Transformative flexibility will decrease with
the number of parties.
Realism RF1 Negotiations driven by a hegemonic actor will
produce agreements with little (or sharply
circumscribed) transformative flexibility.
Realism RF2 Agreements negotiated among relative equals
will feature high levels of adaptive and
interpretive flexibility
Constructivism CF1 Transformative flexibility will increase with
policy uncertainty.
Constructivism CD2 Transformative flexibility will increase with
policy dissensus.
1
Existing sources such as Mitchell (2003-2007) and the FAO-IUCN-UNDP database at
http://www.ecolex.org may prove to be promising resources for identifying agreements within specific
policy spheres.
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Operationalizing Flexibili ty
As described earlier, this study examines three different types of institutional
flexibility: adaptive, interpretive, and transformational. Adaptive flexibility provisions
are those that can be exercised by individual states without requiring further negotiations
or international agreement, provided that certain qualifying criteria obtain. Adaptive
mechanisms thus can be used to suspend or even cease operation of an agreement among
certain parties. They cannot be used to amend cooperative arrangements. The two most
common such provisions are escape clauses and withdrawal clauses. ESCAPE captures
whether a multilateral agreement includes a formal escape mechanism. WITHDRAW
captures whether an agreement includes a formal withdrawal clause.
Interpretive flexibility provisions grant individual states leeway in the
interpretation and domestic implementation of agreement rules. The most common such
provisions are mechanisms for formal reservation. Negotiators may achieve a similar
effect by specifying rules broadly enough to permit, or even necessitate, interpretation by
individual parties. Conversely, they may restrict interpretive flexibility by specifying
rules with a high degree of precision (Goldstein et al 2000; Duffield 2003). RESERVE
captures whether an agreement permits formal reservations. PRECISE captures the
precision of an agreement’s rules in an ordinal measure.
Finally, transformative flexibility provisions permit states to adjust, refine, or
replace an agreement’s rules through renegotiation. Though states may adjust even the
most inflexible agreement by negotiating a replacement accord de novo
,
renegotiation of
multilateral agreements has become increasingly institutionalized through the use of such
devices as the ‘framework convention-protocol’ approach to international cooperation
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AMEND captures whether an agreement provides for future amendment and the decision
rules governing adoption of amendments. A second option available to negotiators is to
make an agreement expire after a certain duration, requiring states to renegotiate if they
wish to continue cooperation. SUNSET captures whether an agreement incorporates
such a ‘sunset’ provision.
Table 3.7 presents the indicators of institutional flexibility used in this study.
Table 3.7 Indicators of Flexibility
Indicator Measurement Description
ESCAPE Nominal Does the agreement include a formal escape
mechanism?
WITHDRAW Nominal Does the agreement include a formal withdrawal
clause?
RESERVE Nominal Does the agreement permit reservations?
PRECISE Ordinal How precise are the agreement’s rules?
AMEND Nominal Does the agreement include formal
amendment/adjustment provisions?
SUNSET Nominal Does the agreement expire? Does it include a sunset
clause?
Independent variables
Based on the review of the literature on international cooperation summarized in
Chapter 2, this section identifies five major explanatory variables that will serve as the
starting point for this study: distribution, enforcement, hegemony, number, and
uncertainty. While other variables also influence the design of multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) in some way, these five account for much of the important variation
in international agreements, and are key variables in the explanations developed here.
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Distribution Problems
This variable refers to the degree to which negotiating parties’ preferences
concerning institutional arrangements differ from each other, when more than one
arrangement is possible (Koremenos et al 2001a, 775). If only one institutional outcome
is possible, or if all negotiating parties prefer the same institutional outcome, distribution
problems are nonexistent or irrelevant. At the other extreme, such problems are likely to
be severe in zero-sum situations in which better arrangements for some come directly at
the expense of worse outcomes for others. One implication of asymmetrical distribution
on institutional design, emphasized by realists like Joseph Gneco ( 198Kb), is an
increasing likelihood of states choosing open or expansive membership rules, in an effort
to make distribution more symmetrical by increasing the number of shares.
Although distribution problems are easy to represent in formal terms, their depth
is difficult to observe. Accordingly, this study uses multiple indicators of distribution
problems. These are summarized in Table 3.8. The indicators include the salience of
distributional conflict in negotiations, the extent of overlap among negotiating states’
interests, and the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with an agreement.
D1STCONF is a qualitative indicator that captures the degree to which distributional
conflicts were salient in the negotiation of an multilateral environmental agreement.
COMONINT captures the extent of overlap among negotiating states’ interests in the
issue area under negotiation DISTBEN captures whether an agreement’s benefits are
distributed symmetrically among participating states, or concentrated primarily in a few
states. Similarly, DISTC'OST captures whether the costs entailed by an agreement are
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distributed symmetrically among participating states, or whether they are concentrated in
a few.
Table 3.8 Indicators of Distribution Problems
Indicator Measurement Description
DISTCONF Ordinal
(0-4)
How salient were distributional conflicts to the
negotiation of the agreement?
COMONINT Ordinal
(1-6)
How compatible were the interests of the negotiating
parties concerning the primary issue area?
D1STBEN Ordinal
0-4)
How evenly were the agreement’s benefits divided
among negotiating parties?
DISTCOST Ordinal
(1-4)
How evenly were the agreement’s costs divided among
negotiating parties?
Enforcement Problems
Problems of enforcement are related to distributional problems. As Koremenos et
al (2001a, 16-17) note, “separating enforcement problems from distribution problems is
an analytic choice, not a substantive claim enforcement and distribution problems
often occur simultaneously.” This study follows the ‘Rational Design' approach in
separating questions of distribution from those of enforcement to facilitate the evaluation
of specific hypotheses concerning institutional design.
Although it is tempting to construe many of the indicators of distribution
problems as useful proxies for enforcement problems, there are drawbacks to such a
move. Although enforcement problems may arise from the same generic incentive
structure as distribution problems, they do not necessarily go together In some cases, it
may be possible (through logrolling or side payments) to reach an equilibrium point -
i.e., to make an agreement self-enforcing in the game-theoretic sense - despite the
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presence of distributional problems concerning which specific equilibrium should be
used. Accordingly, this study avoids stretching indicators of distributional problems to
cover enforcement problems as well. Instead, it uses a single indicator from the IRD that
directly captures the degree of enforcement problems relevant to a given negotiation:
ENFORCEM is a five-point ordinal measure that captures the strength of incentives for
parties to disobey an agreement’s rules, even after it has entered into legal force
Hegemony
Although a single indicator may be sufficient to capture the extent to which an
agreement is self-enforcing, multiple indicators help capture the extent and kind of
hegemony present during the negotiation of an agreement. Classical realism defined
power primarily in material / military terms (Morgenthau 1948). However, in addition to
questioning the material basis of power, critics of realism have long noted that power is
not always fungible. Overall military might does not necessarily translate into ability to
exert influence on a particular issue (Keohane and Nye 1977). Accordingly, this study
accounts for the possibility of 'issue-specific’ power.
Issue-specific power notwithstanding, there is the additional possibility that some
states may be able to translate general economic advantages into negotiating power.
Conference diplomacy is costly to begin with, and this has been exacerbated by the sharp
increase in the number of multilateral environmental negotiations over the past thirty
years. Indeed, during the waning hours of the December 1997 Kyoto Conference, some
smaller delegations complained that the U.S. strategy had become one of “negotiation by
exhaustion’’ (Depledge 2005, 190). Therefore, this study uses multiple indicators to
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capture the multiple dimensions of hegemony and power that shape multilateral
negotiations.
Table 3.9 presents the main indicators of hegemony used in this study.
Hegemony can be analyzed as a function of issue-specific power, as a function of
political control over the negotiating agenda, and as the ability of a hegemon to dominate
the substance and content of negotiations.
Table 3.9 Indicators ofHegemony
Indicator Measurement Description
ISSUEHEG Ordinal
0-5)
How symmetrical were the negotiating states; was there
an issue-specific hegemon?
HEGAGEND Ordinal
(0-4)
To what extent was the negotiating agenda driven by a
hegemonic state?
HEGEMON Ordinal
(0-4)
To what extent were negotiations dominated by a
hegemonic state?
Each of these indicators uses a five-point ordinal scale. ISSUEHEG captures the degree
to which negotiating states possessed roughly equal issue-specific power. HEGAGEND
captures the degree to which the negotiating agenda was driven primarily by a hegemonic
state. Similarly, HEGEMON captures the extent to which negotiations and decisions
were dominated primarily by a hegemonic state.
Number
Number refers, simply, to the number of states that negotiators perceive as
relevant to addressing the problem at hand. This variable is especially significant for
realist theories that stress the influence of relative gains concerns and for institutionalist
theories that stress the difficulties of collective action. It is distinguished from
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“membership,” which is considered as endogenous in this study. In contrast, the number
of relevant states is a function of external, problem-specific issues.
There are two primary ways to interpret the relevance of states to a particular
problem. They may be relevant because they cause the problem and/or because they are
affected by it. NCAUSERS is an ordinal measure of the number of states considered to
be relevant to a problem because they play a significant role in causing it. Similarly,
NAFFECT is an ordinal measure of the number of states considered to be relevant to a
negotiation because they are significantly affected by the specific problem(s) addressed
by an agreement. NSTNEGOT captures the total number of states that actively
participated in the negotiation of a given environmental agreement. Table 3.10 presents
the two indicators of number used in this study.
Table 3.10 Indicators ofNumber
Indicator Measurement Description
NCAUSERS Ordinal Flow many states were regarded as important in causing
the problem(s) addressed by the agreement?
NAFFECT Ordinal How many states were significantly affected by the
problem(s) addressed by the agreement?
NSTNEGOT Ratio How many states actively participated in negotiations?
Knowledge and Uncertainty
Uncertainty plays a key role in realist, institutionalist, and constructivist
explanations of international cooperation For example, uncertainty and fear concerning
other parties’ motives and behavior underlie the realist security dilemma (Herz 1950).
From a rational institutionalist perspective, Oliver Williamson (1985, 30) writes that, “but
for uncertainty, problems of economic organization are relatively uninteresting.” Finally,
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from a constructivist perspective, a number of writers have emphasized the importance of
knowledge and uncertainty in international cooperation (see, e.g., Haas 2001 ).
Uncertainty is the most complex explanatory variable used in this study. Taken
together, rational institutionalist, realist, and constructivist theories suggest that
uncertainty can exist in a number of forms, each of which has a different consequence for
institutional design. Since it is an open question whether the different aspects of
uncertainty emphasized by different theoretical approaches to international cooperation
refer to a single underlying construct, or whether they are alike in name only, this study
makes use of a number of indicators to capture various aspects of knowledge and
uncertainty. It also uses indicators of other processes that have been emphasized
particularly by constructivist accounts of international environmental cooperation. These
indicators may be grouped into five general categories, reflecting: ( 1 ) complexity and
technological intensity of a problem; (2) scientific knowledge concerning problem
causes, policy options, and policy effects; (3) scientific consensus; (4) presence of a
shared perception of crisis or shock; and (5) participation by scientific organizations in
the negotiation of an agreement.
Table 3.1 1 summarizes the indicators for these elements of knowledge and
uncertainty.
90
Table 3.11 Indicators ofKnowledge/Uncertainty
Indicator Measurement Description
COMPLEX Ordinal
(0-4)
How complex (in terms of number of issues and
issue linkage) is the problem addressed by the
agreement?
IMPLEMEN Ordinal
(1-5)
How difficult (in terms of financial and
technological requirements) are solutions to
implement?
SCIENTIF Ordinal
0-5)
How well established is scientific knowledge
concerning the extent and causes of the
problem?
OPTIONS Ordinal
(0-4)
How well established is scientific knowledge
concerning possible policy solutions?
EFFECTS Ordinal
(0-4)
How well established is scientific knowledge
concerning the range of consequences of
different policy solutions?
OPTAGREE Dichotomous
(0-1)
Is there consensus among negotiators
concerning the menu of policy options?
EFFAGREE Dichotomous
(0-1)
Is there consensus among negotiators
concerning the consequences of different policy
options?
SHOCKNEG Ordinal
(0-4)
To what extent was the negotiating agenda
driven by external factors such as a shared
perception of crisis?
EPICOM Dichotomous
(0-1)
Were transnational scientific expert network! s)
present and active during negotiations?
NONSTATE Nominal What types of nonstate actors participated in
negotiations?
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The first two measures relate to problem characteristics, or problem “malignity”
(Underdal 2000). COMPLEX is an ordinal measure of the number of issues that must be
addressed to solve a particular problem, as well as the number of related problems
affected by agreement rules. IMPLEMEN is an ordinal measure of the financial and
technological intensiveness of an agreement’s policies.
The next three measures relate to the state of scientific knowledge concerning the
problems and policies under negotiation. SCIENTIF is an ordinal measure of the extent
of scientific knowledge concerning the causes and extent of a specific problem.
OPTIONS is an ordinal measure capturing the extent of scientific knowledge concerning
the menu of available policy options for addressing a given problem. Similarly,
EFFECTS refers to how well established scientific knowledge is concerning the likely
consequences of different policy options. OPTAGREE and EFFAGREE capture whether
negotiators are substantially in agreement concerning the knowledge of policy options
and policy effects.
The next indicator captures whether the existence of a shared sense of shock or
crisis was an important factor leading states to negotiate an agreement. SHOCKNEG is a
qualitative, ordinal measure of the extent to which a shared sense of crisis or shock drove
multilateral negotiations on a specific issue.
The final two indicators capture a different aspect of knowledge and uncertainty:
whether science- or knowledge-based actors were active in the negotiation and design of
a given agreement EPICOM indicates whether or not a transnational expert network
participated in the negotiation and design of the agreement. NONSTATE is a nominal
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indicator of the type(s) of nonstate actors (e.g., activist groups, multinational
corporations, scientific organizations) that were active during negotiations.
Data
One of the challenges facing analysts of international institutional design is the
relative scarcity of high-quality, public data on the subject. Although several promising
sources currently are in development (see, e.g., Koremenos 2005a; Mitchell 2003-2007),
these do not yet incorporate sufficient information to evaluate the range of hypotheses
identified for this project. The creation of new datasets on an ad hoc basis has the
practical consequence of limiting the scope of analysis. Most such datasets are restricted
to easily observable traits. Qualitative data concerning the actual negotiation and design
of international agreements is scarce. Yet this is precisely the sort of information that is
necessary to arrive at confident conclusions concerning the prevailing practice of
institutional design.
With these considerations in mind, this study will evaluate the aforementioned
design hypotheses against a new dataset that builds from the recently published
International Regimes Database (1RD) (Breitmeier et al 2006). Briefly, the 1RD contains
a wealth of qualitative data on the constituent elements of twenty-three international
environmental regimes. These data are organized into four sections, related to stages in
regime development, each of which contains several variables (often with multiple
indicators) that are of broad theoretical interest. This study focuses on the first two
groups of information: “regime formation” and “regime attributes” (Breitmeier et al
2006, 25-29). The former category contains background information that corresponds to
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the independent variables used in this study. The second category contains information
that is relevant to the dependent variables used in this study.
Although the database is fundamentally concerned with regime analysis, the basic
unit - i.e., the “regime element” - corresponds with specific events in regime
development, including the negotiation of international agreements. For example, the
IRD team “ultimately . . . dated each regime to the signing of an agreement” (Breitmeier
et al 2006, 40). The majority of the regimes in the IRD are constituted by several specific
international agreements. For example, the Antarctic regime encompasses the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, the 1964 Convention on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna, the 1972
Convention on the Conservation of Seals, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection.
Appendix 2 lists the specific regimes covered in the IRD and in this study.
The most obvious drawback of using the IRD is that the international agreements
it contains may not accurately represent the larger population of multilateral
environmental agreements. Accordingly, the results of this study may be of limited
generalizability. Nevertheless, there are at least three significant benefits of drawing on
IRD data for analysis. First, although the set of international agreements used in this
study and contained in the IRD is not especially large, the IRD includes substantial
variation on several variables of theoretical interest. The dataset encompasses ( 1 ) global
agreements as well as regional agreements, (2) resource management agreements as well
as pollution abatement agreements, (3) and symmetric environmental problems as well as
highly asymmetric ‘upstream-downstream’ problems. It is unlikely that the cases
included in the IRD differ from the universe of MEAs in any meaningful way. Second,
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the IRD contains information on many of the highest-profile multilateral environmental
agreements. As Koremenos (2005a, 563ff35) points out, “High-profile agreements get
that way because they have big effects; thus, it is important to be able to make statements
about their characteristics.” Finally, the IRD is unique among datasets of multilateral
environmental agreements because it contains information on the negotiation processes
within which agreements were designed, as well as their eventual, formal institutional
features. For these reasons, the IRD represents an important advance on previous
databases of MEAs.
A second potential drawback of using IRD data derives from the modest number
of multilateral agreements that it surveys (fifty-four). Although the IRD contains over
three hundred data points, the majority of these correspond to different segments, or
“watersheds” within regimes. Consistent with its focus on the contractual design of
multilateral environmental agreements, this study focuses exclusively on those data
points that correspond to the negotiation and conclusion of specific MEAs. Although
clearly theoretically interesting, the subsequent development of individual agreements
lies outside this study’s focus on contractual design.
The IRD served as a starting point for the dataset used in this study, but a number
of additions and modifications were necessary. First, this study examines only those
’regime elements' that correspond to the negotiation of new international agreements.
Other regime elements, including what Breitmeier et al (2006, 43) refer to as
“watersheds” within existing structures - simply do not fit within the research design of
this study. Second, the coding procedure used by the IRD team - assigning two political
scientists to code each regime independently - raises questions of reliability and validity.
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Intercoder reliability in the 1RD is generally high, but I added an additional coding for
each indicator that I used, and either recoded or discarded indicators where there was
significant disagreement. Where coders disagreed only slightly - particularly on ordinal
measures - 1 substituted a coding that took account of both responses. Further, some of
the 1RD variables were recoded for use in this study to maintain consistent ‘direction’. It
was necessary in some cases to reverse the direction of an IRD variable to ensure
consistency with the multiple indicators used in this study. Although the IRD provides
information on dozens of variables, it does not contain complete information on every
variable of interest in this study. Several indicators (including all those corresponding to
formal provisions for institutional flexibility) were constructed and coded by the author,
examining agreement texts. Appendix 1 explains the construction and coding of the
indicators used in this study, including their coding source.
Methods
This study incorporates a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to
evaluate hypotheses on institutional design. For each test, the specific method used
follows from the hypothesized relation and the nature of the data. Many hypotheses can
be illuminated by the construction of simple crosstabulations, accompanied by measures
of association Where crosstabulation tables were ‘square’, Kendall's tau-b is used as a
measure of association between variables. Where tables are non-square, and where there
is a hypothesized direction of influence between the variables, Somers’ d is calculated.
This study uses two-tailed significance consistently.
Due to the ordinal, non-normal nature of much of the data, comparisons between
groups are generally done using nonparametric techniques (e.g., Mann- Whitney U tests
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for two independent groups and Kruskal-Wallis tests for three or more groups). The
Mann-Whitney test is “a test of the statistical significance of differences between two
groups . . . used when the data for two samples are measured on an ordinal scale” (Vogt
2005, 184). The Kruskal-Wallis test “is an extension of the Mann-Whitney U test ... to
three or more independent samples. It is a nonparametric, one-way ANOVA for rank-
order data and is based on medians rather than means” (Vogt 2005, 1 66). When
appropriate data are available, conventional /-test comparison of means and analysis of
variance (ANOVA) are preferred to these nonparametric tests.
Hypotheses that predict the choice of alternate, specific institutional designs are
tested using logistic regression and ordinal regression, as appropriate. When the
dependent variable of interest is dichotomous, logistic regression is used to test whether
certain explanatory variables and indicators are specific predictors. When explanatory
variables are also dichotomous, logit analysis is used. When the dependent variable of
interest is measured ordinally, such as the relative precision of agreement obligations,
ordinal regression is used.
Finally, this study uses factor analysis and structural equation modeling to test the
dimensionality of theoretical constructs and to test hypothesized causal relationships
among latent (unobserved) variables, such as uncertainty. Exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) is more descriptive than theoretical, and is used in this study to test whether a
group of indicators that have been hypothesized to represent a given theoretical construct
do represent a single construct, or whether, in fact, they reflect more than a single
underlying construct (see, e.g., Dimitrov’s (2003) discussion of different aspects of
scientific knowledge). When theory expects a particular relation between manifest
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indicators and latent constructs, measurement models / confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) can be used to evaluate how well data fit the hypothesized structure. Finally,
structural equation modeling (SEM) can be used to test hypothesized causal relationships
between two or more latent variables, such as uncertainty and delegation.
Finally, each empirical chapter concludes by examining hypotheses in light of one
or more specific agreement(s). These case studies allow this study to examine whether
positive results actually reflect the hypothesized causal processes, and to examine
whether hypothesized causal processes are, in fact, absent when findings are negative.
While these discussions do not offer separate Tests' of the hypotheses under
consideration, they nevertheless play an important part in evaluating hypotheses, and in
identifying areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 4
ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MEMBERSHIP
The strategic design of membership rules represents an important aspect of
institutional design. On 18 June 2006, a majority of members of the International
Whaling Commission (1WC) voted thirty-three to thirty-two (with one abstention) in
support of a resolution calling for an end to that body’s 1986 moratorium on commercial
whaling (IWC Resolution 2006-1). This vote marked the first time that the pro-whaling
coalition led by Japan had achieved majority support for ending the ban on all
commercial whaling. Japan’s failure to win the change it desires because the vote fell
short of the three-fourths supermajority needed to reverse the moratorium demonstrates
the significance of membership rules for multilateral diplomacy.
Although few states have (or have had) a domestic commercial whaling industry,
membership in the IWC is open to any interested state. In June 2006 the IWC had 70
member states (and 77 in June 2007), a number far exceeding participation in the actual
activity being regulated. A closer look at the vote begins to reveal some of the reasons
for this large membership. The thirty states sponsoring the resolution included St. Kitts
and Nevis, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Mali, Mauritania,
Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, St. Lucia, Suriname, Togo, and Tuvalu, along with Iceland,
Japan, Norway, and the Russian Federation. This coalition is less indicative of a growing
consensus in favor of commercial whaling than it is of old-fashioned log-rolling. As the
UK newspaper. The Independent, reported the day after the vote:
In a stunning diplomatic coup, Japan and its allies, including Norway and
Iceland, won a voting majority in the IWC for the first time, as a result of a
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remorseless 10-year Japanese campaign to secure the votes of small African and
Caribbean countries in exchange for multimillion-dollar foreign aid packages
(McNeill 2006).
As it turned out, the coalition’s narrow majority rested on the support of three new
members of the IWC: Cambodia, Guatemala, and the Marshall Islands (McNeill 2006).
Clearly, then, the membership rules of the IWC played a significant role in the
June 2006 vote. Had the IWC’s original contracting states decided to limit membership
exclusively to ‘relevant’ states (by almost any definition), neither the anti-whaling nor the
pro-whaling coalition would have been able to stack the organization with sympathetic
votes. Thus, procedural rules can have substantive consequences for international policy.
This chapter explores the design of membership rules in MEAs. First, it explains
two broad dimensions of membership that negotiators can manipulate in designing
MEAs. Next, it describes a number of indicators of membership design and provides
descriptive statistics concerning membership design among agreements in the
International Regimes Database (IRD). Third, it evaluates the hypotheses concerning
membership rules set forth in Chapter 3. Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in
light of two specific cases.
Membership and Multilateral Agreements
One of the most fundamental decisions in designing an international
environmental agreement is whether or not the agreement should be multilateral in the
first place. The decision to make an agreement multilateral is only the beginning of the
process, however. Negotiators are then faced with questions concerning whether or not
to restrict membership to those states that meet certain criteria. Geography provides one
such criterion: international environmental agreements can be specific to a local resource
(e.g., the Rhine River Convention and agreements), regional (e.g. the several Baltic Sea
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agreements), or global (e.g., the Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change).
Other criteria include commitment to particular domestic political or economic policies
(e.g., NATO’s requirement of civilian control of the military) or expertise in a relevant
issue area.
The simplest explanation of membership would be for involvement in an issue
area to map perfectly onto institutional membership. Yet it would be a mistake to assume
that the scope of membership in multilateral environmental agreements follows directly
from the scope of the issue being addressed. As the IWC example makes clear, some
agreements are open to states that are neither directly responsible for, nor victims of, the
environmental problem at hand.
From the perspective of institutional design - i.e., what strategies concerning
membership are available to negotiators - participation in a MEA can be reduced to two
related questions. First, who may participate in a cooperative arrangement? Second, who
must participate in order for cooperation to be successful? Is the participation of one or
more states critical to the success of a cooperative arrangement? This is commonly
referred to in the literature on international cooperation as the minimum participation
threshold (see, e.g.. Barrett 2003).
Membership criteria in multilateral environmental agreements vary significantly
along a number of dimensions. The fist major category of differentiation is who can join.
In some agreements, all states are eligible for membership, while other agreements
restrict membership in some way. When membership is restricted, sometimes it is
restricted to “relevant” states - those causing the problem and / or those affected by it.
Other times, however, potentially relevant states are either excluded from membership.
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In addition to restricting membership on issue relevance, some agreements restrict
membership based on geographic, economic, or political criteria. Some agreements
allow only originally contracting states to participate, while others allow states that were
not part of the original negotiations to accede to the agreement.
This brings us to a second dimension of differentiation in membership. Some
agreements treat some members differently than others. Negotiators may treat original
members differently than subsequently admitted ones (as in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty).
Negotiators also may establish more than one category of membership in a particular
agreement (as in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change). These
differentiations can involve some members having different commitments than others or
some members enjoying different benefits than others.
Finally, agreements may vary in terms of their criteria for entry into force. While
some informal agreements do not require any special action by participating states,
formal treaties generally acquire legal force following ratification by state parties. While
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes a fallback threshold of
universal ratification for entry into force, most international environmental agreements
explicitly specify conditions for their entry into force. Some require ratification by a
certain number of parties, some require ratification by specific states, and others specify a
substantive threshold for entry into force, e.g., ratification by a group of states accounting
for some predefined percentage of treaty-governed behavior.
This chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning the design of membership
rules governing which states may - and which must - participate in MEAs, drawn from
the literature on international cooperation reviewed in Chapter 2 However, before
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evaluating these propositions, it will be helpful to review the indicators of membership
rules discussed in Chapter 3.
Dimensions of Membership in MEAs
Before evaluating specific propositions concerning the design of membership
rules in MEAs, this chapter analyzes the dimensions of membership in MEAs by
examining descriptive statistics for the several indicators of membership set forth in
Chapter 3. These are summarized below in Table 4. 1
,
Table 4.1 Indicators of Membership
Indicator Measurement Description
MEMCR1T Nominal What criteria govern eligibility for membership?
RESTRICT Dichotomous Is membership in an agreement restricted?
NSTNEGOT Ratio How many states actively participated in the negotiation
of the agreement?
ELIGIBLE Ratio How many states are eligible for membership?
NRATIFY Ratio How many states must ratify an agreement for it to enter
into legal force?
PCTRATIF Ratio What percentage of negotiating states must ratify an
agreement for it to enter into legal force?
EIFCOND Dichotomous In addition to a minimum number of ratifications, does
the agreement include substantive conditions for entry
into force9
ACTEARLY Dichotomous Did states promise to comply with an agreement prior to
its entry into legal force?
PUBLGOOD Dichotomous Does the agreement provide a public good (as opposed
to a potentially excludable good)?
NSTNEGOT Ratio How many states actively participated in the negotiation
of the agreement?
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One of the first possible choices in designing the membership rules of a
multilateral agreement is whether or not to restrict membership. The first indicator
examined here, MEMCRIT, captures which criteria, if any, govern eligibility for
membership in agreements. Many agreements do not restrict membership; those that do
have a broad range of reasons for doing so. Among the possible criteria for restriction
are: membership in another agreement, commitment to particular domestic political or
economic institutions, geography, use of the environmental good in question, role in
causing an environmental problem, capacity to help solve a given problem, and expertise
in an issue area. Some agreements restrict membership by more than one condition.
Figure 4 1 shows the relative frequency of each of these (nonexclusive) criteria
among the multilateral agreements surveyed in this study. The most common
membership criterion among the multilateral agreements surveyed is membership in
another agreement. This result is not surprising given the prevalence of the framework
convention - protocol approach among MEAs. While participation in framework
conventions is usually unrestricted, participation in subsequent amendments and
protocols is commonly restricted to convention parties.
The most frequent substantive (as opposed to procedural) criteria are geographic
location and status as a user of an environmental good. ‘Issue-specific expertise’,
‘problem-solving capacity' and ‘role in causing the problem’ were used less frequently.
No agreements were restricted on the basis of domestic political system (e.g. communist),
and fifteen agreements did not restrict membership.
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Figure 4.1 Membership Criteria of Surveyed Agreements (MEMCRIT)
Meivdbei’dup Geographic User of a Role m Potential to Expertise in Domestic Domestic No criteria
ill another good causing help issue aiea economy government
agieement problem problem
solving
To evaluate some propositions concerning the design of membership rules, it is
useful to know simply whether or not negotiators strategically restricted membership.
For this purpose, agreements are considered to have unrestricted membership when either
they have no membership conditions or their only membership condition is membership
in a pre-existing (unrestricted) framework agreement The indicator, RESTRICT,
captures this aspect of membership. Half of the surveyed agreements (twenty-seven of
fifty-four) have unrestricted membership.
Another important element in explaining negotiators’ choice of membership rules
is the number of states participating in negotiations. Figure 4.2 shows the histogram for
105
indicator NSTNEGOT, the number of states participating in negotiations. The mean
number of states active in negotiating the surveyed agreements was roughly thirty-six.
Figure 4.2 Number of States Active in Agreement Negotiation (NSTNEGOT)
Mean =36 19
Std Dev =37.946
N =52
However, the modal size of negotiations was twelve or fewer, and half of the agreements
were negotiated by twenty-five or fewer states. The average is skewed upwards by a
small number of truly global negotiations. Although this information cannot tell us much
by itself, it is necessary for interpreting other design choices, such as the number of states
eligible for membership and the number of ratifications needed for entry into force.
Another variable useful in interpreting membership design choices is the number
of states that qualify for membership in a given agreement In this study, that
information is captured by the indicator, ELIGIBLE. Figure 4.3 shows a histogram of the
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number of states meeting criteria for membership in an agreement. Although the mean
number of states eligible
Figure 4.3 Number of States Eligible for Membership (ELIGIBLE)
Mean =95 66
Std. Dev. =S3 325
N =47
for membership in the surveyed agreements was roughly ninety-six, the distribution is
strongly bimodal. Most frequently, membership in agreements was available to any
interested state. However, as Figure 4.3 shows, the second largest group of agreements
was open to roughly twelve (or fewer) states. Together, these two groups account for
three-fourths of surveyed agreements.
The next question facing negotiators designing membership rules is, “Who must
participate?” Almost all surveyed agreements (96 percent) require a minimal number of
ratifications to enter into legal force. NRATIFY represents the number of states that
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must ratify an agreement for it to enter into force. The number of ratifications necessary
for entry into force ranged from five to sixty-two, with a mean of twenty. The middle
fifty percent (twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth percentile) of surveyed agreements required
between ten and twenty-one ratifications. PCTRATIF expresses this number as a
proportion of the number of states participating in negotiations. This measure ranges
from 1.0 for agreements requiring ratification by all eligible states (e.g., the 1976
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution) to less than 0.04,
for agreements open to any interested state that require very few ratifications for entry
into force (e.g., the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance).
As Figure 4.4 shows, most surveyed agreements requiring ratification for entry
into force only require ratification by a small proportion of eligible states. In terms of the
proportion of eligible states whose participation is required for entry into force, the three
most common provisions are - in order - those requiring less than ten percent
participation; those requiring between ten and twenty percent participation; and those
requiring between twenty and thirty percent participation. However, a substantial
minority of agreements do require universal participation to enter into force.
Although the general level of participation necessary for entry into force is
interesting, a good full survey of membership criteria requires addressing the possibility
that not all states count equally in the minds of negotiators designing MEAs. For
whatever reason, participation by some states may be substantially more important than
participation by others. To account for this possibility, this study incorporates
EIFCOND, which captures whether negotiators stipulated substantive conditions for
entry into force, in addition to a simple minimum level of participation. For example, in
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addition to requiring ratification by fifty-five parties to the Framework Convention, the
Kyoto Protocol requires ratification by Annex 1 (industrialized) states accounting for no
less than fifty-five percent of that group’s 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. One quarter
(25%) of surveyed agreements requiring ratification include additional, substantive
conditions.
Figure 4.4 Level of Participation Required for Entry into Force
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Different theories of international cooperation place different importance on the
use of entry into force conditions. For some (mainly rational institutionalists), these
conditions represent a viable way for negotiators to mitigate concerns of free riding. For
other approaches (mainly constructivists), entry into legal force plays a meaningful role
in international norm diffusion. Still other approaches (mainly realists) consider these
Mean =0.3696
St cl Dev =0 332
N =38
109
conditions to be little more than diplomatic boilerplate. To understand what role entry
into force conditions / minimum participation thresholds have in the design of MEAs, it
is helpful to know whether state parties are willing to comply with an agreement prior to
its entry into force. The indicator, ACTEARLY, captures this information. Such
promises were relatively rare among the negotiation of surveyed agreements. States
promised to comply prior to entry into force in only nine of fifty-four cases (18% of
cases).
Finally, some theories of international cooperation expect restrictive membership
when agreements provide potentially excludable benefits, that is, benefits that may be
withheld from states not participating in the agreement. This study uses the indicator
PUBLGOOD to capture whether an agreement provides a nonexcludable public good
rather than a potentially excludable good. The majority of surveyed agreements (thirty-
three of fifty four) do not govern excludable goods.
Evaluating Hypotheses on Membership
The next step is to apply what we know about membership options by analyzing
them in terms of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. With this member ship data in
hand it is now possible to undertake an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses
concerning the design of membership rules, which are summarized in Table 4.2.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Membership
The first rational institutionalist hypothesis (1M1 ) is that negotiators will restrict
membership when agreements provide excludable benefits, especially when confronted
by enforcement problems. Three indicators are particularly relevant to this hypothesis.
ENFORCEM captures the severity of enforcement problems surrounding an agreement.
PUBLGOOD captures whether or not an agreement provides an essentially public good,
or a potentially excludable one. It is scored dichotomously (yes/no). Finally, RESTRICT
captures whether or not membership in an agreement is open or restricted. It, too, is
measured dichotomously (open/restricted).
Table 4.2 Hypotheses Concerning Membership
Source Theory Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
IM 1 Negotiators facing enforcement problems will restrict
membership when providing excludable benefits.
Rational
Institutionalism
IM2 When confronted with enforcement problems,
negotiators will set specific conditions for entry into
force, and will not require states to promise to comply
with an agreement prior to its entry into legal force.
Realism RM1 Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in
response to distributional concerns.
Realism RM2 Agreements concluded in spite of relative gains
concerns will use very strict entry into force conditions.
Constructivism CM 1 Negotiators responding to perceived crises will be less
likely to restrict membership or use strict entry into
force conditions.
Constructivism CM2 Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially
(over depth of cooperation, if necessary).
Testing IM I is difficult because there are too many relevant variables, and, given
that, too few cases under consideration to support more robust statistical procedures.
Accordingly, Table 4.3 presents a multi-level cross tabulation of the three indicators,
listing the number of observed cases in each cell but not calculating measures of
association Among the nineteen agreements that confront strong or very strong
enforcement problems, only five provide essentially public goods. Among these five.
only one restricts membership. On the other hand, among the fourteen agreements that
provide potentially excludable benefits, ten restrict membership. This study concludes,
therefore, that there is reasonably strong support for IM 1 as it is specified above.
Table 4.3 Crosstabulation of ENFORCEM x PUBLGOOD x RESTRICT
Enforcement
Restricted Membership
Problems Yes No Total
None Public Good No 2 0 2
Yes 0 1 1
Total 2 1 3
Low Public Good No 2 1 3
Yes
1 4 5
Total 3 5 8
Medium Public Good No 5 8 13
Yes 5 5 10
Total 10 13 23
Strong Public Good No 9 1 10
Yes 0 1 1
Total 9 2 1
1
Very Strong Public Good No 1 3 4
Yes
1 3 4
Total 2 6 8
One possible explanation for this pattern is that negotiators are more likely to
restrict membership whenever agreements provide potentially excludable benefits,
regardless of their perception of other states’ incentives to “cheat.” The IRD does not
include enough cases to calculate a reliable measure of association between PUBLGOOD
and RESTRICT Table 4.4 provides a cross tabulation of these two indicators, with
measures of association.
Table 4.4 Crosstabulation: PUBLGOOD x RESTRICT
Restricted Membership?
No Yes Total
Public No 13 20 33
Good? Yes 14 7 21
Total 27 27 54
Measure of Association
Value Sig.
Lambda RESTRICT dependent
.259 .118
Though these results are consistent with IM 1 , they are not conclusive. Among the 33
agreements surveyed that provide potentially excludable benefits to members, more
restrict membership (twenty) than do not (thirteen). However, the relationship is not very
strong (lambda = .259), and is not statistically significant. Accordingly, this study finds
that the MEAs surveyed are consistent with the expectations of IM1, but that statistical
support remains only modest.
The theoretical significance of this finding is that the desire to exclude non-
participants from enjoying agreement benefits, hypothesized by many rational
institutionalists, does not appear to be a major influence on the design of membership
rules among the MEAs surveyed in this study. While these agreements do not contradict
hypothesis IM 1, the relationship is not statistically significant and, in any event, the
association between potentially excludable goods and restrictive membership is too slight
to sustain any strong conclusions.
The second rational institutionalist hypothesis (IM2) concerning membership is
that negotiators will respond to enforcement problems by choosing specific entry into
force conditions expected to mitigate enforcement concerns. A corollary of this is that
states will not promise to comply with such agreements prior to their entry into force.
Testing the rational institutionalist hypothesis that entry into force conditions
serve as “tipping points” (for wider participation) is difficult because the claim involves a
number of factors (Barrett 2003). First, the tipping effect of entry into force conditions
applies only to agreements that are not already self-enforcing. If states have no incentive
to “cheat” under an agreement, then entry into force is a mere formality. Interested states
will have no reason to wait for entry into force before complying with an agreement’s
provisions. When there are enforcement problems, the strategic use of entry into force
criteria can permit states to approve agreements formally without the risk of assuming
unreciprocated obligations. More states will be comfortable ratifying an agreement with
conditional commitments. The more states that ratify, the greater the perceived benefits
of cooperation for other states considering ratification. The number of participating
states increases until a tipping point is reached, at which the agreement has overcome the
initial enforcement problem and has become self-enforcing.
Therefore, an empirical test of this hypothesis should be confined to agreements
associated with at least moderate enforcement problems. That translates in this study to
values of at least ‘medium’ (0.5) on the indicator, ENFORCEM. The next step is to
determine the extent to which negotiators have set specific criteria for entry into force
based on minimum participation levels, and Indicators EIFCOND and NRATIFY
capture these variables. The third step focuses on agreements using relatively high
minimum participation conditions and asks whether or not parties to these agreements
have agreed to comply with their provisions prior to entry into force. Public
commitments to comply prior to entry into force, captured in this study by the indicator,
ACTEARTY, would falsify the rational institutionalist claim that minimum participation
thresholds serve as tipping points for participation in multilateral agreements.
The constraints on empirical testing of the first rational institutionalist hypothesis
are relevant again here. Testing hypothesis 1M2 requires a two-level cross tabulation of
the three indicators mentioned above: ENFORCEM, EIFCOND, and ACTEARLY
Since the number of multilateral agreements surveyed in this study is too low to permit
reliable regression or logit analysis, the analysis at this point is restricted largely to
descriptive inference.
In fact, the results from a cross tabulation of these three indicators, shown below
in Table 4.5, are highly consistent with hypothesis 1M2. First, this hypothesis predicts
that, as the severity of enforcement problems increases, negotiators will increasingly use
substantive criteria for entry into force. The actual distribution of cases in Table 4.5 is
consistent with this expectation. Among agreements facing low (or no) enforcement
problems, only one of nine ( 1 1.1%) used such conditions.
Table 4.5 Crosstabulation: ENEORCEM x EIFCOND x ACTEARLY
Agree to comply before
entry into force?
Enforcement Problem No Yes Total
None Substantive conditions No 1 I 2
for entry into force?
Total 1 1 2
Low Substantive conditions No 3 3 6
for entry into force? Yes 1 0 1
Total 4 3 7
Medium Substantive conditions No 14 2 16
for entry into force? Yes 2 0 2
Total 16 2 18
Strong Substantive conditions No 3 1 4
for entry into force? Yes 3 0 3
Total 6 1 7
Very Strong Substantive conditions No 1 1 2
for entry into force? Yes 4 0 4
Total 5 1 6
Among agreements facing moderate enforcement problems, two of eighteen (11.1%)
used such conditions. However, three of seven (42.9%) agreements facing strong
enforcement problems made entry into force contingent on substantive criteria. Four of
six (66.7%) agreements facing very strong enforcement problems did so
Hypothesis 1M2 also predicts that as the severity of enforcement problems
increases, states will not agree to comply with an agreement prior to its entry into legal
force. It further expects that states will be even less likely to comply “early” with
agreements that use substantive entry into force conditions. The data in Table 4.5 are
consistent with each of these expectations. States agreed to comply prior to entry into
force in four of the nine (44.4%) cases involving agreements with little to no enforcement
problems. However, states agreed to such “early” compliance in only two of thirteen
( 1 5.4%) cases involving strong or very strong enforcement problems. The evidence for
the second prediction is even stronger; there were no cases of states promising “early”
compliance with agreements that used substantively conditional entry into force. The
surveyed cases thus provide strong prima facie evidence in support of 1M2. However,
further testing on a larger number of cases will be necessary to establish whether the
relationships identified above are statistically significant.
The theoretical significance of these findings is rather modest. A true test of IM2
would require a very different research design: one that considers the timing and
sequencing of states’ ratification of an agreement, as well as an ex ante specification of
individual state interests. The logic behind the hypothesis is that while states may be
concerned about free riding upon concluding an agreement, they may be able to identify a
threshold of participation above which participation looks attractive, regardless of
inaction by remaining laggard states. The trick for negotiators, then, is to identify a
common threshold, and to use it as the basis for entry into force conditions. That way
states can ratify, free from significant worries about free riding or unreciprocated
cooperation.
Since it was not possible to specify states’ participation thresholds ex ante or to
consider the timing and sequence of ratifications here, this study attempted to test the
hypothesis further by examining how often ratifying states promised to comply with
agreements prior to entry into force. Such a promise would falsify the claim that states
view entry into force requirements as minimum participation thresholds that will
safeguard them from unreciprocated cooperation. As mentioned above, none of the
surveyed agreements incorporating substantive entry into force conditions secured such
promises of ‘early’ compliance. Thus, the balance of evidence is consistent with the
rational institutionalist theory underlying hypothesis 1M2. Nevertheless, more research is
necessary to evaluate this hypothesis fully.
Realist Hypotheses on Membership
The first Realist hypothesis on membership (RM 1 ) is that distributional and
relative gains concerns will drive states to use inclusive membership rules. Thus
inclusive or unrestricted membership criteria will covary directly with the salience of
distributional concerns. Three of the indicators described earlier provide leverage on this
hypothesis: MEMCR1T (conditions governing eligibility for membership), RESTRICT
(whether or not an agreement in open to any interested state), and ELIGIBLE (the
number of states eligible for membership). The primary indicator of distributional
concerns in the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements is DISTCONF
(relevance of distributional conflict in negotiations).
This study tests this hypothesis by comparing mean scores on DISTCONF
between agreements that contained no fonnal restrictions on membership and those that
did. This latter distinction is made using RESTRICT As Figure 4.5 shows, the
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difference in distributional conflict scores between restricted and unrestricted agreements
is consistent with the realist hypothesis.
Figure 4.5 Distribution of DISTCONF scores for restricted and open agreements
The middle fifty percent of restricted agreements score between Tow' and ‘medium' on
DISTCONF. By comparison, the middle fifty percent of open agreements rank between
‘medium’ and ‘very strong' on DISTCONF.
Since DISTCONF is measured ordinally, and since there are two groups being
compared (restricted and unrestricted membership), a Mann-Whitney U test was
conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that open agreements are associated with greater
distributional conflict than are restrictive ones. The results of the test were statistically
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significant (z = -3.601 ,P< .001). As expected, open agreements had a substantially
higher mean rank (34.29) on DISTCONF than did restrictive agreements ( 1 9.98).
Although the results of the Mann-Whitney U test provide strong evidence that
open and restricted agreements are associated with differing levels of distributional
conflict, this information does not by itself suffice to establish a causal relationship.
Since the independent variable in this relationship (the decision to restrict membership) is
dichotomous, the appropriate statistical procedure to test for relation is logistic
regression.
Table 4.6 presents the results for a logistic regression of RESTRICT on
DISTCONF. Consistent with RM1, distributional conflict is a statistically significant
predictor of negotiators’ decision to use unrestricted membership. The odds ratio of an
agreement using unrestricted membership criteria increases by a factor of nearly three
(2.88) for each ordinal increase in the salience of distributional conflict in negotiations.
The constant, 0.081, reflects the odds ratio of an agreement restricting membership when
distributional conflicts were not relevant in negotiations; that is, when DISTCONF = 0.
This ratio corresponds to a probability of 7.5%.
Table 4.6 Logistic regression results: RESTRICT on DISTCONF
B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Odds Ratio
DISTCONF 1.059 .322 10.796 1 .001 2.882
Constant
-2.51
1
.834 9.056 1 .003 .081
When distributional conflict is “low,” for example, the odds ratio then equals 0.081 *
2.882 = 0.233. This corresponds to a probability of roughly 18.9%. The full probability
distribution is represented graphically in Figure 4.6. Though simplistic, the model
performs quite well, correctly predicting over seventy-two percent of multilateral
agreements in the IRD.
Figure 4.6 Probability of unrestricted membership
According to RM 1, the ultimate distribution of an agreement’s costs and benefits
should be fairly symmetrical. RM 1 rests on expectations that issues presenting
irresolvable distribution problems are not amenable to multilateral governance.
However, it also suggests that it may be possible on occasion for negotiators to mitigate
distributional problems by deliberately expanding membership. The obvious obstacle to
incorporating these indicators in the present evaluation is that they are, according to
RM1, endogenous. Accordingly, the only way to falsify RM1 using indicators of actual
cost/benefit distributions is to demonstrate the presence of restricted agreements with
asymmetrical costs and benefits. To accomplish this, cost-benefit distributional
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indicators DISTBEN and DISTCOST can be cross tabulated with RESTRICT. Tables
4.7 and 4.8 present the results.
No correlation statistics are provided because RM 1 does not imply a linear
relationship between cost-benefit distribution and membership; here we are mostly
concerned with the two leftmost columns in each table, representing asymmetric
Table 4.7 Crosstabulation: DISTBEN x RESTRICT
Highly
Asymmetric
Distribution of benefits [DISTBEN]
Moderately Fairly
Asymmetric Mixed Symmetric
Highly
Symmetric
Total
Unrestricted No
4 7 4 4 7 26
membership
Yes | 12 3 4 6 26
Total 5 19 7 8 13 52
Table 4.8 Crosstabulation: DISTCOST x RESTRICT
Distribution of Costs [DISTCOST] Total
Highly Moderately Fairly Highly
Asymmetric Asymmetric Mixed Symmetric Symmetric
Unrestricted no O 7 26
membership
O 1 O /
yes l 18 1 4 2 26
Total 5 24 2 12 9 52
distributions of costs and benefits. Among surveyed agreements that provide asymmetric
benefits, thirteen of twenty-four (54.2%) do not restrict membership. Among negotiated
agreements that entail asymmetric costs, nineteen of twenty-nine (65.5%) do not restrict
membership. Again, these cross tabulations do not constitute a true hypothesis test
because, according to RM1, the ultimate distribution of costs and benefits may be
influenced by membership criteria. However, these results do suggest that the
distribution of benefits from MEAs is less salient than the distribution of costs in
influencing membership criteria. As with the logistic model, these cross tabulations are
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largely consistent with RM
1 , but suggest that there are more influences on membership
criteria than just distributional conflict during negotiations.
In summary, the theoretical significance of these findings is strong support for the
realist claim that negotiators will favor open or expansionary membership in response to
distributional problems or relative gains concerns. A variety of tests combine to provide
the strongest empirical support so far for any of the hypotheses. Logistic regression
shows that distributional problems are a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision not
to restricted membership in a multilateral agreement. Moreover, the two cross
tabulations involving RESTRICT and the indicators D1STBEN and D1STCOST suggest
that hypothesis RM 1 may even be refined further. Among surveyed agreements, the
distribution of agreement-related costs appear to be more important than the distribution
of agreement-governed benefits in driving this relationship.
The second realist hypothesis (RM2) is that states will seek to mitigate the
problem of free riding by setting strict conditions for entry into force. From a realist
perspective, this strategy does not obviate the need for compliance monitoring but does
offer some protection against states incurring unreciprocal obligations. The most direct
way to test this hypothesis is to compare the mean number of ratifications necessary for
an agreement to enter into force across different groups of agreements ordered by the
relevance of distributional costs in negotiations. Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of
number of ratifications necessary for entry into force for each ordinal category of
DISTCONF.
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Figure 4.7 Distribution of NRATIF by DISTCONF
Salience of Distributional Conflict in Negotiations
A Kruskal-Wallis test was then conducted to further scrutinize the difference
between these distributions. The test was significant, x‘ (4, N=42) = 1 1 .123, p = .025.
These results shown in Table 4.9 support RM2. The difference in mean ranks among
agreements in the five groups is statistically significant, with agreements characterized by
greater distributional conflict requiring relatively greater numbers of signatures.
I able 4.9 Kruskal-Wallis Test of Ranks: NRATIFY x DISTCONF
Salience of Distributional
Conflict in Negotiations N Mean Rank
Number of None 2 4 1 .00
ratifications necessary
for entry into force
Low
Medium
7 15.50
1 1 18.50
Strong 13 19.19
Very Strong 9 28.83
Total 42
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However, two cautions are in order. First, the differences between the
distributions, although statistically significant, are very modest. With the exception of
agreements negotiated against very strong distributional conflict, the distributions are
substantially similar. Second, it is possible - if not probable - that agreements requiring
relatively larger numbers of ratifications also are open to larger numbers of states to join.
Therefore, before concluding that RM2 is strongly supported, it is necessary to
control for the number of states eligible for membership in an agreement. To accomplish
this, a new variable, PCTRATIF, was created by dividing the number of states eligible
for membership by the number of ratifications required for entry into force. The resulting
number, with a maximum value of one, provides one way to gauge the extent to which
negotiators made entry into force contingent on broad participation.
Table 4. 10 presents results from a Kruskal- Wallis test conducted with this new,
computed variable. Controlling in this way for the number of states eligible to join an
agreement changes the results considerably. The test is no longer significant, (4,
N=38) = .877, p = .928. When accounting for the number of states eligible for
membership, there is no basis to conclude that any systematic relationship exists between
distributional conflict and number of ratifications necessary for entry into force.
Table 4.10 kruskal-VVallis Test of Ranks: PCTRATIF x DISTCONF
Salience of Distributional
Conflict in Negotiations N Mean Rank
Percentage of None 1 16.00
ratifications Low 6 2 1 .00
necessary for entry
into force
Medium 9 21.1
1
Strong 13 17.46
Very Strong
Total
9
38
20.22
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By the logic of hypothesis RM2, it is reasonable to expect negotiators to choose
strict entry into force conditions in response to enforcement concerns as well as
distributional conflict. Therefore, two additional Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted
using ENFORCEM in place of DISTCONF: one comparing distributions of the total
number of ratifications necessary for entry into force for each ordinal value of
ENFORCEM, and one comparing distributions of the percentage of ratifications
necessary for entry into force, grouped by each ordinal value of ENFORCEM. Neither of
these tests shows any systematic relationship between the severity of enforcement
problems and the number of ratifications necessary for entry into force.
So far, the IRD data reveal very little empirical support for hypothesis RM2.
Although agreements negotiated against greater levels of distributional conflict appear to
require a greater numbers of ratifications for entry into force, in fact this relationship is
merely a by-product of a relationship between the number of states eligible to join an
agreement and the level of distributional conflict in negotiations. The severity of the
enforcement problems facing agreements also does not appear to have any influence on
either the absolute number of ratifications necessary for entry into force or the percentage
of ratifications necessary for entry into force.
Generic minimum participation thresholds are relatively crude instruments of
institutional design, however. Negotiators have other ways to make entry into force
conditional to mitigate concerns of free riding, particularly making an agreement’s entry
into legal force contingent on ratification or approval by a set of states representing a
certain proportion of the activity being regulated Negotiators sometimes go so far as to
require participation by specific state(s) for an agreement to enter into force. Such
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conditions offer more precision than do minimum participation thresholds. If variation in
minimum participation thresholds is incongruent with RM2, one plausible explanation is
that negotiators are achieving the same ends, perhaps even more effectively, by using
such substantive conditions.
This study uses a binary indicator, EIFCOND, to reflect the use of substantive
criteria for entry into force. The first test of RM2 is to compare mean ranks on
DISTCONF, and ENFORCEM, for the two values of EIFCOND.
Once again, the appropriate procedure is the Mann-Whitney U test. Agreements using
substantive entry into force conditions rank higher on DISTCONF than do agreements
which do not use substantive entry into force criteria. The test was significant (z = -
2.105, p = .035), so this study can reject the null hypothesis that the distributions for both
values are the same.
Table 4.1 1 Mann-Whitnev U Test: EIFCOND x DISTCONF
Substantively conditional Mean Sum of
entry into force? N Rank Ranks
Salience of
distributional conflict
No
30 18.33 550.00
Yes 10 27.00 270.00
Total 40
Similarly, the result for the Mann-Whitney test using ENFORCEM is statistically
significant (z = -2.608, p = .009). As Table 4. 12 shows, the mean rank on ENFORCEM
of agreements using substantively conditional entry into force is significantly greater than
that of agreements without such conditions.
Table 4.12 Mann-VYhitney test: EIFCOND x ENFORCEM
Substantively conditional
entry into force? N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Enforcement Problems No 30 17,80 534.00
Yes 10 28.60 286.00
Total 40
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Since this difference is highly significant, and since this study uses a dichotomous
indicator of substantive entry into force conditions, logistic regression was used to
determine whether or not the severity of enforcement problems associated with an
agreement is a significant predictor of the decision to use substantively conditional entry
into force requirements. Table 4. 12 presents logistic regression results for the single
predictor model. It shows that ENFORCEM is, in fact, a significant predictor of the use
of substantive conditions for entry into force.
Table 4.13 Logistic Regression of EIFCOND on ENFORCEM
B S.E. Wald df Sig.
Odds
Ratio
[101 G] 1.106 .443 6.246 1 .012 3.023
Constant
-3.882 1.257 9.539 1 .002 .02)
This single predictor model (using ENFORCEM) also was statistically reliable and
accurate in predicting whether or not an agreement used such conditions. It correctly
'y
classifies over 80% of agreements in the IRD, with a pseudo-R~ of .262.
As these results make clear, the severity of the enforcement problem surrounding a
multilateral environmental agreement is a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to
design substantive criteria for the entry into force of an agreement. The results also
suggest that other, additional factors influence negotiators’ decisions to use such
conditions. Other factors not included in the current model likely are necessary to predict
correctly a higher percentage of agreements.
Figure 4.8 sheds light on why this is the case, Based on the results presented in
Table 4.13 (i.e., the value of the constant and the odds ratio), it is possible to plot the
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model’s predicted probability of any new agreement using substantively contingent entry
into force conditions.
Figure 4.8 Predicted Probability of substantive entry into force conditions
In the single predictor model using ENFORCEM, the probability of an agreement using
such conditions is greater than 0.5 only for those agreements confronting very strong
enforcement problems. The fact that several agreements with lower scores on
ENFORCEM use such conditions implies, again, that while enforcement problems are a
significant predictor of substantively conditional entry into force, other influences factor
into the decision
This study finds strong support not only for the realist hypothesis concerning who
can participate (RM 1 ) but also for the realist hypothesis concerning who must participate
(RM2). One theoretically significant finding is that negotiators do not design general
minimum participation thresholds in response to enforcement problems or relative gains
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concerns. As shown above in Table 4.10, controlling for the number of eligible states
demonstrates that general minimum participation thresholds are actually fairly constant,
regardless of the severity of distribution or enforcement problems.
A second theoretically significant finding is that enforcement and distributional
problems both are significantly related to negotiators' decision to design specific,
substantive criteria for entry into force. Thus, the evidence suggests that negotiators
prefer attempting to mitigate concerns of free-riding by making an MEAs’ entry into
legal force contingent on the satisfaction of specific substantive criteria, such as the
requirement that MARPOL be ratified not only by a minimum of twelve states, but by
twelve states which collectively account for at least fifty per cent of the world’s merchant
shipping.
Table 4.12 shows that agreements including such conditional entry into force
score significantly higher on ENFORCEM than those that do not. Furthermore, the
logistic regression described by Table 4. 13 shows that the severity of enforcement
problems surrounding an agreement is a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to
make an agreement’s entry into legal force contingent on the satisfaction of substantive
criteria. These results strongly support the realist argument that negotiators will be
especially concerned to resolve problems of free-riding when designing multilateral
agreements. However, although this study finds strong support for the realist hypothesis
that negotiators will use strict entry into force conditions in response to enforcement
problems, it also finds that enforcement problems most likely are not the only significant
influences on negotiators’ decision to design substantive criteria for entry into force.
This is reinforced by the moderate explanatory power of the single-variable regression
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described in Table 4.13. Thus, although there is strong support for hypothesis RM2,
there is also good reason to explore this relationship further in future research.
Constructivist Hypotheses on Membership
The first constructivist hypothesis holds that the way in which negotiators
perceive a problem shapes the choice of policy responses. In particular, the perception
that a given issue constitutes a crisis has specific implications for the range of politically
acceptable policy options (Haas 2001; Kingdon 1984; Litfin 1994). While specific
programmatic responses vary from one individual case to the next, hypothesis CM1
expects that perceived crises will make the use of restrictive membership and entry into
force criteria (important in realist and rational institutionalist explanations) politically
unacceptable.
A number of specific indicators are relevant to conducting an empirical test of this
claim. The degree to which multilateral negotiations owe their place on the international
agenda to an external shock / perceived crisis is captured by the indicator, SHOCKNEG.
This indicator is coded ordinally: no relevance, low relevance, medium relevance, strong
relevance, very strong relevance. Hypothesis CM1 is not specified as a linear
relationship, however. It is expressed as a dichotomous contingency; perceived shocks /
crises either shaped the negotiation and design of a given multilateral agreement, or they
did not. For present purposes, then, it will be necessary to transform the ordinal values
into a binary (yes/no) indicator. Agreements for which the influence of external shocks
was coded ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ are coded ‘yes’; agreements for which the influence
of external shocks was coded ‘medium’ or lower are coded ‘no’
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The first step in evaluating hypothesis CM1 is to determine whether negotiations
catalyzed by external shocks / crises are, in fact, associated with the choice not to restrict
membership. Since both SHOCKNEG and RESTRICT are dichotomous, the relationship
can be expressed in a simple cross tabulation. As Table 4. 14 shows, the proportion of
agreements with restricted membership is nearly identical whether or not negotiations
were driven by external shocks or crises. Thus the null hypothesis that the presence of
external shocks has no influence on the decision to restrict membership, cannot be
rejected.
Table 4.14 Crosstabulation: RESTRICT x SHOCKNEG
Agenda Driven by
External Shock
No Yes Total
Restricted No 21 6 27
Membership Yes 22 5 27
Total 43 11 54
There may be a compelling explanation for this negative finding. After
agreements (e.g., protocols) in which membership is restricted to parties to the relevant
framework convention, the second most common type of membership restriction among
surveyed agreements is geographic. This reflects the basic fact that not all environmental
issues are global in scope. Likewise, not all external shocks result in the perception of
global crisis. Put simply, it may be inappropriate to expect external shocks to create
pressure for unrestricted membership
A second prediction ofCM 1 is that negotiators responding to external shocks will
not choose strict conditions for agreements’ entry into legal force. Specifically, ifCM 1 is
accurate, one would expect negotiators responding to external shocks: ( 1 ) to require
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ratification by relatively fewer numbers of states, and (2) to be less likely to use
substantive criteria for entry into force.
For present purposes, the relative number of ratifications required for an
agreement to enter into force, PCTRATIF, is represented as a scale variable, with values
ranging from 0 to 1 . The specific value represents the number of ratifications required
for entry into force divided by the estimated number of states eligible for membership.
Figure 4.9 shows the distributions of this statistic for agreements negotiated in response
to a perceived crisis, and those that are not.
Figure 4.9 Distribution of PCTRATIF by SHOCKBIN
The median value for agreements negotiated in response to a perceived crisis
(roughly 0,1 ) is only one-third of the median value for agreements not negotiated in
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response to a crisis (roughly 0.3). Nevertheless, as Figure 4.9 shows, there is substantial
overlap between the two distributions.
Next, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that
negotiators will require a lower ratification threshold for entry into force when they are
responding to a crisis than they would if they were not. The means were consistent with
the hypothesis. On average, agreements negotiated in response to a crisis required
ratification by a lower percentage of eligible countries (mean = .288, SD = .350) than did
agreements that were not negotiated in response to a crisis (mean = .400, SD = .344).
However, standard deviations for both values were quite large, and the test was
not significant (t (36) = .797, p = .431). Therefore, this study cannot reject the null
hypothesis that population means are equal for both types of agreements. With respect to
hypothesis CM 1, these results indicate that there is very little evidence to support the
claim that agreements negotiated in response to external shocks require ratification by
relatively more states than do agreements not negotiated in response to such shocks.
Finally, CM1 expects that agreements negotiated in response to external shocks
will be less likely to use substantively conditional entry into force. Rather, negotiators
will seek to ensure that the agreement will enter into force quickly. This proposition can
be evaluated by using a simple 2x2 cross tabulation of SHOCKNEG and E1FCOND.
Table 4.14 presents the results of this cross tabulation, as well as a directional measure of
association (since it makes no sense to test whether criteria for entry into force causes
external shocks).
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Table 4.15 Crosstabulation EIFCOND x SHOCKNEG
External Shock
No Yes Total
Substantive Condition No 22 10 32
for Entry Into Force Yes 8 0 8
Total 30 10 40
Measure of Association
Asymp. Approx. Approx.
Value Std. Error T Sig.
Uncertainty EIFCOND
coefficient Dependent .1 16 .042 2.436 .022
Notably, there are no cases of agreements responding to a perceived crisis and
using substantively conditional entry into force. Because no agreements fall into the
lower right cell of Table 4.14, no lambda coefficient is provided for this table. Instead,
this study reports the uncertainty coefficient: another proportional reduction of error
(PRE) measure of association. In this case, knowing that an agreement was negotiated in
response to a perceived crisis provides a modest (0. 1 16) but significant (p = .022)
improvement in ability to predict whether negotiators will use substantive conditions for
entry into force. In essence, this statistic reveals that the presence of an external shock is
not, by itself, a good predictor of the decision to make entry into force contingent on
ratifying states meeting substantive conditions. This result is not surprising, given that
the majority of all agreements in Table 4.14 do not include such conditions.
In summary, the above data support the interpretation that the absence of external
shocks or crises may be a necessary condition for the use of substantive entry into force
conditions. This is consistent with hypothesis CM1, which does not predict a linear
relationship However, the absence of a perceived crisis is not a sufficient condition tor
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the use of such conditions. There must be other variables relevant to negotiators’
decision to make an agreement’s entry into force conditional.
Thus, the results of the preceding empirical tests support hypothesis CM 1 , but
suggest that additional refinement is possible. For example, there is very little evidence
to suggest that external shocks significantly influence the decision whether or not to
restrict eligibility for membership in an agreement. Likewise, there is very little evidence
to support the claim that negotiators require ratification by relatively fewer parties for
entry into force when they are responding to external shocks. Flowever, there is strong
evidence that negotiators do not augment minimum participation thresholds for entry into
force with restrictive substantive conditions (as does, for example, the Kyoto Protocol to
the UNFCCC).
The results of these tests are similar to those for hypothesis RM2. In this case,
there is no evidence to suggest that negotiators respond shared perceptions of crisis by
requiring a lower number of ratifications for entry into force. Rather, the primary
theoretical significance of these findings derives from the evidence that negotiators
driven by a shared perception of crisis do not appear to use substantive criteria for entry
into force. As Table 4. 1 5 shows, all of the surveyed agreements incorporating such
conditions were negotiated under non-crisis? ‘normal’ (as opposed to crisis) conditions.
Likewise, no agreements negotiated primarily in response to a perceived crisis used such
conditions.
These results support the constructivist argument that perceived crises can
override rational institutionalist and realist concerns with free riding and enforcement
problems. Under such circumstances, negotiators will feel greater pressure to “succeed”
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in designing agreements that may be concluded and enter into force quickly. In short,
while there is little evidence to suggest that crises decisively influence negotiators
response to the question of which states may participate in an agreement, there is strong
evidence that crises influence negotiators not to require substantial levels of participation
for entry into force. Of course, perceived crises may influence the design of MEAs in
other ways than membership and participation rules. These concerns will be taken up in
the following chapters.
The second constructivist hypothesis (CM2) expects that, at least initially,
negotiators will prioritize breadth of participation over depth of cooperation. This
hypothesis derives from a broader model of international cooperation, in which
negotiators seek to maximize participation in a regime to build normative and political
support for action in a given issue area before attempting to set specific, binding policies.
This model, generally referred to as the framework convention - protocol approach to
international environmental law, can be contrasted with a rationalist “sequential”
approach that emphasizes the initial depth of agreement over breadth of initial
participation (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998, 398). In short, the framework
convention - protocol approach prioritizes initial participation over agreement depth,
with the goal of spreading norms and developing political support for deeper cooperation
in the future by as many parties as possible. In contrast, the sequential approach
prioritizes agreement depth over participation, with the goal of persuading new members
to join in the future.
Hypothesis CM2 is included in this study because the ideas that underlie it are
central to constructivist understandings of multilateral cooperation. Developing
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satisfactory empirical tests of this hypothesis, however, requires a longitudinal research
design far beyond that required to test other hypotheses on membership, delegation, and
flexibility in MEAs. In part this is because hypothesis CM2 provides a bridge from focus
on the design and choice of multilateral institutional forms in international environmental
politics to questions of the consequences and relative effectiveness of different
institutional designs.
Although a comparative evaluation of the two pathways’ effectiveness in
fostering “deep” cooperation lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to
scrutinize the validity of the distinction. Namely, does a tradeoff exist between
membership and depth of cooperation? A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to compare
scores on the ordinal indicator, AGRDEPTH, between restricted and open agreements.
Among surveyed agreements, open and restricted agreements rank almost identically in
depth of cooperation. The test was not significant, however (z = -.277, p = .782).
Consequently, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in
agreement depth between inclusive and restrictive agreements.
One remaining possibility concerning the constructivist design of membership
rules is that negotiators will choose open membership rules, regardless of concern for
depth of cooperation. This expectation is consistent with the normative content of
multilateralism identified by Ruggie and described in Chapter 3. This approach expects
that multilateralism, in general, entails commitment to norms of nonexclusion and
impartiality These norms will be manifest in multilateral agreements that do not restrict
membership and that do not provide unequal benefits to members.
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It is possible to arrive at a general estimate of the openness of surveyed
agreements by calculating the percentage of agreements that restrict membership by any
of the several criteria introduced at the beginning of the chapter. As Table 4.15 shows,
the most common basis for restricting membership among surveyed agreements was
participation in another pre-existing agreement (thirty-seven percent). Since most of
those pre-exsiting agreements are open, these agreements may be considered to be
effectively open themselves. The only other criteria used in more than one-fourth of
surveyed agreements were geography and status as a user of the good in question.
Commitment to particular economic system barely registers as a basis for restriction, and
none of the surveyed agreements were restricted according to form of domestic
government.
Table 4.16 Frequenc> of Membership Restrictions
Membership Criteria Frequency
Participation in Another Agreement .37
Geographic .28
Status as User of a Good .26
Role in Causing Problem .11
Expertise in Issue Area .06
Potential to Help Problem Solving .06
Domestic Economy 04
Domestic Government .00
No Membership Criteria .28
The theoretical significance of these findings is twofold. First, they support
recent research on that questions the validity of the participation - depth of cooperation
tradeoff in international cooperation (Gilligan 2004). Second, membership restrictions ot
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any type - and particularly those based on economic or political policy - are rare among
MEAs. This is broadly consistent with the view that multilateral environmental politics
may be characterized by general norms of non-exclusion and impartiality (Ruggie
1993b). While hypothesis CM2 is silent concerning the occasions when negotiators have
restricted membership, the normative content of multilateralism may structure the
environment in which design choices are made.
Summary of Findings
The results of the empirical analyses of the rational institutionalist, realist, and
constructivist hypotheses concerning membership are summarized in Table 4.17. To
recap, this study found strong support for both realist hypotheses concerning
membership. Logistic regression shows that distributional conflict is a significant
predictor of negotiators’ choice of open membership (RM 1 ). Similarly, enforcement
problems are a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to design specific,
substantive criteria for agreements’ entry into legal force (RM2).
This study found mixed support for both constructivist hypotheses concerning
membership. In no cases did negotiators respond to a perceived crisis by designing
specific criteria for entry into force. However, unlike distribution or enforcement
problems, crises are not significant predictors of negotiators’ decision (not) to design
such conditions. Furthermore, there is no evidence that negotiators respond to crises by
requiring relatively fewer ratifications for entry into force (thus speeding the process).
With respect to hypothesis CM2, this study finds strong support, but only for half of the
predictions. There is no systematic evidence among surveyed agreements of a tradeoff
between inclusive membership and agreement depth However, there is evidence that the
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overall frequency of membership restrictions is low. The frequency of potentially
divisive (e.g., political or economic) restrictions is almost nil.
Finally, this study found only modest support for the two rational institutionalist
hypotheses. The first hypothesis (IM1), that membership is restricted when excludable
benefits are at stake, receives little support for the same reason that hypothesis CM2
receives strong support: membership restrictions simply are rare among the surveyed
agreements. The second hypothesis requires more information to test than this study can
consider. Nevertheless, the available evidence is consistent with hypothesis 1M2: states
did not promise to comply prior to entry into force in the face of enforcement problems
and conditional entry into force. This suggests that the design and interpretation of entry
into force conditions are governed more by a logic of consequences than by a logic of
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). However, a diachronic research design and
information about state preferences are necessary to evaluate hypothesis IM2 fully.
The next section examines these hypotheses in light of specific cases: the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer These case analyses contributes to this chapter
by demonstrating whether or not the causal mechanisms specified (or implied) by the
various hypotheses were present. In doing so, these studies may confirm results of the
preceding empirical analysis. They may also highlight false positives. That is, they may
help identify whether the positive relationships identified in the empirical analyses are
genuine or spurious. The examination of outliers and negative cases may further help
this study to identify potential refinements to the hypotheses as well as the limits of the
hypotheses under consideration.
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Table 4.17 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings on Membership
Hyp Description Support Notes
Negotiators will choose inclusive Strong Nevertheless, other
membership criteria in response to Distributional conflict factors also influence
RM1
relative gains concerns is a significant predictor the decision to restrict
of the decision not to membership.
s
restrict membership.
C/5
Negotiators will respond to Strong / Mixed There is no evidence
QJ enforcement problems by choosing The severity of that negotiators require
strict criteria for entry into force. enforcement problems a greater number of
RM2 is a significant predictor generic ratifications in
of the decision to use response to
specific, substantive
entry into force criteria.
enforcement problems.
When distributional problems are Modest / Weak Not statistically
present, negotiators will not provide Restricted membership significant; more cases
excludable benefits in the absence of is slightly more would be helpful in
£
C/5
IMl restrictive membership criteria. common among analyzing multi-level
"S agreements that provide hypotheses such as
c
o potentially excludable this.
3 benefits.
C/5
S When confronted with enforcement Modest / Weak Not statistically
problems, negotiators will not Cross tabulations show significant; more cases
«
C promise (state) action prior to an that negotiators have would be helpful in
c
IM2 agreement's entry into legal force not promised “early” analyzing multi-level
QS
compliance hypotheses such as
this.
Negotiators will be less likely to Strong / Mixed There is no evidence
restrict membership or entry into Negotiators do not that external shocks
force when responding to external appear to required influence negotiators’
shocks or perceived crises. specific conditions for decision not to restrict
CM 1 entry into force when eligibility for
£
C/5
>
responding to crises. membership in MEAs.
CJ
3 When necessary, negotiators will Modest / Mixed Evaluating alternate
C/5
prioritize breadth of participation Some evidence of pathways to
S
O over depth of cooperation; this general norms of cooperation bridges
u approach to multilateralism sustains nonexclusion; no institutional "design”
CM2
deeper cooperation than alternative, evidence of breadth and “effectiveness,”
“sequential admission” approaches. depth tradeoff. and is a promising area
for future research
”
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Exploring Membership Design: Case Studies
This section supplements the preceding analysis by comparing the negotiation
of entry into force conditions for two pairs of cases: acid rain and stratospheric ozone
depletion. The object is not to choose a representative sample of all multilateral
environmental agreements but, rather, to illuminate certain hypotheses by searching for
relevant differences among similarly structured cases (Mitchell 2006). The following
four agreements were selected because each involves regulation of air pollution among
a large number of potential (and actual) participants. The four agreements that will be
considered are the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP) and the 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions, and the 1985
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and 1987 Montreal Protocol.
These four cases will be used to examine the same three sets of hypotheses on
membership in MEAs considered in the statistical study. Realism expects that
negotiators will favor expansive membership when confronted with relative gains
concerns, and will respond to increasing enforcement problems by designing
increasingly strict criteria for entry into force. Rational institutionalism expects that
negotiators facing distributional conflicts will neither offer nor oblige state action prior
to entry into force Finally, constructivism expects that negotiators will respond to
conflicts of interest with shallower agreements and lenient entry into force conditions,
to maximize participation and facilitate future consensus building.
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Negotiations for the 1979 LRTAP Convention were conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), on the heels
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of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Initially, at least, negotiations were driven not by environmental concern but, rather, by
a general desire among negotiating parties to further the process of detente. The Soviet
Union, in particular, perceived environmental issues as a more promising area of
opportunity for further diplomatic process than human rights or arms control. After
deciding on the environmental, the ECE then chose air pollution as the most suitable
candidate for an East-West accord (Levy 1993, 81; Wettestad 2002, 197).
That LRTAP negotiations were conducted under ECE auspices highlights the
fact that states and their delegated representatives seldom negotiate cooperative
agreements entirely de novo. Usually, negotiated agreements are nested within one or
more existing institutional structures, the selection of which is not always without
controversy. Though much existing work on “forum shopping” focuses on the
selection of venues for dispute resolution (see, for example, Busch 1999^forthcoming),
it is plausible that such phenomena are also significant in the negotiation of new
agreements. The negotiation and design of multilateral agreements is but one stage in
the larger process of international cooperation.
The LRTAP convention enjoyed nearly universal participation among eligible
entities when it was concluded in November 1979. According to Article 14,1 of the
convention, participation in the agreement was open to ( 1 ) the member states of the
ECE, (2) states having consultative status with the ECE, and (3) regional economic
organizations constituted by member states of the ECE, namely the European
Community. Thirty of the thirty-three members of the ECE at that time signed the
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convention: only Albania, Malta, and Cyprus failed to do so. Additionally, the
convention was signed by Liechtenstein, the Holy See, and the European Community.
Article 16 of the LRTAP convention stipulated that it would enter into force
ninety days following the deposit of the twenty-fourth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession. The convention did not specify any further
conditions (e.g., ratification by parties accounting for a certain proportion of emissions)
for entry into force. The LRTAP convention entered into legal force on 16 March
1983.
The LRTAP convention itself has been described as a “least common
denominator” compromise (Chasek et al 2006, 102). It did not contain binding targets
or schedules for emissions reductions. Rather, it established a collective norm of
reducing transboundary air pollution and institutionalized international information-
sharing. Specific policy commitments were deferred to future protocols to the
agreement in order to secure participation of then “laggard” states such as the United
Kingdom and the United States.
At the first meeting of parties following the convention’s entry into force, the
Nordic countries proposed a protocol to the convention that would oblige parties to
reduce their emission of sulfur dioxide to thirty percent of 1980 levels by 1993. There
was greater support for such a commitment than there had been in 1979; the Federal
Republic of Germany, in particular, increasingly supported binding emissions
reductions following widely publicized reports of the acidification of the Black Forest.
Nevertheless, the original core group of “laggard” states led by the U.K. and the U.S
remained opposed to a binding protocol (McCormick 1998).
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Although the first meeting of parties did not yield agreement on the need for a
substantive protocol, a smaller group of committed “pusher” states was able to
coordinate emissions reductions outside of formal LRTAP institutions. As Chasek et al
(2006, 103) report:
In an unusual departure from diplomatic tradition, some states
committed themselves formally to larger unilateral reductions,
thus setting the standard by which other states would be judged.
At a conference in Ottawa in March 1984, ten states pledged to
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 30 percent . . . thus forming
the “Thirty Percent Club.”
Although the Thirty Percent Club was not able to gamer universal support, it drove the
agenda on a sulfur protocol to LRTAP, and drew enough support to conclude a sulfur
protocol in 1985.
On 9 July 1985, twenty-one states signed the Protocol on the Reduction of
Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent. This protocol
required ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by sixteen parties before it
would enter into force. Like the LRTAP convention, the first sulfur protocol did not
specify any further substantive, conditions for entry into force.
How congruent are the LRTAP convention and 1985 sulfur protocol with the
Realist hypotheses on membership? Hypothesis RM1 holds that negotiators will
choose inclusive membership criteria in response to relative gains concerns; hypothesis
RM2 holds that negotiators will choose strict entry into force conditions in response to
enforcement problems. The acid rain case probably is incongruent with the first
hypothesis, and certainly is incongruent with the second
The negotiations for the original LRTAP convention are coded as having
“strongly relevant” conflicts about distributional costs, but “low relevance” of
145
enforcement problems in the IRD. This is because, as previously mentioned, the
LRTAP convention does not include binding commitments. There is, therefore, little
incentive to “cheat” or “defect” from the convention. Distributional conflict is coded as
having been of “medium relevance” to the 1985 sulfur protocol. Likewise,
enforcement problems are coded as having had “medium relevance” to the protocol.
This is because there was less dispute concerning the need for binding commitments in
1985 than there had been in 1979. However, since the protocol entailed such
commitments, there was correspondingly greater incentive for parties to “cheat” -
creating relatively greater enforcement problems.
According to the first Realist hypothesis, since the LRTAP negotiations were
characterized by strong distributional conflict, membership in the agreement should be
unrestricted. Thus, this hypothesis is unable to explain the decision to conduct LRTAP
negotiations under the auspices of the ECE, and to restrict participation to ECE
members and consultative states. The selection of the ECE is congruent both with a
problem-definition perspective, and with a “high politics”-detente perspective, but not
with hypothesis RM 1. The 1985 protocol used the same membership criteria as the
original protocol, with the additional stipulation that membership be restricted to parties
to the LRTAP convention. Thus, the protocol's membership criteria are, essentially, an
extension of those established by the convention.
The second Realist hypothesis expects that the 1985 protocol will contain
relatively strict entry into force conditions, and that entry into force conditions will not
be an important element of the LRTAP convention, since the former is characterized as
entailing “medium” enforcement problems, and the latter as entailing “low”
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enforcement problems. In fact, the exact opposite is the case. To enter into force, the
1979 LRTAP convention required ratification by twenty-four states. Since the ECE
had only thirty-three members at the time, this is equivalent to requiring roughly a
seventy percent ratification rate. Although the 1985 sulfur protocol presented greater
enforcement problems than did the convention, it required a relatively lower level of
participation to enter into force. To enter into force, the 1985 sulfur protocol required
ratification by sixteen of the twenty-eight parties who were then eligible for
membership, a 57% ratification rate. This would not contradict the second Realist
hypothesis if the protocol had been designed with a double-trigger - that is, if it
specifically required participation by parties accounting for a specific proportion of
sulfur emissions. However, like the 1979 convention, the protocol was not designed
with any such criteria. In fact, when the first sulfur protocol entered into force in 1987,
it did so without the participation of the LRTAP party with the highest (US) and fourth
highest (UK) 1980 level of sulfur emissions. Thus there is no reason to conclude that
the 1979 LRTAP convention and the 1985 sulfur protocol are congruent with the
second realist hypothesis.
The first rational institutionalist hypothesis (IM 1 ) expects that negotiators will
not provide excludable benefits without restricting membership. The second rational
institutionalist hypothesis (IM2) expects that negotiators confronting distributional
problems will not promise state action prior to entry into force. The acid rain case does
not provide leverage on hypothesis IM1, and contradicts hypothesis IM2.
Neither the LRTAP Convention nor the 1985 sulfur protocol provide excludable
benefits to members. Thus, hypothesis IM 1 simply is not applicable here. Hypothesis
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IM2 expects that negotiators will not promise action prior to entry into force. Yet this
is precisely what the “Thirty Percent Club” did when trying to gamer support for what
became the 1985 sulfur protocol. Arguably, this is mitigated by the fact that the club
included leading “victim” states such as the Nordic countries. Yet the “Thirty Percent
Club” also included France, a large Western European state by any definition, and
Canada, which had very little to gain absent U.S. participation. Promising action prior
to the entry into force of a sulfur protocol was not a meaningless gesture for these
states. Rather than states using entry into force conditions as a “tipping point” for
participation with an agreement, this action reflects states using normative standards to
leverage advocacy groups to pressure laggards. Accordingly, the acid rain case
provides no support for the rational institutionalist expectation that negotiators may
Finally, the first constructivist hypothesis (CM1 ) expects that negotiators will be
less likely to restrict membership, or to choose strict criteria for entry into force, when
responding primarily to external shocks, or to a perceived crisis. The second
constructivist hypothesis expects that, when necessary, negotiators will prioritize
participation over agreement depth to build support for a greater level of cooperation at
a later date. The acid rain case does not provide significant leverage on hypothesis
CM 1
,
and provides at best mixed support for CM2.
Although such concern may have been present in some constituencies,
negotiations of the 1979 LRTAP convention and the 1985 sulfur protocol were not
motivated primarily by an external shock or perceived crisis. Since monitoring efforts
had been underway for several years prior to the negotiation of LRTAP, it is hard to
sustain the claim that the negotiation of the convention was motivated primarily by a
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shared sense of urgency to respond to an external shock. Even by 1 979, there remained
significant uncertainty concerning the extent of transboundary movement of airborne
pollutants. Hypothesis CM1 thus offers little help in explaining the acid rain case.
Hypothesis CM2 correctly expects that negotiators would prioritize
participation in the LRTAP convention over depth of cooperation. In fact, the
convention was signed, and ultimately ratified, by nearly every state that was eligible to
participate. The negotiation of the 1985 sulfur protocol, however, shows evidence of
the contrasting “sequential” approach. In that case, the announcement by the “Thirty
Percent Club” initially screened states for their commitment to pursuing emissions
reductions more than it persuaded other states to change policy. It ultimately served
that purpose, of course, as committed states succeeded in setting an example by which
others could be judged. But this approach to cooperation - identifying a policy first
and then expanding participation through normative persuasion - stands in contrast to
the framework-protocol approach, which seeks to maximize participation and build
consensus internally. Thus, the evidence for CM2 in this case is mixed. The 1979
LRTAP convention clearly is congruent with the framework-protocol approach to
cooperation emphasized by Constructivism, as it institutionalized the norm of reducing
transboundary pollution, maximized participation, and set the stage for future
agreements. The 1985 sulfur protocol does exhibit elements of a sequential approach to
cooperation. Taken together, these two agreements support the conclusion reached
earlier, that it is difficult to compare the implications of alternative pathways to
cooperation by looking at a limited number of static data points. The necessary
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dynamic analysis simply lies beyond the scope of this study, though it presents a great
opportunity expand it in the future.
Ozone Depletion
The ozone depletion case focuses on the regime’s two founding agreements: the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol. The design of the international regime for the protection of the ozone layer was
closely modeled on the example set by the LRTAP Convention and subsequent protocols.
Unlike in the acid ram case, negotiations for an ozone convention and protocol restricting
the use of CFCs proceeded simultaneously. The first Draft International Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer was submitted by the delegations from Finland and
Sweden to a meeting of the UNEP Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, held in Stockholm from 20-29 January 1982. Although the first draft
convention articulated a supermajority for the entry into force of amendments to the
convention (consent by two-thirds of parties), it bracketed the specific entry into force
requirements for the convention itself. Meeting documents of the ad hoc working group
for the convention reveal that the entry into force conditions of the Vienna Convention
were not seriously considered until the Vienna conference itself. Article 17 of the Vienna
Convention provides that it shall enter into force ninety days following the deposit of the
twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. The Convention
makes no further, specific conditions for entry into force.
Similarly, debate on the Montreal Protocol’s entry into force conditions did not
take place “until near the end of the negotiating process,” (Benedick 1998, 88). Unlike
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the proposed entry into force conditions of the Vienna Convention, however, the
proposed Montreal Protocol entry into force conditions proved to be very contentious.
The initial design of entry into force conditions appeared in 26 September 1986
publication of the Fifth Revised Draft Protocol on Chlorotluorocarbons (UNEP 1986a).
At this early stage, the clause stipulated simply that entry into force required the
ratification of nine parties:
This Protocol shall enter into force on the same date as the Convention enters
into force, provided that there have been deposited nine instruments of
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Protocol (UNEP 1986a).
The bulk of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol took place between
December, 1986 and September, 1987. During much of this time, final clause issues such
as entry into force took a backseat to more substantive concerns, as consensus developed
around the scientific basis for the Protocol’s measures (Anderson and Sarma 2002;
Benedick 1998; Haas 1992). From the beginning of the Montreal Protocol negotiations
in December 1986 to the third meeting of the ad hoc working group on the Protocol in
April 1987, there was virtually no negotiation on the issue of entry into force. Entry
provisions continued to stipulate a simple conditions: ratification or accession by nine
parties.
At the April 1987 meeting of the working group, an additional clause was inserted
into Article 15 to qualify the minimum level of participation. The revised Article 15
required that the nine ratifying parties account for 60% of global production of the
controlled substances (UNEP 1987b). This made the Protocol’s entry into force
requirements significantly stricter.
Still, this change was not sufficient to placate some negotiating delegations, who
feared that an effective protocol would require a much broader participation level than
the stipulated sixty percent of global production. The United States, in particular, argued
that entry into force requirements should be much stricter. Responding to Mostafa
Tolba's informal request for feedback on the third working group meeting in April 1987,
the United States argued that:
It is important that substantially all of the major producing nations participate at
the time of entry into force. In Article 15, the percentage of global production
required to trigger entry into force should therefore be higher than the sixty
percent figure in the current text.
We are concerned that if the requirement is set at only sixty percent, key nations
will wait before moving ahead with their ratification process until they are
assured that other key nations will ratify. If each waits for the others, the entire
process could be delayed. If entry into force will not occur until nations
representing a relatively high percentage of global production ratify, each can
ratify without concern about being left out on a limb carrying more than its fair
share of the burden or being required to invoke trade restrictions against major
trading partners (UNEP 1987b, 7-8).
Underlying US concern was the fact that a sixty percent participation threshold would
permit the protocol’s entry into force despite nonparticipation on the part of both the EC
and the USSR The United States clearly was concerned that weak entry into force
requirements could result in the United States bearing a disproportionate share of the
burden of protecting stratospheric ozone.
The United States changed its negotiating position on entry into force at the
Montreal conference. According to Benedick (1998, 89), in response to pressure from
domestic constituencies opposed to the Protocol, the United States proposed a ninety
percent participation threshold for entry into force. Significantly, this level was high
enough require participation by “all four major blocs: the European Communty, Japan,
the Soviet Union, and the United States” (Benedick 1998, 89). Most other countries
realized that there would be a tradeoff between the level of participation required to
trigger entry into force and the strength of the controls to which all parties could agree.
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As Benedick (1998, 89) explains, “Many observers feared that such a requirement could
hold the treaty hostage to Japan or the Soviet Union, which might then weaken the
protocol by extracting other concessions as the price for adherence.” The disagreement
ultimately was resolved through compromise, albeit one that was much closer to the 1987
provision than to the United States’ proposal of ninety percent. Article 16 of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer stipulated that the
Protocol could enter into force on 1 January 1989 if it had been ratified by at least eleven
parties or regional economic organizations, collectively accounting for at least two-thirds
of 1986 estimated global consumption of controlled substances.
How congruent is the ozone case with the Realist hypotheses on membership
advanced earlier? Again, hypothesis RM1 holds that negotiators will choose inclusive
membership criteria in response to relative gains concerns; hypothesis RM2 holds that
negotiators will choose strict entry into force conditions in response to enforcement
problems. The negotiation of the 1985 Vienna Convention is coded as having “low”
relevance of distributional conflict, and “no” significant enforcement problems in the
IRD. This is because, from the beginning, negotiators anticipated that the convention
would not include specific or binding controls on the production of use of CFCs; this
would be left to a subsequent protocol on CFCs. Accordingly, the negotiation of the
1987 Montreal Protocol is coded as having “strong” relevance of distributional conflict,
and the Protocol is coded as entailing “medium” enforcement problems.
Hypothesis RM I makes no strong prediction about the decision to restrict
membership in the Vienna Convention itself, though it does suggest that negotiators
would not restrict membership in the Montreal Protocol. Case evidence is congruent with
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these expectations; negotiators did not restrict eligibility for membership in the Vienna
Convention, and eligibility for membership in the Montreal Protocol was restricted only
to members of the (otherwise unrestricted) Vienna Convention.
Hypothesis RM2 makes no strong prediction about the entry into force provisions
of the Vienna Convention, but expects that the Montreal Protocol will contain fairly strict
conditions for entry into force. Evidence from the ozone case is congruent with these
expectations. Forty-three states participated in the March 1985 Vienna conference; the
convention required ratification by only twenty parties to enter into force. It contained no
additional, more specific conditions beyond this generic level of participation. Though
the Montreal Protocol required ratification by only eleven parties, it also required
ratification by parties accounting for at least two-thirds of 1986 global CFC consumption
to enter into legal force Though higher minimum participation thresholds were
suggested during negotiations (at one point the U.S. suggested requiring ratification by
ninety percent of signatories), the more moderate provision actually chosen by
negotiators is congruent with this study’s coding of the Montreal Protocol as entailing
only moderately severe enforcement problems.
Once again, the first rational institutionalist hypothesis (IM1 ) expects that
negotiators will not provide excludable benefits without restricting membership
accordingly. The second rational institutionalist hypothesis (IM2) expects that
negotiators confronting distributional problems will not promise state action prior to
entry into force.
The ozone case does not provide leverage on the first hypothesis - like many
multilateral environmental agreements, it does not provide excludable benefits - and is
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inconsistent with the second. The United States - the leading global producer of CFCs
- banned the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans prior to the negotiation of the Vienna
Convention. This information may still be consistent with a Realist conception of a
powerful state attempting to use multilateral diplomacy to internationalize its own.
domestic policy. Likewise, it may also be consistent with a constructivist account
emphasizing the development of consensual knowledge. It is not consistent, however,
with the utilitarian contracting models emphasized by rational institutionalism.
The significance of the ozone case for the first constructivist hypothesis depends
largely on one’s understanding of the significance of the 1985 discovery of the “ozone
hole” over Antarctica. This study codes the salience of a shared perception of crisis for
the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol as “low,” and “very low / none” for the
negotiation of the Vienna Convention. This corresponds to the belief that the discovery
of the hole in 1985 did not decisively drive the agenda for the Montreal Protocol
negotiations. As Benedick (1998, 19) points out, “the ozone hole did not . .
,
provide
any clear signal for policy-makers at that time. Scientists in 1986 and 1987 were far
from certain that CFCs were involved in Antarctica.”
Since this study finds that a shared perception of crisis was not decisive in
driving the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, that agreement’s use of substantive
conditions for entry into force does not contradict hypothesis CM 1 . If, on the other
hand, one interprets the discovery of the ozone hole as constituting such a shock or
crisis (e.g., Litfin 1994), then the Montreal Protocol's incorporation of strict entry into
force conditions would contradict CM1
.
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The ozone ease provides similarly mixed evidence for hypothesis CM2.
Although the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol are examples of
the framework convention - protocol approach to international environmental law, they
do not necessarily reflect the breadth - depth tradeoff that underlies the choice of the
framework convention - protocol path to cooperation. Negotiations for the Vienna
Convention and Montreal Protocol proceeded at the same time. Hypothesis CM2
implies a causal process whereby an initial convention is struck to assist norm
diffusion, after which deeper cooperation is possible. The Vienna Convention and
Montreal Protocol do not map terribly well onto this template.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that negotiators choose membership rules in response to
two related questions: “Who may participate?” and “Who must participate?” for
cooperation to succeed. To find answers to these questions, this chapter has described
and examined hypotheses from three theoretical orientations: rational institutionalism,
realism, and constructivism. Finally, it has discussed two specific cases that point to
the strengths, and limits, of those hypotheses. The LRTAP Convention was negotiated
in a pre-existing institutional framework (the UNECE) that strongly influenced the
design of membership rules. This case reminds us that cooperative arrangements need
not be created de novo, and that agreements are not always entirely self-contained.
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw several conclusions from the foregoing
discussion. The first is that the two realist hypotheses concerning membership have
fared relatively well Both receive strong empirical support in the aggregate, although
hypothesis RM2, that negotiators will design strict entry into force conditions in
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response to relative gains concerns, may usefully be restated. There is little evidence to
suggest that negotiators respond to enforcement problems by requiring a relatively
greater number of ratifications for entry into force. On the other hand, enforcement
problems are a significant predictor of negotiators' decision to design specific,
substantive criteria concerning the minimum level of participation necessary for an
agreement to enter into force.
In contrast, the two rational institutionalist hypotheses receive only modest
empirical support in the aggregate. The surveyed agreements are consistent with
hypothesis IM1, that negotiators will restrict membership in agreements providing
potentially excludable benefits. However, the strength of the association is fairly weak,
and is not statistically significant. Similarly, the surveyed agreements are reasonably
consistent with IM2, that negotiators will use minimum participation thresholds to
create bandwagonmg, or “tipping” effects on participation. Specifically, the finding
that negotiating states did not promise “early compliance” with agreements
incorporating substantive entry into force conditions is consistent with hypothesis IM2.
However, further research will be necessary to establish whether the timing and
sequence of ratifications of a given agreement reflects the creation of entry into force
“tipping” points.
Finally, the two constructivist hypotheses concerning membership receive
modest support. With respect to the question of who may participate, this study finds
only partial support for hypothesis CM2, that negotiators initially will prioritize
inclusive membership over depth of cooperation. There is no evidence of a tradeoff
between inclusiveness of membership and depth of cooperation. Thus, this study
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cannot find support for constructivist arguments that expect negotiators to maximize
participation at the expense of agreement depth, when necessary, to build the strongest
possible platform for norm diffusion. However, the low frequency of membership
restrictions among the surveyed agreements is consistent with the norms of non-
exclusion and impartiality that Ruggie ( 1993b) has characterized as constitutive of
multilateralism.
With respect to the question of who must participate, this study found only
partial support for hypothesis CM1, that negotiators will avoid strict entry into force
conditions when responding to a perceived crisis. In such cases, there is no evidence
that negotiators require ratification by a relatively lower number of states. However,
this study does find that, in crisis situations, negotiators are significantly less likely to
design substantive conditions for entry into force (as in the Kyoto Protocol and
MARPOL).
Viewed together, it is not surprising that the realist and constructivist
hypotheses concerning membership appear to receive more support than do the rational
institutionalist hypotheses. The realist and constructivist hypotheses examined here
largely work in the same direction; both provide reasons why one should expect
negotiators to avoid restricting membership. Constructivists expect negotiators to
choose open membership because of concerns for legitimacy. Realists expect that
negotiators will dampen the severity of distributional conflict by adopting open or
inclusive membership rules. Rational institutionalism, on the other hand, tends to offer
predictions concerning when negotiators will restrict membership - for example, when
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providing excludable benefits. In practice, the surveyed agreements are quite open in
their approach to membership.
Accordingly, the best interpretation of the evidence seems to be that negotiators
tend to follow multilateral norms of non-exclusion, unless they have compelling reason
to do otherwise. Empirical support for hypothesis RM 1 , that negotiators design
inclusive membership rules in response to distribution problems, may simply reflect the
generally low frequency of restrictive membership among the agreements surveyed in
the IRD as much as it reflects strategic design. On the other hand, hypothesis RM2,
that negotiators design strict entry into force rules in response to relative gains
concerns, provides the clearest explanation for negotiators’ decision to use substantive
criteria for entry into force.
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CHAPTER 5
ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: DELEGATION
On June 5, 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was opened for
signature at the United Nations Conference of Environment and Development,
culminating a negotiating process that was initiated in a 1987 decision by the Governing
Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and began in earnest in
February, 1991 The CBD specifies a number of policy-oriented goals to promote its
three goals of promoting “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from [its] utilization”
(Art. 1 ). The Convention also created an institutional framework within which the
contracting parties could delegate resources and functional responsibilities to more
efficiently achieve the substantive ends of the agreement.
The CBD includes several different delegations of functional responsibilities,
creating 1 ) a Conference of Parties (COP) to serve as the Convention's governing
organization (Art. 23), 2) a standing body to provide scientific advice to member states
(Art. 25); 3) a permanent secretariat to provide information to the COP and to coordinate
with other international organizations (Art. 24); 4) a financial mechanism to provide
financial resources to developing state members (Art. 2
1 ); and 5) an information
clearinghouse (Art. 18).
Not all delegations involve equal levels of resources or authority. The COP, for
example, is an institutionalized forum for bargaining among member states. The
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Secretariat and the standing body for scientific advice, in contrast, operate with some
degree of discretion from member states.
This delegation raises several questions for the design of multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs). Why do states sometimes look for ‘outside' help in
implementing agreements? What factors encourage or discourage states to delegate
authority to independent parties, and how much authority do states delegate? What
specific functions do states entrust to such parties? What difference does it make? This
chapter explores delegation in multilateral environmental agreements. First, it identifies
a number of dimensions of delegation in MEAs. Next, it describes those dimensions and
provides descriptive statistics concerning delegation in the agreements surveyed in this
study. Third, it evaluates the hypotheses concerning delegation set forth in Chapter 3.
Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in light of two specific cases.
Delegation and Multilateral Agreements
In this study delegation refers to the degree to which states negotiating a
multilateral environmental agreement formally confer functional responsibilities,
resources, and programmatic authority on a third parties (such as intergovernmental
organizations, expert committees, tribunals, and the like). This project adopts the
definition used in Kenneth Abbott et al (2000, 17), “delegation means that third parties
have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve
disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.” Among these various aspects of
delegation, Abbott et al (2000, 32) identify two dimensions of significant variation:
dispute resolution and rule making.
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On the first dimension, dispute resolution, the most highly delegated forms of
dispute resolution are formal judicial bodies (e.g., courts, tribunals, or other arbitral
institutions) possessing general jurisdiction over activities covered by an agreement, and
binding decision making power. Abbott et al (2000a, 32) list a number of other
institutional forms, in descending order of delegation:
Establishment of formal courts possessing general jurisdiction and binding decision-
making authority (greatest delegation);
Establishment of formal courts with limited, or strictly consensual jurisdiction;
Use of binding ad hoc arbitration;
Use of nonbinding arbitration;
Provision of mediation services;
Providing a forum for institutionalized bargaining;
Pure political bargaining (least delegation)
Within the “legalization” framework delegation is closely related to “precision”
(Abbott et al 2000a, 3 1 ). Vague and indeterminate rules permit greater discretion in
interpretation and application than do specific and determinate ones. By itself, such
imprecision reflects low legalization; states remain free to interpret the very rules that
were meant to govern them Imprecise agreements may nevertheless be highly legalized
when the power to interpret rules is delegated to a third party. While this study does not
follow the legalization project in considering precision as a “top-level” variable of
institutional design, it accounts for precision as an aspect delegation.
The second dimension of delegation described by Abbott et al (2000a, 32) is rule
making and implementation. While the dispute resolution dimension captures where and
how authority is delegated in a multilateral agreement, the rule making and
implementation dimension captures what authority is delegated Abbott et al (2000a, 32)
summarize variation along this dimension in descending order of delegation:
Binding rules, with centralized enforcement provisions;
162
Binding rules, with consensual enforcement and withdrawal provisions;
Binding rules with decentralized enforcement;
Coordination of standards;
Monitoring and publicity of compliance;
Confidential monitoring;
Normative or aspirational statements;
Forum for negotiating
In this study, the variable, “delegation,” captures: (1 ) whether and how the parties
to a multilateral agreement have granted authority to a third party, and (2) the extent and
character of the authority that they have transferred. These can be referred to as the
“structure” of delegation and the “substance” of delegation (the labels are Raustiala’s
(2005), although his usage is slightly different than the one used here). The first aspect
directs attention to negotiators’ use and creation of intergovernmental bodies and
organizations to manage the implementation of agreements. The second aspect directs
attention to the specific functions delegated to such organizations, as well as the authority
that such organizations have in carrying out their delegated functions. Using this
framework of delegation, this chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning delegation
in MEAs, drawn from the competing literatures on international cooperation reviewed in
Chapter 2.
Dimensions of Delegation in MEAs
However, before evaluating these propositions, it will be helpful to review the
indicators of delegation discussed in Chapter 3. These are summarized below in Table
5.1
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Table 5.1 Indicators of Delegation (continued on the next page)
Indicator Measurement Description
SECRETAR Nominal What type of secretariat did the agreement
establish (if any)?
SECINDEP Ordinal
(0-4)
How independent is the secretariat from
member states?
ADMNFUND Nominal How are administrative functions funded?
PROGFUND Nominal How are programmatic activities funded?
ENFORCE Ordinal
(0-2)
To what extent does the agreement adopt an
‘enforcement’ approach to rule compliance?
AGRSCOPE Ordinal
0-5)
Is the agreement narrow in terms of the scope
of issues it addresses9
AGRDEPTH Ordinal
(1-5)
Is the agreement deep in terms of the substance
of its rules and obligations?
PROGRAMS Nominal What types of programmatic activities (if any)
does the agreement set forth?
MONPROB Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize monitoring of
problem causes and effects? (yes/no)
RESEARCH Dichotomous
(0-1)
Does the agreement centralize research into a
problem's causes and effects? (yes/no)
EXPERTAD Dichotomous Does the agreement provide expert policy
advice to member states? (yes/no)
CMPLYMON Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize compliance
monitoring? (yes/no)
RVWIMPLM Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize implementation
review9 (yes/no)
VERIFY Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize verification of
compliance? (yes/no)
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Table 5.1 Indicators of Delegation (continued)
Indicator Measurement Description
FTXFER Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize the management
of financial/technological transfers? (yes/no)
REVWADEQ Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize review of
adequacy of commitments?
CLRNGHSE Dichotomous Does the agreement centralize problem-related
information?
Delegation in a multilateral environmental agreement is a function of its
structure and substance. With respect to the former, negotiators must decide how a
cooperative arrangement will be administered. Usually this involves the creation of a
secretariat to oversee agreement-related activities. Negotiators have the further option
of deciding who will serve as the secretarial body of an agreement, and how much
discretion they will possess in administering an agreement’s rules. Finally, negotiators
must make the (related) decision of how to fund an agreement’s secretariat. This
choice has definite implications for the independence or discretion of the secretariat.
The second category of choices concerns the substance of the agreement. Delegation in
MEAs is influenced significantly by negotiators’ decisions concerning the scope, depth,
and substance of an agreement’s rules.
In choosing whether or not to establish a secretariat, negotiators can establish a
new organization for the specific purpose of administering the agreement, or entrust
such responsibilities to an existing intergovernmental organization (IGO), one or more
member states, or even to a nongovernmental organization (NGO). Finally, in some
cases, negotiators may decide against delegating any administrative power. These
options are represented by the indicator SECRETAR As Figure 5 1 shows, nearly half
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of the MEAs surveyed in this study establish a new organization for the specific
purpose of administering the agreement. The second largest category of agreements
assigns secretarial duties to an existing intergovernmental organization. This category
includes agreements such as protocols that delegate administrative duties to the
secretariat of the convention or parent agreement. In very few cases did negotiators
delegate secretarial authority to states or nongovernmental organizations. Similarly,
negotiators failed to delegate such authority in only a few cases.
Figure 5.1 Delegation of Secretarial Duties (SECRETAR)
secretariat functions functions
Type of Secretariat
Negotiators also must decide how much authority and discretion to entrust to
the secretariat Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of surveyed agreements on
SECINDEP, a qualitative measure of how independent secretariats are from the
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member states of an agreement. A clear majority of the surveyed agreements that
delegated secretarial duties give little or no independence to the secretariat.
Nevertheless, a substantial minority of agreements delegated moderate to strong levels
of independence. No secretariats were coded as completely independent from member
states.
Figure 5.2 Independence of Secretariat (SECINI)EP)
Mot at all Weakly Moderately Strongly Completely
independent independent independent independent independent
Independence of Secretariat
Another way in which negotiators can influence secretariats’ independence is
through their decision how to fund secretariats’ administrative and programmatic
activities. The more resources that a secretariat has, and the more reliable the source of
those resources, the more able a secretariat will be to exercise discretion in carrying out
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its functions. Conversely, the smaller and more unstable the funding, the less capable a
secretariat will be of exercising discretion.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the (nonexclusive) frequency of different funding
sources for administrative and programmatic activities among the surveyed agreements.
The majority of secretariats rely on nationally-funded and implemented programs, as
well as on the use of national facilities, for both administrative and programmatic
activities. Very few possess a distinct, independent source of revenue. Assessments on
member states are relatively more prevalent for funding administrative activities than
for funding programmatic activities. In-kind contributions are a relatively more
significant source of funding for programmatic activities than for administrative ones.
Figure 5.3 Sources of Administrative / Secretarial Funding
Nationally Relies on Relies on Relies on Relies on In Has Ovm Relies on Does Hot
Funded National Assessments Assessments Kind Distmct Voluntary Rely on
Activities Contributions and on Members Contributions Source of Contributions Distmct
Contribute Voluntary Revenue Source of
Revenue
Funding for Administrative Functions (Including Secretariat)
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Figure 5.4 Sources of Funding for Programmatic Activities
Nationally Relies cat Relies an In Relies oat Relies cat Relies oat Does Not Rely Has Own
Raided National Kind Assessments Assessments cat Voluntary on Distinct Distant Source
Activities Contributions Contributions and Wluntoty Members Contributions Source of ofRevenue
Cantribitte Contributions Revenue
Fmiding For Programmatic Activities
The second aspect of delegation that negotiators can control is the substance of
an agreement. This study examines substance in three ways. First, it considers the
specific programmatic activities prescribed by MEAs. Second, it considers the breadth
or scope of an agreement’s rules. Finally, it considers the depth of an agreement’s
rules.
Figure 5.5 shows the frequency with which negotiators delegated several
programmatic functions among the surveyed multilateral environmental agreements.
Among surveyed agreements, the most commonly delegated activity is the provision of
expert advice by the secretariat back to the member states In addition to the provision
of expert advice, four other tasks were delegated in more than half of the surveyed
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agreements: monitoring causes and effects of the problem, conducting research into the
causes and effects of a problem, monitoring compliance, and implementation review.
Less frequently delegated tasks include: reviewing the adequacy of an agreement’s
commitments, information management, and verification of compliance. Only a small
minority of surveyed agreements tasked administrative bodies with coordinating
financial and/or technological transfers.
Figure 5.5 Delegated Programs
Expert Monitor Research Compliance Review Review Information Verify Financial and
Advice problem problem monitoring implement- adequacy of management compliance or technology
causes and causes and ation commitments transfer
effects effects
Programmatic activities delegated
Next, this study considers the scope of multilateral agreements as part of their
substance. Specific, programmatic functions comprise one important aspect of an
agreement’s substance. However, we can get a fuller picture by considering also the
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scope of activity that negotiators address. This study uses a qualitative indicator,
AGRSCOPE, to represent the scope of MEAs.
As Figure 5.6 shows, most of the surveyed agreements are quite broad in scope;
more than half are coded either as “broad” or “very broad” in functional scope. Only a
few agreements decompose problems, addressing them in a narrow fashion.
Figure 5.6 Agreement Scope
Agreement Scope
Finally, this study addresses the depth of cooperation. It uses the qualitative
indicator, AGRDEPTH, to represent the depth of cooperation achieved in MEAs. As
Figure 5.7 shows, the surveyed agreements are roughly normally distributed with
respect the depth of their rules. Surveyed agreements were most frequently coded as
having ‘medium' depth, and include substantial numbers of both shallow or very
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shallow and deep agreements. Only a few agreements, however, were coded as ‘very
deep’. It is worth noting that this indicator is operationalized generously; ‘medium’
depth represents the qualitative judgment that an agreement’s rules are at least
somewhat adequate for managing the issue at hand. Also, depth of agreement does not
imply commitment to a particular approach to enforcement. Strategies for enforcement
are considered in Chapter 6.
Figure 5.7 Agreement Depth
Agreement Depth
The next step is to apply what we know about delegation options by analyzing
them in terms of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3.
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Evaluating* Hypotheses on Delegation
This section provides an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses concerning
delegation in MEAs, which are summarized below in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Hypotheses Concerning Delegation
Theoretical Approach Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
ID1 Delegation increases with the severity of the
enforcement problem.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID2 Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state of the world.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID3 Delegation increases with the number of
relevant parties.
Rational
Institutionalism
ID4 When the salience of distributional conflict is
low, delegation increases with complexity.
Realism RD1 Multilateral agreements will be characterized by
very low levels of delegation.
Realism RD2 High levels of delegation will be strongly
associated with high levels of precision when a
hegemon seeks to internationalize its own
domestic or foreign policy.
Constructivism CD1 Multilateral agreements will be characterized by
generally high levels of delegation with respect
to rule interpretation and adjudication.
Constructivism C'D2 Delegation will increase when ( 1 ) expert
groups participate in negotiations by (2)
supplying policy knowledge to state parties.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Delegation
Rational institutionalist theory yields a broad array of expectations concerning
the use of delegation in institutional design. The first institutionalist hypothesis (ID1
)
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expects that negotiators will delegate more authority when they are faced with
enforcement problems because states will not find it in their interest to participate in
cooperative arrangements in such situations unless enforcement problems are
adequately addressed. Those agreements that are successfully concluded in spite of
such problems will be those that delegate power as necessary to ease concerns about
enforcement. This study evaluates this hypothesis by determining whether there is a
positive relationship between the indicator of enforcement problems (ENFORCEM)
and the several indicators of delegation.
The first step is to compare the severity of enforcement problems in
negotiations that created different types of secretariats. Since the distribution of
ENFORCEM is nonnormal, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted rather than an
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The differences in mean ranks on ENFORCEM
among the different types of secretariats were consistent with hypothesis 1D1. The
surveyed agreements that ranked highest on enforcement problems were those that
established an independent secretariat. The second highest-ranking group consisted of
agreements that delegated secretarial duties to an existing 1GO. The group with the
lowest mean rank concerning ENFORCEM consisted of agreements that simply
delegated secretarial duties to one member state. However, these results were not
statistically significant, (4, N=53) = 4.901
, p = .298.
Since the mean ranks on enforcement problems for agreements establishing an
independent secretariat and those delegating to an existing IGO were very similar, these
groups were aggregated and a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to find whether
these agreements were associated with more severe enforcement problems than were
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agreements that simply delegated secretarial duties to one member. Again the mean
ranks were consistent with hypothesis ID 1
,
though the test was not significant (z = -
1.537, p = .124).
As mentioned earlier, delegation cannot be explained solely by the decision
whether and how to create a secretariat. It is a function also of the degree of
independence entrusted to a secretariat to administer a cooperative arrangement.
Therefore, this study tests hypothesis ID1 in a second way. by examining the
relationship between SECINDEP, a qualitative measure of how independent
secretariats are from their member states, and ENFORCEM.
Table 5.3 presents a cross tabulation of these two indicators. Contrary to
hypothesis ID1 ’s expectations, there is essentially no relationship between enforcement
problems and the independence of secretariats (Somers’ d is actually weakly negative,
-042 while p = .746).
Table 5.3 Cross tabulation of SECINDEP x ENFORCEM
Severity of Enforcement Problems
Very
none low Medium strong strong Total
Independence Not at all independent | 0 4 1 3 9
of secretariat Weakly independent 0 4 7 4 2 17
Moderately independent 1 0 2 4 2 9
Strongly Independent
\ 0 4 2 0 7
Total 3 4 17 11 7 42
Directional Measures
Asymp
Value Std Error Approx. T Approx. Sig
Somers' d SECINDEP Dependent
- 042 130 -.324 746
Finally, the third way to test hypothesis ID1 is to examine relationship between
enforcement problems and the delegation of specific tasks To do this, Mann-Whitney
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U tests were conducted to compare the severity of enforcement problems for
agreements that do/ do not delegate nine tasks common among MEAs, shown in Figure
5.8. Among these nine tasks, there were significant differences in the distribution of
enforcement problems for only three: monitoring, implementation review, and
verification of compliance.
Figure 5.8 Enforcement Problems and Monitoring
Figure 5.8 shows the difference distributions of ENFORCEM between surveyed
agreements that delegated compliance monitoring, and those that did not. There is a
clear difference between the distribution of enforcement problems between agreements
that delegate monitoring and those that do not; in fact, there is no overlap between the
middle fifty percent of each group. The result of the Mann-Whitney U test of ranks for
these distributions is statistically significant (z = -3.004, p = .003).
Figure 5.9 shows the difference distributions of ENFORCEM between surveyed
agreements that delegated implementation review, and those that did not. The
difference here is not as great; there is some overlap between the middle fifty percent of
the two distributions. Nevertheless, it is clear that agreements that delegated
implementation review confronted generally more severe enforcement problems. The
result of the Mann-Whitney U test for these distributions, also, is significant,
(z = -2.32 1
, p = .02).
Figure 5.9 Enforcement Problems and Implementation Review
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Figure 5.10 shows the difference distributions of ENFORCEM between
surveyed agreements that delegated verification of compliance, and those that did not.
The difference here is lower still, although it appears that agreements delegating
compliance verification confronted somewhat more severe enforcement problems. The
result of the Mann-Whitney U test for these distributions is only marginally significant,
(z = -1.837, p - .066).
Figure 5.10 Enforcement Problems and Compliance Verification
In summary, support for hypothesis 1D1 is modest. The three indicators with
significant differences in the distribution of ENFORCEM correspond to programmatic
functions that rational institutionalists would expect negotiators to choose to mitigate
enforcement problems. That is, there is evidence that, in designing MEAs, negotiators
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increasingly focus on monitoring, verification, and implementation review as
enforcement problems become more salient.
Among these three, the strongest relationship appears to be between
enforcement problems and monitoring. In contrast, many agreements that rank highly
with respect to enforcement problems do not incorporate provisions for verification,
and many agreements that rank low on do include provisions for verification. In other
words, these results are not entirely inconsistent with the reverse expectation, that
negotiators design verification programs when enforcement problems are low. Further
research on more cases will be necessary to resolve this dilemma with confidence.
Notwithstanding the evidence that enforcement problems lead negotiators to
delegate certain tasks targeted at enforcement problems, this study has found no
evidence that negotiators endow administrative bodies with greater resources, capacity,
or discretion to implement these programs in response to increasing enforcement
problems. Therefore, this study finds only modest support for hypothesis ID1
The logic of hypothesis ID1 is that delegation increases with enforcement
problems because states do not trust one another. The modest support found here
means that either states did trust each other in negotiating the surveyed agreements, or
they neither trusted each other nor the organizations to which they delegated
administrative tasks. This hypothesis is either wrong about the problem (trust) or about
the solution to the problem (delegation).
The second rational institutionalist hypothesis (ID2) is that delegation increases
with uncertainty about the state of the world. Uncertainty may be more central to
institutionalist theories of international cooperation than any other explanatory variable.
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yet it is not always clear exactly what is meant by the term. Therefore the first step in
testing this claim is to specify what is meant by ‘uncertainty’. Koremenos et al (2001a,
773) respond to this problem by drawing a distinction among “uncertainty about others’
behavior,” “uncertainty about preferences,” and “uncertainty about the state of the
world.” Although this distinction lends greater precision to the underlying concept of
uncertainty, it nonetheless is under-specified for the present task. This study
understands uncertainty about behavior and preferences primarily as constitutive
elements of enforcement problems; these types of uncertainty are significant primarily
because they affect incentives to cheat. Therefore, this study focuses on Koremenos,
Lipson. and SnidaTs third usage: uncertainty about the state of the world.
However, even this restricted usage may be excessively vague. Uncertainty
about the state of the world can refer to any or all of four things; descriptive
knowledge about a specific problem under consideration, a cause-effect understanding
of that problem, knowledge of policy alternatives, or to likely consequences of policy
choices (see, e.g., Dimitrov 2003). Accordingly, this study uses multiple indicators of
uncertainty to capture the several different possible dimensions that have been
identified in the literature on international environmental politics (see Table 3.5).
Hypothesis ID2 can be tested in a similar fashion to hypothesis ID1; this study
will examine influences on the decision whether and how to create a secretariat, how
much independence to entrust to a secretariat, and which specific functions to delegate.
The first test looks for differences in the distribution of the uncertainty indicators
between agreements that delegate secretarial authority to a member state and agreements
that create a new secretariat or delegate to an existing IGO.
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As before, this is done by conducting a Mann-Whitney U test of mean ranks.
Unlike hypothesis ID 1 , the results for uncertainty are statistically significant. Table 5.4
summarizes the test results.
Table 5.4 Mann-Whitney U Test of Secretariat Creation and Uncertainty
Secretariat
Mean
Rank z
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
COMPLEX Member State 11.80
IGO or New Secretariat 27.54 -2.325 .020
IMPLEMEN Member State 8.40
IGO or New Secretariat 27,91 -3.036 .002
SCIENTIF Member State 16.00
IGO or New Secretariat 27.09 -1.702 .089
OPTIONS Member State 18.90
IGO or New Secretariat 26.77 -1.300 .194
EFFECTS Member State 10.60
IGO or New Secretariat 27.67 -2.557 .01 1
There are strongly significant differences between the two groups with respect to
three indicators: complexity of the issue area (COMPLEX), difficulty of implementing
policy (1MPLEMEN), and uncertainty concerning the consequences of different policy
options (EFFECTS). There was a marginally significant difference with respect to
uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of the problem (SCIENTIF). Finally, the
difference between the two types of agreements with respect to uncertainty about the
menu of possible policy choices (OPTIONS) was not statistically significant. Taken
together, these results are consistent with hypothesis ID2, Creating a new secretariat or
delegating administrative functions to an existing IGO reflect greater delegation than
reserving such duties to one or more member states, and the surveyed agreements
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reflecting this choice are associated with significantly greater levels of most dimensions
of uncertainty.
The second step is to test whether different indicators of uncertainty are
significantly associated with greater levels of delegated discretion, or independence
(SECINDEP). Table 5.5 presents Somers’ d measures of association for the several
indicators of uncertainty and the dependent variable, SECINDEP.
Table 5.5 Associations between Secretariat Independence and Uncertainty
Independent Dependent Somers’ d
Asymp.
Std. Error
Approx.
Sig.
COMPLEX SECINDEP -.046 118 .695
IMPLEMEN SECINDEP
-.174 .145 .234
SCIENTIF SECINDEP
-.017 141 .902
OPTION SECINDEP
.173 .153 .261
EFFECTS SECINDEP
.105 .134 .437
Three of the five indicators actually have a negative association with SECINDEP, and all
five associations are weak. None are close to any reasonable threshold of statistical
significance. Accordingly, this study finds no evidence that increases in uncertainty are
associated with increased levels of discretion.
Finally, the third step in evaluating hypothesis 1D2 is to examine the influence of
uncertainty on negotiators’ decision of which specific tasks to delegate. As before, the
specific tasks being examined are: monitoring (MONPROB), researching causes and
effects (RESEARCH), providing expert advice back to members (EXPERTAD),
monitoring compliance (CMPLYMON), reviewing implementation (RVWIMPLM),
verification of compliance (VERIFY), managing financial and/or technological transfers
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(FTXFER), reviewing the adequacy of agreement commitments (REVWADEQ), and
providing a clearinghouse for information about the problem (CLRNGF1SE). Each of
these task-specific indicators is coded dichotomously.
Since the literature on international environmental politics suggests that multiple
aspects of uncertainty may influence policy, and the outcomes under consideration are
dichotomous, this study uses logistic regression to identify whether any of the uncertainty
indicators are significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to delegate the specific tasks
listed above. Significant predictors were found for five of the nine tasks identified above
(no significant predictors were found for: provision of expert advice, implementation
review, verification of compliance, and review of the adequacy of commitments). Table
5.6 presents logistic regression results for these five tasks.
Among surveyed agreements, the decision to delegate monitoring powers is
significantly predicted by issue complexity, uncertainty concerning policy options, and
lack of consensus concerning policy options. Among these three, uncertainty about
possible policy options has the strongest effect; each unit increase on the five-point
ordinal scale corresponds to increasing odds of delegation by a factor of, roughly, three.
Each increase in issue complexity (also measured on a five-point ordinal scale)
corresponds to increasing odds of delegation by a factor of two. Lack of consensus
concerning the adequacy of policy knowledge (measured dichotomously) is also strongly
associated with the decision to delegate problem monitoring
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Table 5.6 Logistic Regression Results for Delegation and Uncertainty
Dependent Independent (a) B Wald Df Sig. Odds Ratio
MONPROB Constant
-.6111 8.112 1 .004 .002
COMPLEX
.712 5.107 1 .024 2.039
OPTIONS 1.097 5.652 1 .017 2.996
OPTAGREE 1.480 3.418 1 .064 4.394
RESEARCH Constant
-4.160 6.103 1 .013 .016
COMPLEX
.742 6.099 1 .014 2.101
OPTIONS
.617 2.660 1 .100 1.853
CMPLYMON Constant
-1.262 .899 1 .343 .283
IMPLEMEN
.571 3.578 1 .059 1 .770
SCIENTIF
-.840 3.166 1 .075 .432
EFFECTS
.575 2.747 1 .097 1.778
FTXFER Constant
-6.106 7.902 1 .005 .002
COMPLEX 1.586 10.735 1 .001 4.885
SCIENTIF
-1.079 3.612 1 .057 .340
EFFAGREE
.722 4.943 1 .026 2.058
CLRNGHSE Constant 2.775 6.102 1 .014 16.035
OPTAGREE
-1.935 4.796 1 .029 .144
EFFAGREE
-.882 6.419 1 .011 .414
a Variables entered on step 1: COMPLEX, 1MPLEMEN, SCIENTIF, OPTIONS, OPTAGREE, EFFECTS,
EFFAGREE.
The decision to delegate research into the causes and effects of problems is
significantly predicted by issue complexity and uncertainty concerning possible policy
options. Increases in both of these indicators increase the odds of delegation roughly by a
factor of two.
Compliance monitoring is predicted by difficulty of implementation, uncertainty
concerning the causes and extent of a problem, and uncertainty concerning policy
consequences. Increasing difficulty of implementation and uncertainty concerning policy
consequences both correspond to increasing odds of delegation. Interestingly, though,
increasing uncertainty concerning the general causes and extent of a problem leads to
lower odds of delegation This suggests either that as general scientific uncertainty about
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an issue increases, negotiators are less concerned to monitor compliance with the terms of
a specific arrangement or that agreements negotiated amidst great uncertainty include
fewer specific obligations that can be monitored..
Negotiators’ decision to establish financial and/or technological transfers among
the parties is significantly predicted by issue complexity, uncertainty about the causes or
extent of a problem, and lack of consensus about the consequences of policy options.
Once again, uncertainty about the causes and extent of a problem leads to substantially
lower odds of negotiators establishing transfers. In contrast, increasing disagreement
among the parties leads to substantially higher odds of negotiators designing transfers.
Two explanations may be given for this combination of effects. One possibility is that
when some parties favor a particular policy, they may attempt to broaden support by
providing financial or technological incentives to more reluctant parties.
Finally, the decision to establish an information clearinghouse is strongly
predicted by consensus concerning policy options and consequences. Lack of consensus
in either area has a strong negative effect on the odds of delegation. Thus, it appears that
decisions to establish information clearinghouse are made to solidity consensus by
disseminating consensual knowledge. They are not created to resolve existing
disagreements among members.
The overall picture that emerges from these tests of hypothesis 1D2 is similar in
many ways to that for hypothesis 1D1 There is strong evidence that, as scientific
uncertainty increases in salience, negotiators are more likely to create a new secretariat or
delegate to an existing 1GO, rather than delegate administrative duties to one or more
member states. Since the assignment of duties to an international body represents greater
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delegation than does assigning tasks directly to member states, this study finds
preliminary support for hypothesis ID2. However, as before, there is no evidence that
negotiators delegate more discretion to these bodies in response to increasing levels of
uncertainty. The strongest evidence of the influence of uncertainty on delegation is at the
level of specific, functional tasks. This study found that different aspects of scientific
uncertainty/knowledge are significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to delegate
several specific tasks. However, this study also found that uncertainty fails to predict the
delegation of some important functions (e.g., provision of expert advice). Other variables
must be considered to explain these decisions.
Two causal mechanisms underlie hypothesis 1D2. First, rational institutionalists
expect that negotiators will delegate specific informational functions in response to
scientific uncertainty. Second, they expect that in cases of high uncertainty, negotiators
will be more likely to delegate general guidelines, providing administrators with
discretion to act on new information as it becomes available. The test results strongly
support the first causal mechanism. Issue complexity, uncertainty about the causes and
extent of a problem, and uncertainty about possible policy options all are significant
predictors of the decision to delegate informational functions. However, the results
provide very weak support for the second causal mechanism. Although negotiators are
more likely to delegate administrative duties to an independent organization under
conditions of uncertainty, there is no evidence to suggest that they entrust those
organizations with greater levels of discretion and independence.
The third rational institutionalist hypothesis on delegation (ID3) expects that
delegation will increase with the number of parties to a negotiation. Two causal
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mechanisms underlie this expectation. First, as the number of relevant parties increases,
so do the costs of ad hoc bilateral negotiation. Centralization of negotiations in a
multilateral forum reduces transaction costs. Second, as the number of relevant parties
increases, so, too, does the potential for conflicts of interest among parties. Such conflict
creates incentives for exchange. Issues are added to the agenda as necessary to permit
such logrolling and gams from exchange.
The first test here is to examine the relationship between number and delegation
through the mechanism of exchange. Does the breadth of an agreement’s scope increase
with the number of relevant parties? This study uses ordinal indicators that directly
capture these concepts: NCAUSERS, the number of parties that are relevant because they
contribute to the problem at hand; NAFFECT, the number of parties relevant because
they are significantly affected by the problem at hand; and AGRSCOPE, the functional
scope of an agreement. Table 5.7 presents a cross tabulation of NAFFECT and
AGRSCOPE.
Table 5.7 Crosstabulation: AGRSCOPE \ NCAUSERS
1-5 6-15
NCAUSERS
16-30 31-60 61-120 120+ Total
AGRSCOPE Very Narrow 2 0 1 1 0 0 4
Narrow
1 2 2 0 0 0 5
Medium 3 6 7 0 0 2 18
Broad 1 1
1
5 2 0 0 19
Very Broad 0 4 1 0 1 1 7
Total 7 23 16 1 3 53
There is no significant relationship between the NCAUSERS and AGRSCOPE (with
AGRSCOPE dependent, Somers’ d = .08, p = .546). This offers no support to the
hypothesis that agreement scope will increase with the number of relevant parties.
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Before dismissing this causal mechanism, however, it is necessary to consider an
alternative. Since the mechanism being evaluated is one of ‘gains from exchange’, it may
be more appropriate to focus on demandeur states than on states responsible for causing a
problem. It is demandeur states that drive the expansion of an agreement’s scope, when
they offer concessions or side payments to the parties responsible for causing the
environmental harm (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001).
The next step, therefore, is to repeat the analysis, using NAFFECT in place of
NCAUSERS. Table 5.8 presents the cross tabulation of these indicators. The results are
markedly more consistent with hypothesis ID3. Almost all of the agreements coded as
“very narrow” or “narrow” involved fifteen or fewer significantly affected parties. At the
other extreme, most of the agreements coded as “very broad" in scope have high
membership (greater than sixty states). In fact, there is a significant, positive association
between NAFFECT and AGRSCOPE (Somers’ d = .345, p < .001 with AGRSCOPE
dependent).
Table 5.8 Crosstabulation: AGRSCOPE x INAFFECT
1-5 6-15
Number Affected
16-30 31-60 61- 120 120+ Total
Agreement Very Narrow 1 2 0 0 1 0 4
Scope Narrow 2 3 0 0 0 0 5
Medium 3 10 1 0 1 3 18
Broad 2 7 2 2 3 3 19
Very Broad 0 1 1 0 4 1 7
Total 8 23 4 2 9 7 53
The logic behind hypothesis ID3 is that transaction costs of bilateral diplomacy
increase as the number of parties to a negotiation increases. This leads states to
centralize negotiations in a single forum As the number of participating states
increases, the heterogeneity of state interests is also likely to increase, creating potential
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gains from exchange on different issues. One primary consequence of this is that
agreements will be broadened to accommodate such exchanges.
It is not surprising, then, that the number of parties responsible for causing a
problem is not significantly related to the scope of an agreement. Rational
institutionalists should not expect states to have an interest in negotiating a solution to a
problem that does not affect them. That the number of affected states is significantly,
positively associated with agreement scope is perfectly consistent with the causal
mechanism specified above.
The fourth rational institutionalist hypothesis (1D4) is that delegation increases
with complexity when distributional problems are low. This hypothesis rests on the
belief that especially complex issues entail particularly high transaction costs for states.
It expects that, in the absence of significant distributional conflict, negotiating states
simply will find it more efficient to delegate rule making or standard setting authority
to an outside body, rather than acquire the expertise necessary to accomplish those
tasks themselves.
The first test of this hypothesis was to conduct a Rruskal-Wallis test of mean
ranks on COMPLEX, among different categories of SECRETAR. Only agreements
scoring “medium” or lower on distributional conflict were selected for the test, in
keeping with hypothesis 1D4. If high complexity leads negotiators to favor greater
delegation when distributional conflict is low, we would expect to find that agreements
creating new secretariats and those delegating to IGOs would score higher on
COMPLEX than agreements that simply assigned administrative duties to one or more
member states. Table 5.9 presents the mean ranks
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Table 5.9 kruskal-Wallis Test of Ranks: Type of Secretariat and Complexity
SECRETAR N Mean Rank
COMPLEX None 5 19.00
Member state performs
secretariat's functions
2 3.5
IGO performs secretariat's
functions
9 15.17
Agreement establishes
independent secretariat 12 13.96
Total 28
The test results are strongly consistent with hypothesis 1D4. Twenty-eight
agreements rank “medium” or lower on distributional conflict. Among these, the group
with the highest average rank on COMPLEX delegated no administrative or secretarial
duties at all. The next highest-ranking groups delegated secretarial functions to an
existing IGO or created a new, independent secretariat to manage implementation of the
agreement. The lowest-ranking group on COMPLEX assigned secretarial duties to a
member state. However, the test was not statistically significant, (3, N=28) = 5.607,
p = .132. Further testing on more cases will be necessary to reject the null hypothesis
that the various groups have the same distribution of COMPLEX.
A second test of hypothesis ID4 is to measure the association between the level of
secretariat independence and the level of complexity of the problem addressed by the
agreement. Again, only cases scoring “medium” or lower on distributional conflict will
be selected for the test. If the hypothesis is correct, there should be a positive association
between problem complexity and level of independence entrusted to the secretariat. The
observed association is negative, Somers' d = -.321 with SECINDEP dependent.
However, the association is not statistically significant (p = .106).
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In summary, the support these tests offer hypothesis !D4 is very modest. Among
surveyed agreements ranking low on distributional conflict, negotiators only assigned
administrative duties to a member state in agreements governing relatively simple
problems. Surveyed agreements governing more complex problems assigned secretarial
duties to an IGO or created a new secretariat. The surveyed agreements governing the
most complex problems did not delegate any administrative tasks. This suggests that
while hypothesis ID4 is correct to expect that increasing complexity generally leads to
greater delegation, there may be a ceiling of complexity above which negotiators are
reluctant to delegate any administrative functions or power Moreover, confidence in
these results is weak due to the low significance of the Kruskal-Wallis test (p = .132).
There is no evidence that greater complexity is associated with delegation of
greater discretion or independence. In fact, the observed association between the two
variables was negative, suggesting that negotiators may be reluctant to delegate
substantial authority over complex issues. Again, confidence in this result must be weak,
given the low significance of the association (p = .106).
The logic behind hypothesis 1D4 is that states will find it more efficient to
delegate highly complex tasks to third parties, rather than incur the cost of acquiring
sufficient expertise to perform those tasks themselves. Rational institutionalists expect
this relationship to hold unless the activity in question has significant distributional
consequences that implicate national interests. The theoretical significance of the weak
empirical results in this area suggests one of two explanations. Either states do not find it
as costly to develop expertise as hypothesis ID4 suggests, or states generally do not
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accompany the delegation of highly complex tasks with delegation of significant
independence or discretion.
Realist Hypotheses on Delegation
The first realist hypothesis on delegation (RD1) is that levels of delegation in
MEAs will be low. States should retain most, if not all, authority over decisions and
policy making. Independent secretariats should be uncommon. They may be created to
serve minor operational needs in some cases, but even in these, control over
consequential decision making should remain with states. The one expected exception
to this occurs when negotiations are driven by a hegemon. In these cases, dominant
states may trade on the perceived legitimacy of international organizations; they may
delegate authority (at least symbolically) to a secretariat, so long as that authority is
precisely circumscribed, making the secretariat’s actions are predictable for the
hegemon. Controlling for hegemonic influence over negotiations, then, we would
expect to find a strong positive correlation between the delegation of decision making
authority and the specificity of precision of agreements.
The descriptive statistics reviewed earlier in this Chapter accord fairly well
with realist expectations. Although realists would be surprised to find that nearly half
of the agreements considered in this study created an independent secretariat, they
correctly anticipate that secretariat independence is generally quite low. Not a single
secretariat was coded as being fully independent from its member states. Realist
expectations find further support from the type of functional activities delegated in
MEAs. The two least frequently delegated activities, managing financial/technological
transfers and verification of compliance, are also the most potentially intrusive
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activities. The third least frequent activity, reviewing adequacy of commitments, also
may be a threat to sovereignty if it questions states’ policy preferences (especially those
of a hegemon).
After reviewing the descriptive data, it seems plausible that sovereignty exerts a
dampening influence on delegation in international agreements. However, RD1 has no
explanation for those agreements that do feature significant levels of delegation, and
these exceptions are sufficiently common that one is forced to wonder what other
explanatory forces may be at work. Realists may correctly expect that sovereignty
concerns will dampen states’ willingness to delegate resources or power. But
sovereignty concerns do not preclude delegation. The task for realists, then, is to
develop a more precise account of the conditions under which delegation is likely.
The second realist hypothesis concerning delegation (RD2) is more precise; it
expects that delegation will be highly precise in hegemonic multilateralism. That is,
hegemonic negotiators may choose to delegate functions to independent organizations,
to reap the benefits of legitimacy that these organizations may possess. But hegemonic
actors will limit the discretion and autonomy of these organizations by precisely
defining the boundaries of delegation
A linear regression analysis was conducted to further evaluate hypothesis RD2.
Several stepwise regressions in search of causes of precisely defined boundaries of
delegation demonstrated both a high collinearity between indicators of hegemony (see
Table 3.3) and the continued salience of one indicator, HEGEMON, an indicator that
captures whether control over multilateral outcomes was dominated by a single state or
a small group of states. HEGEMON is a strong indicator of precision, as the regression
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results below show. There is a significant relationship between the activity of such a
hegemon and the precision of delegation, with an R~ of .234. This means that, while
the variable is a significant predictor of precision, it only explains a modest part of the
variation in rule precision. The results are summarized in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Linear Regression of PRECISE on HEGEMON
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta l Sig-
(Constant)
.622 .038 16.230 .000
HEGEMON
.216 .057 .484 3.830 .000
Dependent Variable: PRECISE
Another way to test hypothesis RD2 is to transform the indicator HEGEMON
from an ordinal measure to a dichotomous one. The original coding of HEGEMON
uses an ordinal scale to capture varying degrees of hegemonic control over negotiation
processes. However, the hypothesis is not specified to take advantage of ordinal
measurement. Rather, it simply predicts that hegemony will make a difference in rule
precision. For present purposes, then, HEGEMON can be transformed into a
dichotomous indicator by treating the original values of “strongly dominated” and
“very strongly dominated” as indicating hegemonic control over negotiations, and all
lower values as corresponding to lack of hegemonic control.
Figure 5 .11 presents the distribution of rule precision for agreements that were,
and were not, driven by hegemonic control, Rule precision is clearly higher in
hegemonic agreements than in non-hegemonic agreements; there is no overlap between
the middle fifty percent of each distribution A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to
test the statistical significance of the difference. The test was significant, z = -3.470, p
=
.001
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Figure 5.1
1
Distribution of PRECISE by HEGEMON
These results provide significant support for hypothesis RD2. Nearly half of
surveyed agreements were the product of a multilateral process dominated by a
hegemonic actor. These agreements were, on average, significantly more precise than
those negotiated among relative equals. However, while hegemonic control over
negotiations is a significant predictor of increased rule precision, regression results
show that it does not by itself determine whether rules will be vague or precise. Other
explanatory variables would need to be added to build a model with such predictive
power.
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Constructivist Hypotheses on Delegation
The first constructivist hypothesis on delegation (CD1 ) expects that levels of
delegation in MEAs will be generally high because multilateralism, in general, in entails
a nonnative commitment to principled behavior. Ruggie ( 1993b) specifically points to
principles of non-exclusion and impartiality. Thus, the institution of multilateralism
favors cooperative arrangements designed to promote shared notions of legitimacy more
than individual gain. Cooperative arrangements thus should favor delegation of
administrative duties to disinterested inter-governmental bodies, rather than to self-
interested member states. Furthermore, hypothesis CD1 expects that negotiators will
entrust administrative and secretarial bodies with discretion in carrying out their
activities. Lower levels of independence, in contrast, would reflect a lower commitment
to impartiality and legitimacy by negotiators.
As this study showed earlier, the great majority of surveyed agreements delegate
administrative/secretarial duties to an existing IGO or create a new, independent
organization. Very few assign such responsibilities to a member state. While this pattern
is consistent with hypothesis CD1, CD1 is undermined by the generally low levels of
independence entrusted to secretariats, as shown in Figure 5.2. This is underscored by
the funding patterns shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Negotiators generally do not delegate
sufficient resources for secretariats to carry out independently their assigned
administrative duties and programmatic activities. Rather, they are to a significant extent
kept dependent on the use of national resources and infrastructure. In summary, evidence
in support of hypothesis CD1 may be characterized as broad, but thin. Although
negotiators generally delegate administrative responsibilities to an international
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organization, rather than a member state, they do not generally delegate significant
resources or discretion to those organizations.
While hypothesis CD1 directs attention to the influence of norms of legitimacy,
the second constructivist hypothesis on delegation focuses on the power of uncertainty
and knowledge to influence multilateral delegation. Constructivist work on the
influence of epistemic communities and social learning yields a number of fairly
precise causal mechanisms (e.g., Haas 1993; Haas and Haas 1995, 2002). Specifically,
the second constructivist hypothesis on delegation (CD2) expects that delegation will
increase when expert groups participate in the design of agreements by providing
policy relevant knowledge to states.
This study has already shown that the cognitive setting within which
institutional design takes place can influence design choices. Agreements concerning
issues perceived by negotiators as especially complex are more relatively more likely to
involve delegation. In explaining this phenomenon, rational institutionalists point to
the efficiency of delegation as a response to transaction costs. This relationship is also
expected by some constructivists, although for a slightly different reason. States require
causal knowledge to connect preferences to policy choices. Uncertainty disrupts this
process. States thus have a motivation to seek knowledge to reduce uncertainty.
Delegation to external bodies, especially those recognized to have scientific expertise,
is one way for states to reduce uncertainty (see, e.g., Haas 1993).
The discovery that complexity interacts with (the absence of) distributional
conflict in influencing greater delegation, then, is equally consistent with constructivist
explanations of multilateral environmental cooperation One way to )udge whether the
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constructivist explanation is more persuasive than the transaction costs explanation
favored by rational institutionalists is to search for the presence of factors necessary for
the specific causal mechanisms emphasized by constructivists. In this case, that means
controlling for the active role of international science-based groups in the negotiation
and design of an agreement. In this study, such participation is represented by the
indicator INTSCI. Additionally, the constructivist explanation directs attention not to
the presence of complexity or uncertainty in general, but, rather, to the extent of policy-
relevant knowledge available to states. Like the rational institutionalist hypothesis
examined earlier, the constructivist explanation highlights the importance of low
distributional conflict. In the constructivist account, significant distributional conflict
can short-circuit the influence of uncertainty; even when states are uncertain about the
nature and complexity of an issue, the knowledge that certain policies impose
substantially greater costs than others may provide policy makers with sufficient
information to form policy preferences.
Finally, in testing the constructivist account described above, it is important to
use an indicator of delegation that accords with constructivist usage. Constructivist
accounts emphasizing the role of epistemic communities and learning expect generally
expect that these factors combine to produce agreements with relatively greater
delegation. For example, Haas and Haas ( 1995) stress that learning promotes holistic
problem solving, as opposed to maximizing ‘easy' gains through the de-coupling of
complex issues. Thus, for constructivists, scope follows from learning, not logrolling.
Therefore, the indicator AGRDEPTH is preferable to AGRSCOPE because it
measures the range of rules adopted explicitly in reference to the problem at hand
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Higher values on this indicator correspond to more holistic approaches to problem
solving. Lower scores correspond to partial approaches that may leave some aspects of
a problem unaddressed.
Measuring the correlation between expert scientific groups' influence and
agreement depth, while controlling for distributional concerns and policy-relevant
knowledge, could be done by creating a multi-layered cross-tabulation. At this stage,
however, there simply are not enough cases in the database to justify such an approach .
Instead, ordinal logistic regression will be used to model the determinants of agreement
depth. Indicators will be removed via backward selection. That is, the initial model
will include all theoretically relevant indicators. At subsequent iterations, the least
significant indicator will be dropped, until only significant ones remain.
The initial model for AGRDEPTH includes:
DISTCONF (distributional conflict during negotiations);
SCIENTIF (uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a problem);
OPTIONS (uncertainty concerning possible policy options)
EFFECTS (uncertainty concerning the full consequences of different policy options)
NATSCI (participation by national-level scientific associations)
INTSCI (participation by international scientific organizations)
EXPERTAD (provision of expert advice to states)
SHOCKNEG (relevance of perceived shock or crisis in driving negotiating agenda)
Through five iterations, five indicators were eliminated as not being statistically
significant predictors of agreement depth: DISTCONF (p=0.874), EFFECTS
(p=0.831), NATSCI (p=0 ,793), INTSCI (p=0.400), and SCIENTIF (p=0. 140)
The most significant influence on agreement depth is OPTIONS, uncertainty
concerning policy options. Increasing uncertainty of options has a strong negative
effect on agreement depth Two other factors mitigate this effect The most significant
positive influence on agreement depth is EXPERTAD, provision of expert advice This
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predictor also has the largest effect, nearly 2 1 7% greater odds of agreement depth.
SHOCKNEG, negotiating agenda driven perceived shocks or crises, also has a positive
effect on agreement depth, though it is substantially smaller, unit increases in
SHOCKNEG correspond to roughly a 61% increase odds.
Table 5.1 1 presents the final ordinal logistic regression model of agreement
depth.
Table 5.1
1
Ordered Logistic Regression Model of Agreement Depth
AGRDEPTH Odds Ratio Std. Error z P> z|
EXPERTAD 3.1695 1.9272 1.90 0.058
SHOCKNEG 1 .6095 .4417 1.73 0.083
OPTIONS .4418 .1402 -2.57 0.010
While the above model of agreement depth offers substantial support to the
constructivist hypothesis, it also offers a couple of qualifications. The first
qualification is that the presence of scientific INGOs and/or transnational networks
does not, by itself, lead to deeper agreements. This may be because expert group
participation can be selected when negotiating parties hold well-defined preferences. In
any event, indicators of such participation were among the earliest to be dropped from
the model. The explanatory power attributed to these indicators, however, seems to be
captured by the relatively more precise indicator of expert advice, EXPERTAD
The second qualification is that policy uncertainty may not always function as a
necessary condition for the positive association between expert advice and agreement
depth. The data here show that, in some cases, expert advice has a mitigating effect on
the overall negative effect of policy uncertainty.
It is necessary to note one final caution in interpreting these results. Although
distributional conflict did not have a statistically significant influence on agreement
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depth, one should be careful before excluding it as a relevant influence. The
conventional view in rational institutionalist literature on international cooperation is
that unresolved distributional problems can have a negative effect on agreement depth.
The literature on policy windows (e.g., Kingdon 1984) has similar expectations
concerning distributional conflict, as does the constructivist literature on learning (e.g.,
Haas 2001). However, as Fearon (1998) suggests, it may also be possible that greater
agreement depth can lead to greater distributional conflict, as the increased stakes give
parties a greater interest in securing favorable terms of cooperation A priority for
future research should be to refine the concept of distribution problems to facilitate
careful specification of these different causal mechanisms.
Summary of Findings
The results of the empirical analyses of rational institutionalist, realist, and
constructivist hypotheses concerning delegation are summarized below in Table 5.12,
To recap, this study found generally modest support for the rational institutionalist
hypotheses. Empirical analysis shows that negotiators responded to enforcement
problems by delegating tasks consistent with an ‘enforcement’ approach to compliance
However, they still favored less intrusive measures, such as monitoring, over more
intrusive verification policies. Moreover, there is little evidence that negotiators
delegated significantly more discretion to third parties to administer or enforce rules.
Likewise, under conditions of uncertainty, negotiators were more likely to delegate
informational tasks than otherwise. Once again, however, there is no evidence that
negotiators delegated greater discretion in response to uncertainty. Hypothesis ID3,
which expects that the scope of an agreement will increase with the number of relevant
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parties, received the strongest empirical support of the four rational institutionalist
hypotheses. Additionally, this study found evidence that that the number of countries
affected by a problem is more appropriate definition of ‘relevance’ than the number of
countries responsible for causing it. Finally, hypothesis ID4 received very little
support. This study found no systematic evidence that states delegated certain activities
that they found too costly to do themselves. Another explanation, more consistent with
realism, is that states may be reluctant to delegate complex tasks to third parties that
they do not have the capacity or knowledge to control.
This study found somewhat stronger support for the two realist hypotheses. The
surveyed agreements are characterized by generally low levels of delegation. There are
several exceptions, however, which hypothesis RD1 is ill-equipped to explain. This
study also found substantial support for hypothesis RD2, which expects that agreements
created through hegemonic negotiations may feature nominal delegation, but will
delegate little, if any, discretion to interpret agreement rules. States’ unexpected
reluctance to delegate rule making/interpreting authority in highly complex issue areas,
described above in relation to hypothesis 1D4, is entirely consistent with the second
realist hypothesis.
Finally, this study found mixed support for the constructivist hypotheses. It
found broad, but very shallow empirical support for hypothesis CD1 . Negotiators
frequently created new, independent organizations to administer multilateral agreements,
or delegated such functions to existing IGOs. However, they generally did not delegate
substantial resources of discretion in applying agreement rules. In contrast, this study
found strong support for the second constructivist hypothesis, CD2, that expert group
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participation can lead to greater levels of delegation. Specifically, this study found that
the provision of expert advice and, to a lesser extent, the existence of a shared perception
of crisis both are significant predictors of increased depth of cooperation. However,
participation by national and international scientific groups does not, by itself,
significantly predict greater depth of cooperation. This suggests that, in some cases,
states may select such groups may to participate on the basis of their expected
contributions.
The next section examines these hypotheses in light of specific cases: the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (C’LRTAP) and the 1989 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal. As mentioned previously in Chapter 4, this analysis contributes to the chapter
by demonstrating whether or not the causal mechanisms specified (or implied) by various
hypotheses were present. In doing so, these studies may strengthen the results of the
preceding empirical analysis. The two cases both deal with regulation and management
of environmental externalities. They complement each other in that one governs an area
characterized at the time by relatively high levels of scientific uncertainty while the other
governs an activity characterized by little scientific uncertainty.
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Table 5.12 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings on Delegation
Hyp Description Support Notes
101 Delegation increases with
the severity of the
enforcement problem.
Modest
Negotiators are more likely
to delegate specific
functions related to
There is no evidence
that negotiators
delegate greater
resources or
1D2 Delegation increases with
uncertainty about the state
of the world.
Moderate.
Negotiators are more likely
to delegate administrative
duties to an international
body. Uncertainty is a
significant predictor of
several programmatic
activities.
There is no evidence
that negotiators
delegate greater
resources or
discretion in response
to uncertainty.
ID3 Delegation increases with
the number of relevant
parties.
Fairly Strong.
There is a significant,
positive relationship
between number of parties
and agreement scope.
The number of
affected parties is
more important than
the number of parties
causing the problem.
ID4 Delegation increases with
complexity when
distributional conflict is
low.
Weak.
Negotiators appear more
likely to delegate
administrative powers, but
tests were not significant.
Beyond a certain
point, greater
complexity appears to
dampen delegation.
KOI Multilateral agreements
generally will be
characterized by low levels
of delegation.
Moderate.
Negotiators do not generally
delegate a significant
amount of resources or
discretion.
Unable to account for
contradictory cases.
R02 Under hegemony, high
levels of delegation will be
accompanied by high
levels of rule precision.
Strong.
Hegemony is a significant
predictor of greater rule
precision.
Nevertheless,
hegemony leaves
substantial amount of
variance in precision
unexplained.
CD1 Multilateral agreements
will feature generally high
levels of delegation.
Weak
Although negotiators often
delegate administrative
duties to an international
body, they generally
delegate little discretion.
Empirical support is
broad but shallow.
Many contradictory
cases exist.
CD2 Delegation will increase
when expert groups
participate by supplying
policy knowledge to states.
Strong
Provision of expert advice
has the largest positive
effect on agreement depth
Shared perceptions of crisis
also have a positive effect
Participation by
scientific groups is
not by itself a reliable
predictor of
increasing agreement
depth.
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Exploring Delegation: Case Studies
Before drawing final conclusions about these hypotheses concerning delegation in
MEAs, it is useful to consider how they perform in specific cases. This section examines
a number of hypotheses on delegation as they relate to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and the 1989 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. Unlike
the preceding analysis, which privileged generalizability and external validity, this
section is primarily concerned with internal validity. It does not address all the
hypotheses mentioned throughout the chapter. Nor does it claim that these two
multilateral agreements are representative of all MEAs. To the contrary, these two were
chosen specifically because they address similar issues: problems resulting from the
transboundary movement of environmentally harmful substances. Controlling for general
problem-type in this way allows the case studies to focus more directly on the effects of
variation along more precise dimensions (Mitchell 2006).
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Negotiations for the 1979 LRTAP Convention were conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), on the heels of
the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Initially,
at least, negotiations were driven not by environmental concern but, rather, by a general
desire among negotiating parties to further the process of detente. The Soviet Union, in
particular, perceived environmental issues as presenting more favorable opportunities for
furthering detente than human rights or arms control. After deciding on the
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environmental, the ECE then chose air pollution as the most suitable candidate for an
East-West accord (Levy 1993, 81; Wettestad 2002, 197).
Realists attach special importance to the presence of hegemony in the negotiation
of multilateral agreements. Although the Soviet Union and the United States participated
in LRTAP negotiations, and both possessed hegemonic influence within their respective
spheres of power, LRTAP was not significantly influenced by hegemony in the manner
described in the second realist hypothesis (RD2). That hypothesis expects hegemonic
powers to select multilateral negotiations when they offer a more efficient alternative to
bilateral diplomacy. Although this agreement scores “high” on ISSUEHEG (issue-
specific hegemony), it scores only “medium” on HEGEMON (negotiations dominated by
hegemon). As Levy and Wettestad suggest, this is likely due to the presence of
incentives to reach agreement beyond those that existed specifically with respect to air
pollution.
Since LRTAP was not a process of unilateral statecraft with a multilateral veneer,
realists would expect sovereignty concerns to prevent the agreement from employing no
or at most weak delegation. On this count, they are correct. Parties to the 1979 LRTAP
convention did not significantly delegate political authority. They did not create a
separate administrative secretariat (although they did create a quasi-secretarial Executive
Body). Instead, they delegated administrative power to the ECE’s Environment and
Human Settlements division. For its part, this body “has remained rather small since its
creation, with five professional staff members” (Levy 1993, 84). Not surprisingly, the
ECE’s Air Pollution Unit serves mostly to facilitate and coordinate further negotiations,
delegating programmatic tasks to the individual states themselves (Levy 1993, 84).
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Although the LRTAP convention employed consensual decision making rules, it
did not delegate asymmetric control over policy decisions. Although consensual decision
rules entail decentralization of veto power among parties, voluntary compliance rendered
formal use of veto power moot (Levy 1993). What the 1979 LRTAP convention did do
was to coordinate national research (Art. 7) and facilitate information exchange (Art. 8).
When the LRTAP Convention was negotiated, air pollution was a highly complex
problem, involving significant uncertainty with respect both to the extent of the problem
(how far does air pollution travel?) and the policy options ( how much will it cost to
implement measures to reduce emissions, and how successful will they be?).
The salience of these uncertainties is immediately apparent in the text of the Convention.
Article 7 (Research and Development) stresses the need for the parties to develop:
a) Existing and proposed technologies for reducing emissions of
sulfur compounds and other major air pollutants, including the
technical and economic feasibility, and environmental
consequences;
b) Instrumentation and other techniques for monitoring and
measuring emission rates and ambient concentrations of air
pollutants;
c) Improved models for a better understanding of the transmission
of long-range transboundary air pollutants;
However, it is difficult to interpret these programmatic activities as evidence of
substantial delegation. Agreeing to coordinate nationally conducted research is not
equivalent to delegating resources and responsibilities to a third party Moreover,
LRTAP’s principal air pollution monitoring program, EMEP, predated the Convention; it
was established as an OECD program a year prior to the LRTAP Convention. This is not
to say that EMEP was less effective than it could have been if it had been created de novo
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by LRTAP. Rather, the point is merely descriptive. LRTAP represents a coordination of
national policy, not a delegation of it.
At this point, it is possible to evaluate several additional hypotheses concerning
delegation and LRTAP. Hypothesis 1D1 expects that delegation will increase with the
salience of enforcement problems; parties will create enforcement mechanisms to prevent
free-riding. LRTAP scores only “low” on ENFORCEM, the primary indicator of the
relevance enforcement problems for an agreement. This is largely because the LRTAP
Convention itself only committed parties to search for ways to reduce air pollution;
specific emissions programs and targets were reserved for subsequent protocols to the
Convention. Absent such requirements, there was little incentive for parties to renege or
defect from the Convention itself. Thus, the LRTAP framework agreement is consistent
with 1D1
Hypothesis 1D2 expects that specific forms of delegation will increase with
uncertainty. LRTAP provides modest support for this hypothesis. Although the
negotiating parties certainly recognized the importance of coordination, they did not
create a strong secretariat to facilitate or manage such coordination. The strongest
support is for the dimensional understanding of uncertainty advanced earlier in the
chapter. Levy (1993) observes that new knowledge about the nature of the problem (i.e.,
air pollution does travel significant distances) allowed states to begin to form preferences.
For example, a 1977 OECD report on transboundary air pollution classified countries
according to whether they were primarily importers or exporters of air pollution. Thus,
even though there remained substantial uncertainty concerning policy options and effects,
there was no longer much uncertainty about the distributive consequences of
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transboundary air pollution. Although each state suffered from its own air pollution,
some were dramatically more vulnerable than others to transboundary pollution. The
UK, for instance, is less vulnerable to transboundary pollution than is Sweden. Likewise,
some states are substantially more responsible than others for creating transboundary
pollution. Prevailing winds make the UK a more significant source of such pollution in
Europe than, say, the Soviet Union. Thus, LRTAP is even more consistent with
hypothesis ID4.
The third rational institutional hypothesis, 1D3, holds that delegation will increase
with the number of relevant parties, as states create the policy linkages necessary to
support broad participation. LRTAP offers little support for this hypothesis and, in fact,
seems to contradict it. LRTAP exhibits neither a broad functional scope nor the level of
delegation necessary to manage it. Despite the presence of clear distributional
consequences of transboundary air pollution, LRTAP did not need to use formal side
payments to secure the participation of reluctant states. Instead, LRTAP sidestepped the
nonparticipation problem by delegating very little power and by placing very few
demands on members.
Hypothesis C'D2 focuses on uncertainty and the significance of expert groups in
the negotiation of multilateral agreements. With LRTAP, all the conditions were present
The Convention was negotiated against a background of policy uncertainty, and there
was meaningful participation by at least one expert group, 11ASA contributed a model
(RAINS) to simulate effects of different policy interventions on air pollution (Levy 1993,
87). Yet the Convention did not delegate substantial authority and did not entail
substantial commitments. It appears that while policy uncertainty and expert group
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participation facilitate delegation, they should not be understood as sufficient causes of
delegation. In this case, it seems likely that known distributional consequences mitigated
policy uncertainty. Furthermore, although IIASA fits the description of an expert
scientific organization, it may not possess the particular qualities that enable an epistemic
community
>
to exert policy influence. In summary, then, hypothesis CD2 may not be
specified well enough to explain the LRTAP case.
Basel Convention
Problems associated with the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
became a prominent international concern in the 1980s, following negative publicity
surrounding a number of cases. Developing countries, in particular, wished to regulate
such trade to curb the growing practice by firms in developed countries of simply
exporting toxic wastes to avoid domestic environmental regulations.
The origins of the international hazardous waste regime predate the Basel
Convention; The Organization of African Unity, the European Community, and the
OECD each had adopted more limited measures earlier in the decade, as had a number of
individual countries. These measures were significant in keeping the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste on the international agenda. Nevertheless, a truly global
regime was necessary to coordinate policies among states. In 1987, UNEP Executive
Director Mostafa Tolba started the negotiation process that culminated in the 1989 Basel
Convention. This section examines the extent of delegation in the Basel Convention in
light of the several hypotheses described above.
The realist hypothesis concerning hegemonic multilateralism (RD2) is not
applicable here. Hypothesis RD2 expects that hegemonic actors will act multilaterally to
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internationalize their preferred policies. However, in this case, the major fault lines in
negotiations were not between a single hegemonic state or a handful of powerful states.
The Negotiations were conducted between two broad coalitions: developed states that
preferred looser regulation of hazardous waste shipments, and developing states that
preferred stricter regulations.
The Realist hypothesis that does apply here is the general expectation that, absent
hegemonic action, multilateral agreements will not entail substantial delegation (RD1 ).
Evidence on this count is mixed. Developing states unsuccessfully advocated the
creation of a strong secretariat, with sufficient financial resources to implement financial
and technology transfers. Although developed states did not object to the creation of a
secretariat, per se, they did object to the creation of an independent secretariat, and they
were unwilling to commit significant financial resources to funding a secretariat or
financial and technology transfers. Instead, they preferred to locate a secretariat in an
existing international organization (Hampson 1995, 286). Likewise, delegation of
programmatic responsibilities is also mixed. The 1989 Convention does not delegate
significant resources or authority toward centralized monitoring of international
shipments. Similarly, it does not delegate significant authority or resources to enforce
rules, leaving responsibility to individual member states. The Convention explicitly
recognizes the need for financial and technological transfers, but reserves implementation
of such programs to future amendment. However, the Convention does provide for
voluntary, binding arbitration of disputes. In cases where all parties to a dispute do not
submit to arbitration, the Convention delegates dispute resolution to the ICJ In
summary, if the Basel Convention’s delegation of resources and political authority is not
substantial, neither is it trivial. Although there was no relevant hegemon in the Basel
negotiations, the negotiating coalitions were strongly asymmetrical in resources.
Not surprisingly, the enforcement problems surrounding the Basel Convention are
similarly moderate; it scores “medium” on the indicator ENFORCEM. The absence of
specific financial obligations and the absence of specific penalties are strong mitigating
factors on the actual enforcement problem presented by the agreement. Nevertheless,
parties to the Convention do commit to developing legal provisions to regulate domestic
industries, and they agree to require that domestic actors obtain prior consent from
relevant importing states before shipping hazardous wastes. Thus the Basel Convention
appears to be consistent with the rational institutionalist hypothesis that delegation
increases with the severity of enforcement problems (1D1 ).
The hypothesis that delegation increases with uncertainty does not seem
especially relevant here. The dangers associated with hazardous waste shipments are not
especially complex. Likewise, there is little, if any, uncertainty concerning the proximate
causes of environmental harm in the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The
relevance of uncertainty to this case is largely restricted to uncertainty concerning other
parties’ behavior Private actors may smuggle substances or make false declarations.
Developing countries with little monitoring capacity may be uncertain about which
substances, exactly, they are importing. The Basel Convention’s provision for prior
informed consent between parties (Art. 6) directly responds to such uncertainty. In
addition, the Convention requires state parties to submit to the Secretariat annual reports
detailing hazardous waste shipments. In this respect, the Basel case is consistent with
hypothesis ID2. However, the limited relevance of uncertainty for the transboundary
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movement of hazardous waste prevents one from drawing more than modest conclusions
on the basis of this case.
The rational institutionalist hypothesis that delegation increases with the number
of relevant parties (ID3) receives little support. Although the number of countries
affected by the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is quite large, the Basel
Convention entails only moderate delegation. This suggests a possible revision of the
hypothesis. Rational institutionalists expect the scope of agreements, and the ensuing
need for centralized administration, to increase when large numbers of parties are
involved m a negotiation. It presumes that parties have individual interests, and that the
more parties there are, the broader the range of interests. In the case of the Basel
Convention, however, there were basically two coalitions of parties, each one composed
of a group of states possessing mostly shared interests. Therefore, the causal mechanism
underlying the expected relationship (between number and delegation) simply was absent
in this case.
The final rational institutionalist hypothesis, that delegation increases with
complexity when distributional conflict is low (ID4), is entirely irrelevant here. As
previously mentioned, transboundary movements of hazardous waste does not pose an
especially complex problem Thus, there is little efficiency to be gained by delegating
consideration of the problem to an expert third party. Moreover, the regulation of
hazardous waste shipments presents acute distributional problems, given the polarized
preferences of developed and developing parties. Since parties in both coalitions have
little difficulty understanding the distributional consequences of policy options, there is
even less incentive to delegate policy making to third parties
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The Basel case supports hypothesis C'Dl . This hypothesis, again, expects that
agreements influenced by the norm of multilateralism will entail significant delegation.
Concern for legitimacy leads parties to emphasize general principles over specific
interests, and to establish mechanisms for the impartial adjudication of disputes. It is
worth pausing to note that the two coalitions in the Basel negotiation did not disagree
about whether or not regulation was desirable. They disagreed about how much
regulation was desirable. A purely economistic derivation of preferences would show
that developed states’ best interests were to avoid regulation altogether. Reasoning in
this manner, why would a developed state object to domestic firms exporting hazardous
wastes - especially if that state were reasonably capable of preventing such wastes from
being imported? The simple answer is that doing so would be inappropriate. Unlike
many multilateral environmental agreements, the Basel Convention was norm-driven, not
science-driven (Hampson 1995). The issue of hazardous waste transport/dumping gained
prominence on the international agenda precisely because developing and developed
states shared the belief that such practices were illegitimate. Even though the Convention
does not perfectly reflect the norm of multilateralism described by Ruggie (1993b), it is
difficult to explain in purely utilitarian terms (whether realist or rational institutionalist).
The second constructivist hypothesis, CD2, seems poorly matched to the Basel
case, for many of the same reasons mentioned earlier. Parties to the agreement did not
require expert advice to form policy preferences. Developed and developing countries
alike felt a normative pull toward successfully concluding an agreement. Developing
countries knew understood that they would need financial and technical assistance to
effectively assert sovereign control over the importation of hazardous wastes. Developed
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states sought to prevent the worst abuses, but without committing significant financial
resources, and without compromising international markets for their comparatively
advanced recycling technologies. With such clear distributional consequences, it would
have been difficult for uncertainty to have significant influence even if it had been a
salient factor. However, unlike the more complex problems of, for example, biodiversity
loss or climate change, the international shipment of hazardous wastes is conceptually
simple.
In summary, the Basel case is interesting for a number of reasons. It entails
greater delegation than realists would expect. It seems to involve clear normative
motivations. Uncertainty has limited relevance for the case. It contradicts the rational
institutionalist expectation that greater numbers lead to broader agreements with greater
delegation, suggesting a modification to the variable number to account for coalitions and
shared interests.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that delegation in MEAs can be understood in terms of its
structure and substance. The first aspect of delegation, structure, refers to the
organizational forms created or chosen by negotiators to oversee the implementation of
agreement rules. The decision to entrust administrative responsibilities and capacity in a
third party thus reflects delegation of power The second aspect of delegation in MEAs,
substance, refers both to the specific tasks delegated to third parties, and the leeway
provided to them by states to interpret and implement agreement rules.
Two distinct patterns have emerged in the foregoing discussion. First, no
theoretical orientation can claim a convincing victory in explaining delegation in MEAs.
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Each approach has strengths and weaknesses. Second, considered together, the
hypotheses concerning the substance of delegation receive much greater empirical
support than do the hypotheses concerning the structure of delegation.
The empirical results were mixed for each theoretical approach. First, as Table
5.12 makes clear, this study finds only mixed support for the rational institutionalist
hypotheses on delegation in MEAs. This is true within hypotheses, as well as across
them. Hypothesis ID 1 , which expects delegation to increase with the severity of
enforcement problems, received mixed support. There was no significant evidence that
enforcement problems influenced the structure of delegation. In contrast, there was
substantial evidence that negotiators were increasingly likely to delegate monitoring,
implementation review, and to a lesser extent, compliance verification, in response to
enforcement problems. Hypothesis ID2 similarly does a better job of predicting the
substance of delegation (e.g., negotiators’ decision to delegate specific informational
tasks) than the structure of delegation. Although it correctly expects states to create
independent secretariats or delegate to an existing IGO, this is not a strong statement,
since these are the modal responses among all surveyed agreements, regardless of
uncertainty. Moreover, there is no evidence that negotiators delegate increased discretion
in response to uncertainty. Hypothesis ID3 addresses the substance of delegation much
more directly than the structure of delegation. Its expectation that negotiators will design
broader agreements as the number of relevant parties increases also received significant
support. In contrast, this study found no support for hypothesis ID4 (delegation increases
with complexity), which addresses the structure of delegation much more directly than
the substance of delegation.
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The case discussion generally supports these conclusions, although it points to a
possible limitation of hypothesis ID3. Given the number of relevant countries
participating in negotiations, hypothesis ID3 would expect the substance of the Basel
Convention to be broader than it was. The hypothesis assumes that as the number of
parties to a negotiation increases, the degree of heterogeneity among parties also
increases which, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest The actual
degree of preference heterogeneity in a given negotiation is, of course, an empirical
question. In theory, the formation of negotiating blocs or coalitions can dampen, or
circumvent entirely, the causal mechanism implied by this hypothesis. This is likely
what happened in the Basel case, in which countries’ position as a net exporter or
importer of hazardous waste led to the formation of straightforward coalitions with
respect to depth of regulation.
Concerning realism, the two hypotheses on delegation receive generally strong
support. Hypothesis RD1 expects delegation in MEAs generally will be low. This study
found that negotiators were much more willing to delegate administrative functions to
third parties than this hypothesis would expect. However, it also found negotiators
generally delegated little discretion, and few resources, to these organizations. This study
also found some support for hypothesis RDI in that the least frequently delegated
functions were also the most intrusive. In short, both the observed structure and
substance of delegation among surveyed agreements were generally consistent with
hypothesis RD 1 . However, the hypothesis is ill-equipped to account for contradicting
cases. Hypothesis RD2 does a better job predicting the structure of delegation than the
substance of delegation, about which it is mute. This study found strong empirical
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support for the hypothesis that negotiations dominated by a hegemonic actor will produce
agreements with relatively precise rules, permitting little discretion in their interpretation
or implementation.
Again, the case discussion generally supports these conclusions, although they
highlight a potential limitation of hypothesis RD2. Although empirical results strongly
support hypothesis RD2, neither case provides an example of hegemonic negotiation.
The chief limitation of hypothesis RD2, then, is that it cannot explain with certainty when
countries with the potential for hegemonic control over negotiations will choose to
exercise that power. It can only explain what the likely outcomes will be if a hegemon
does, in fact, dominate negotiations.
The constructivist hypotheses on delegation also receive mixed support. Unlike
rational institutionalism, which clearly performs better at explaining the substance of
delegation than the structure, or realism, which performs better at explaining the structure
of delegation than the substance of delegation, constructivism has a mixed record in both
aspects of delegation. Hypothesis CD1, which expects generally high levels of
delegation, is better suited to structural explanations than substantive ones. This study
found mixed support for hypothesis CD1 Negotiators' clear preference for locating
administrative/secretanal bodies in IGOs or independent secretariats clearly is consistent
with hypothesis CDl’s on general principles of impartiality. However, hypothesis CD1
fails to explain the generally low levels of resources and discretion delegated to such
bodies, and it has no definite expectations concerning the specific substance of
delegation. Hypothesis CD2, on the other hand, makes much more specific predictions
about the substance of delegation than the structure of delegation. This study found that
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provision of expert advice to states and, to a lesser extent, the existence of a shared
perception of crisis, were significant predictors of increased depth of cooperation.
The case discussion is generally consistent with these results. However, the
LRTAP case points to a potential limitation of hypothesis CD2. In this case, the requisite
conditions seemed to be in place. There was a shared perception that acid rain was a
problem that needed to be addressed. An expert scientific group (UASA) provided
policy-relevant information (e.g., the RAINS model) to states. However, the negotiations
did not produce the extent of delegation expected by hypothesis CD2 One explanation
for this may be that known distributional problems inhibited the salience of expert advice.
States did not need perfect scientific knowledge of transboundary air pollution to have an
idea whether they were a net importer or exporter of such environmental externalities or
to form preferences concerning regulation of air pollution
In evaluating the contributions of the three theoretical approaches, it is useful to
consider them explicitly in terms of the structure and substance of delegation. First, three
rational institutionalist hypotheses address the structure of delegation: ID 1 , ID2, and IDT
Among these three, only hypothesis ID2 performs even moderately well in predicting
negotiator’s decision how to handle secretarial duties. None of the three perform well in
predicting the amount of discretion that negotiators delegate to such bodies. There are
also three rational institutionalist hypotheses that address the substance of delegation:
1D1, ID2, and ID3. This study has found significant empirical support for all three. It is
fair to say, then, that the rational institutionalist hypotheses on delegation perform better
at explaining the substance of delegation than the structure of delegation.
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Both realist hypotheses address the structure of delegation. Hypothesis RD1 fails
to explain the prevalence of delegation of administrative functions to IGOs, or the
creation of independent secretariats for the purpose. However, hypothesis RD1 fares
better in expecting overall levels of delegated discretion to be low. Hypothesis RD2 is
entirely concerned with the delegation of discretion; it has no significant expectations
concerning the use of international organizations. This study finds that hypothesis RD2
performs well - better than any other hypothesis under consideration - in explaining the
delegation of discretion (i.e., the precision of agreements). In contrast, neither realist
hypothesis performs well in explaining agreement substance. That the realist hypotheses
perform better in explaining the structure of delegation than the substance of delegation is
likely because realists tend to focus on structural impediments to cooperation, assuming
that the substance of cooperation will follow from the interests of a specific hegemon.
One constructivist hypothesis (GDI ) mainly addresses the structure of delegation.
The other (CD2) mainly addresses the substance of negotiation. Hypothesis CD1
performs best when interpreted as a constraining, rather than determining influence on
delegation. It correctly expects that negotiators will delegate functions to impartial,
hence legitimate, third parties. However, it cannot explain why states delegate so little
discretion or resources. The observed prevalence of ‘thin’ delegation may reflect a
tension between a realist concern for sovereignty and a constructivist concern for
legitimacy. Hypothesis CD2, in contrast, performs quite well, significantly predicting the
substantive depth of agreements.
To recap, the structure of delegation appears to reflect a tension between a realist
concern for sovereignty and a constructivist concern for legitimacy. The presence of
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hegemonic influence (hypothesis RD2) appears to be the best predictor of discretion.
Both rational institutionalism and constructivism accurately describe the substance of
delegation. Hypotheses from both approaches performed well in predicting the
delegation of functions significant to the approach (compliance functions for rational
institutionalism, informational functions for constructivism).
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CHAPTER 6
ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: FLEXIBILITY
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change is
notable because it specified a binding target of 5% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
by developed (Annex I) members of the FCCC. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol has
become equally notable for the many features of institutional flexibility that negotiators
included Three features -- the Clean Development Mechanism (Art. 12), Joint
Implementation (Art. 6), and emissions trading - have received the most attention but
they only scratch the surface of the flexibility that negotiators designed into the
agreement. Nearly every rule in the Protocol is accompanied by some form of flexibility
designed to respond to some party’s concerns. Primarily at the U.S. delegation’s
insistence, negotiators adopted a ‘basket’ approach to emissions, rather than focus on
carbon dioxide. This provides states with greater flexibility in choosing how to meet
commitments. Likewise, Article 3 stipulates that parties can meet their obligations
individually or jointly. Negotiators included this provision at the behest of European
states, who preferred the flexibility of meeting commitments either individually or within
the framework of the European Union. Other forms of institutional flexibility in the
Kyoto Protocol include specifying emission reductions within a limited timeframe only,
and requiring implementation review to inform subsequent modifications to the
agreement’s rules.
This Chapter examines the role that institutional flexibility plays in the design of
MEAs. It proceeds by first defining institutional flexibility. Next, it describes the
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institutional flexibility found among surveyed agreements. Third, it evaluates the
hypotheses concerning institutional flexibility described in Chapter 3. Finally, it
discusses these findings in light of two specific cases.
Flexibility and Multilateral Agreements
Institutional flexibility refers to various formal and informal mechanisms by
which states can change the terms of cooperation in response to both specific concerns
and unanticipated developments. Contemporary multilateral environmental agreements
respond to flexibility concerns in a number of ways. Following Duffield (2003) and
Koremenos et al (2001a), flexibility provisions may be conceptualized as falling into one
of three categories: adaptive, interpretive, and transformative.
Adaptive flexibility provisions allow states to respond to future contingencies by
suspending participation in treaty-governed cooperative arrangements (as opposed to
amending or modifying the terms of the agreement). The provision of escape clauses in
multilateral agreements represents the most significant form of adaptive flexibility in
institutional design. Escape mechanisms typically can be exercised by individual states
without the need for further negotiations or international agreement, provided that certain
qualifying criteria obtain. This study uses a dichotomous indicator, ESCAPE, to capture
whether or not negotiators provided an escape mechanism in a given agreement.
Interpretive flexibility provisions grant individual members leeway in interpreting
and in domestic implementation of agreement rules. Interpretive flexibility generally
takes one of two forms. First, it may be provided contractually upon parties’ signature of
an agreement through reservation. Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties defines reservations as:
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unilateral statements], however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State.
Reservations thus provide states with the flexibility to sign and ratify agreements with
which they are satisfied on the whole, but include one or a few specific provisions they
are unwilling to accept.
The default rule in international law is to permit reservations. As Article 19 of the
Vienna Convention stipulates:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation, may be made; or
(c) in cases not failing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Therefore, unless a multilateral treaty explicitly provides otherwise, state parties are free
to make reservations. Occasionally, as specified above in subparagraph (b) of Article 19,
negotiators will permit formal reservations, but restrict reservations to one or more
specific parts of an agreement. For example. Article 23 of the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) permits parties to make reservations
concerning the listing of specific species for protection (though it does not permit parties
to make general reservations).
The second source of interpretive flexibility in MEAs derives from the relative
precision of an agreement’s rules. Unlike reservations, which are made at the time of
contracting, ambiguity in the rules can be a lasting source of flexibility in an agreement.
Transformative flexibility refers to the ability of state parties to alter their
originally contracted tenns of cooperation over time and in response to new
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circumstances that arise. States may provide transformative flexibility both actively and
permissively. In the first case, states may limit the duration of a multilateral agreement
such that renegotiation is necessary to sustain cooperation after the initial term expires.
Alternately, states may provide transformative flexibility in a more permissive sense, by
designing provisions that allow the terms of cooperation to be amended. In this case,
states are faced with the further choice of choosing rules to govern the process of
adopting amendments. States may set demanding requirements for the adoption of
amendments, such as unanimity or consensus, or more lenient conditions, such as simple
majority support.
Table 6.1 summarizes the three categories of flexibility provisions.
Table 6.1 Categories & Mechanisms of Institutional Flexibility
Adaptive Flexibility Transformative Flexibility Interpretive Flexibility
Escape clauses Amendment Reservations
Duration (sunset provisions) Rule precision / specificity
Renegotiation provisions
Using this framework, this chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning flexibility in
MEAs drawn from the literature on international cooperation reviewed in Chapter 2.
However, before evaluating these propositions, it will be helpful to review the indicators
of flexibility discussed in Chapter 3.
Dimensions of Flexibility in MEAs
Before evaluating specific propositions concerning flexibility, this chapter
analyzes the dimensions of flexibility in MEAs by examining the several indicators of
flexibility set forth in Chapter 3. These are summarized below in Table 6.2.
225
Table 6.2 Indicators of Flexibility
Indicator Measurement Description
ESCAPE Dichotomous Does the agreement include a formal escape
clause?
RESERVE Dichotomous Does the agreement permit reservations?
PRECISE Ordinal How precise are the agreement’s rules?
AMEND Nominal How does the agreement provide for formal
amendment?
SUNSET Dichotomous Does the agreement include a sunset clause?
This study operationalizes adaptive flexibility in terms of formal escape
mechanisms. Among surveyed agreements, escape clauses are found in several
agreements constituting the Baltic Sea regime (centered around the 1974 Helsinki
Convention), the London Dumping Convention, the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands, the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement, and the 1954 Oil Pollution
Convention. The great majority of surveyed agreements do not include an escape
mechanism; such clauses are found in only eleven of fifty-three agreements.
As discussed earlier, interpretive flexibility can be either formal or informal.
Formally, negotiators can provide interpretive flexibility by permitting states to attach
reservations to the signature of an agreement. Informally, negotiators can create
interpretive flexibility by specifying rules, commitments, and obligations broadly
enough that states can exercise some degree of discretion in interpreting and applying
them.
In this study, the precision of an agreement’s rules is captured by the indicator,
PRECISE. This measure classifies agreements’ rules on a five-point ordinal scale, from
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vague and indeterminate (most flexible) to precise and easy to interpret (least flexible).
Since almost all surveyed agreements specify more than one rule, the value of PRECISE
reflects the mean of all substantive policy rules. This measure accords equal weight to
each rule; it does not attempt to weight rules according to some predefined general
criteria of importance. For example, eighteen rules are identified for the 1994
Convention on Biological Diversity, with a mean score on PRECISE of 2.94.
As Figure 6.1 shows, the observed values for PRECISE range from 1 to 4. The
mean precision score among surveyed multilaterals is 2.0, and the middle fifty percent
(25
th
to 75
th
percentiles) ranges from 1 .4 to 2.8. Thus the CBD is one of the less precise
agreements surveyed.
Figure 6.1 Distribution of PRECISE
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Relatively precise agreements include the 1995 Waigani Convention (1.13); the 1987
Montreal Protocol (1.29); and the 1949 Convention for the Establishment for the
Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ( 1 .44). Relatively
imprecise agreements include the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change
(3.61); the 1974 Helsinki Convention (3.08); and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance.
In addition to granting members leeway to interpret an agreement’s rules,
negotiators may formally allow parties to condition their acceptance of an agreement by
expressing reservations to specific parts of the agreement. The surveyed agreements
are evenly divided between those that permit reservations (50%) and those that
explicitly prohibit them (50%). All but one of the surveyed agreements permitting
reservations do so implicitly. The one exception is the 1973 CITES treaty, which also
specifically delimits the range of permissible reservations.
The third form of institutional flexibility considered here concerns the
possibility of changing an agreement as new circumstances arise. This can be achieved
passively, by specifying formal procedures for modifying the terms of an agreement, or
actively, by stipulating that an agreement will remain in force for a limited duration
(i.e., by including a ‘sunset clause’). Among surveyed agreements, the 1994
International Tropical Timber Agreement provides one clear example of a sunset
clause. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol also provides for cooperation a limited time period.
Among surveyed agreements, negotiators were far more likely to design
permissive amendment procedures than they were to use active mechanisms like sunset
clauses. Only three of the agreements in the IRD did not specify a formal amendment
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procedure: the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chlorides, the
1996 Black Sea Strategic Action Plan, and the 1999 Protocol to the Convention for the
Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (1ATTC).
However, these may be marginal examples of negotiators failing to provide for
amendment. The 1976 Rhine Chlorides Convention was negotiated simultaneously, but
separately from the broader Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against
Chemical Pollution, which did include a formal amendment procedure. The 1996
Black Sea Strategic Action Plan was mainly an aspirational declaration, made by
Environment Ministers of the Black Sea states, outside the existing institutional
framework provided by the 1992 Black Sea Convention. Finally, the 1999 Protocol to
the IATTC is little more than an amendment to permit regional economic organizations
to become parties to the original convention.
Thus, the real variation among surveyed MEAs is not whether they can be
amended but how amendments are adopted As Table 6.3 shows, the distribution of
decision rules governing amendments is strongly bimodal among surveyed agreements.
The most common decision rule among surveyed agreements is to require unanimity, or
at least consensus, to successfully amend an agreement. Nearly as many agreements
require a numerically-defined supermajority (e.g., support by two-thirds or three-
fourths of parties). Very infrequently did parties did negotiators choose to require
either a simple majority or a more complex qualified supermajority.
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Table 6.3 Amendment Decision Rules
Frequency Percent
No provisions 5 9.4
Permitted with simple majority 2 3.8
Permitted with supermajority 21 39.6
Permitted with qualified supermajority 1 1.9
Permitted by consensus or unanimity 24 45.3
Total 53 100.0
Evaluating Hypotheses on Flexibility
The IRD data on use of institutional flexibility in multilateral environmental
agreements reveals patterns in negotiators’ use of the various forms of flexibility. This
seetion uses that data for an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses concerning
flexibility in MEAs, which are summarized below in Table 6.4
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Flexibility
Rational institutionalist theory yields a number of expectations concerning the
use of flexibility in institutional design The first rational institutionalist hypothesis
(IF l
)
posits that flexibility will increase with the use of enforcement mechanisms. The
logic behind this hypothesis is that the presence of enforcement mechanisms in a
multilateral agreement can amplify the distributional problems surrounding an
agreement By making participation more costly, enforcement mechanisms create
incentives for states to bargain more intensively over the initial terms of an agreement
(Fearon 1998). The provision of flexibility mechanisms may be necessary to mitigate
distributional conflicts over initial terms, and to facilitate the successful conclusion of
an agreement. Thus, it is not the presence of distributional problems, per se, that
explains negotiators’ choice to provide institutional flexibility. Rather, distributional
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conflict follows from negotiators' decision to include enforcement mechanisms in an
agreement.
Table 6.4 Hypotheses Concerning Flexibility
Theoretical Approach Label Hypothesis
Rational
Institutionalism
1F1 Adaptive flexibility will increase with the use of
enforcement mechanisms
Rational
Institutionalism
IF2 Flexibility (particularly transformative) will
increase with uncertainty.
Rational
Institutionalism
IF3 Transformative flexibility will decrease with
the number of parties.
Realism RF1 Agreements driven by a hegemonic actor will
incorporate little transformative flexibility.
Realism RF2 Agreements negotiated among relative equals
will feature high levels of adaptive and
interpretive flexibility.
Constructivism CF1 Transformative flexibility will increase with
uncertainty.
Constructivism CF2 Transformative flexibility will increase with
policy dissensus.
Therefore, to test hypothesis I FI, it is necessary to have an indicator of
enforcement mechanisms in multilateral agreements. To accomplish this, an ordinal
measure of enforcement mechanisms was constructed Agreements with no
compliance provisions, or that provide only positive incentives are coded as having
“no" enforcement mechanisms. Agreements that permit restricting membership
privileges are coded as having “medium” enforcement. Agreements that permit
imposing financial penalties or sanctions are coded as having “strong” enforcement
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As Table 6.5 shows, the surveyed agreements are not consistent with hypothesis
IF I . Among surveyed agreements escape clauses were not more common among
agreements with significant enforcement provisions. Rather, the frequency of escape
clauses appears to be constant regardless of enforcement provisions; negotiators
provided for escape in roughly one-fourth of surveyed agreements. In absolute terms,
nine of the eleven agreements that provide for escape incorporate no enforcement
mechanisms, and four of five agreements that provide substantial enforcement do not
provide for escape.
Table 6.5 Cross Tabulation: ESCAPE x ENFORCEM
Enforcement Provisions
None Medium Strong Total
Escape No 34 2 4 40
Clause Yes 9 1 1 1
1
Total 43 3 5 51
Two further tests were conducted to examine whether negotiators provided
increased flexibility to accompany enforcement mechanisms. Neither of the results
support hypothesis IF1 . First, RESERVE was cross tabulated with ENFORCE.
Agreements incorporating no enforcement mechanisms were evenly divided with
respect to provision for reservations. Twenty-three (51.1%) of such agreements permit
reservations; twenty-two (48.9%) do not However, among the eight agreements that
do incorporate enforcement mechanisms, only two (25.0%) permit reservations. This
runs contrary to hypothesis IF l, which expects negotiators to provide increased
flexibility to mitigate the effects of enforcement mechanisms. In contrast to hypothesis
IFF negotiators do not appear to provide institutional flexibility to complement
enforcement provisions.
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Finally, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine whether rule
precision differed significantly across agreements that included no, medium or strong
enforcement mechanisms. The results were opposite what hypothesis IF1 would
expect. Agreements featuring strong enforcement mechanisms also provided the least
interpretive flexibility (mean rank 20.3); agreements featuring moderate enforcement
mechanisms fell in the middle (mean rank 21.2) and agreements featuring no
enforcement provided the most interpretive flexibility (mean rank 26,4). However,
these results are not statistically significant, %
2
(2, 50) = 1.074, p = .585.
In summary, these results provide no evidence of the causal mechanism entailed
by hypothesis IF 1
. Negotiators were not more likely to provide flexibility to mitigate
the effects of enforcement mechanisms on bargaining. To the contrary, in the great
majority of cases, negotiators provided for withdrawal regardless of enforcement
mechanisms. Likewise, negotiators did not provide for reservations, regardless of their
choice to provide enforcement. Though they are not statistically significant, the results
of the Kruskal-Wallis test actually are consistent with the opposite hypothesis, that
negotiators' provision of flexibility will decrease with the provision of enforcement
mechanisms.
The second rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility (1F2) expects that
flexibility will increase with uncertainty about the state of the world. Specifically, this
hypothesis expects that transformative flexibility will increase with uncertainty. For
example, uncertainty increases the probability that the benefits of an agreement will
decrease over time, due to unforeseen events and changes in circumstances over time.
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In response, rational institutionalists have hypothesized that risk averse states will
respond by limiting the duration of agreements negotiated under uncertainty (Harris
and Holmstrom 1987; Koremenos 2005hegnegota).
Even a cursory glimpse reveals that such a relationship is unlikely to be found
among the surveyed agreements; only three of fifty-three agreements incorporate sunset
provisions. A backward-stepwise logistic regression was conducted to determine
whether any of the indicators of scientific knowledge/uncertainty were significant
predictors of negotiators' decision to limit agreement duration. No indicators were
found to explain negotiators’ choice to limit duration. Next, a Mann-Whitney U test
was conducted to determine whether limited duration agreements addressed problems
characterized by greater uncertainty. Again, the results were negative. The three
limited duration agreements ranked slightly higher than open-ended agreements on
uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a problem (SCIENTIF), uncertainty
concerning policy options (OPTIONS), and uncertainty concerning the consequences of
different policy options (EFFECTS). However, these differences were extremely
slight, and none of the three tests was statistically significant, even at the 0. 1 level.
Accordingly, this study finds no evidence to support hypothesis 1F2; negotiators
were not more likely to limit the duration of agreements negotiated under uncertainty
The logic behind hypothesis IF2 is that risk-averse states will act to limit the potential
for the benefits of cooperation to decrease. The only way to do this is to make
renegotiation necessary to sustain cooperation. This is because unforeseen events can
make an agreement more beneficial to some states than they originally anticipated.
Such beneficiaries can be expected to resist attempts to amend or renegotiate
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agreements. Therefore, permissive approaches to transformative flexibility, such as
amendment procedures, do not address the motive of risk-averse negotiators posited by
hypothesis IF2. Risk-averse negotiators will insist on sunset clauses if uncertainty is
too great. As we have seen, however, there is no evidence at all of this process among
surveyed agreements.
The third rational institutionalist hypothesis (IF3) expects that transformative
flexibility will decrease with the number of parties. The reason for this is that
transaction costs of (re)negotiation increase as more states participate. These
increasing transaction costs mitigate the anticipated benefits from renegotiating an
agreement. Therefore hypothesis IF3 expects that negotiators will be less likely to
require renegotiation as numbers increase, and that they will be less likely to choose
demanding decision rules for adoption of amendments as numbers increase.
The first way to test hypothesis IF3 is to determine whether larger negotiations
are increasingly likely to produce limited duration agreements. To accomplish this, a
Mann-Whitney test was conducted first to compare the number of states actively
participating in negotiations (NSTNEGOT) between limited duration agreements and
indefinite agreements. Among surveyed agreements, those with limited duration were
negotiated by a greater number of states (mean rank on NSTNEGOT = 40.8) than those
with indefinite duration (mean rank = 24.5). This test was statistically significant, z = -
1 .953, p = 05
Next, a logistic regression was conducted to determine whether the number of
states actively participating in negotiations is a significant predictor of negotiators'
decision to limit an agreement’s duration The number of states is not by itself a
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significant predictor; the increase in the odds ratio of negotiators choosing to limit
duration was slight ( 1 .0 1 8), and the test was not significant, p = . 1 4 1
.
The second way to test hypothesis IF3 is to determine whether the decision
rules governing amendments are different, and less demanding, in agreements produced
by larger negotiations. To accomplish this a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to
compare mean ranks on NSTNEGOT among surveyed agreements with different
decision rules governing amendments.
Table 6.6 Mean Ranks: NSTNEGOT x AMEND
Amendment Decision Rule N Mean Rank
NSTNEGOT No Amendment Provisions 5 9.50
Permitted by Consensus or Unanimity 23 18.67
Permitted with Simple Majority 2 28.00
Permitted with Supermajority 21 38.33
Permitted with Qualified Supermajority 1 40.00
Total 52
Table 6.6 presents mean ranks on number of negotiating states for surveyed
agreements, grouped by amendment decision rules. The group of agreements
negotiated by the smallest number of states specified no formal amendment rules. The
group of agreements negotiated by the largest number of states required supermajority
approval for the adoption of amendments, These results are mostly consistent with
hypothesis IF3; the groups that appear to be out of place include only one or two
agreements.
As Table 6.6 also makes clear, the distribution of amendment decision rules
among surveyed agreements is strongly bimodal; more than four-fifths require either
consensus or supermajority support to adopt amendments to the agreement Since these
are negotiators’ predominant design choices concerning the adoption of amendments, it
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is worthwhile to compare these groups directly against each other. A t-test was
conducted to compare the mean number of negotiating states for the two groups. The
test was significant, t = 5.362, p < .001. Agreements requiring supermajority approval
of amendments (M = 66.05, SD = 43. 14) were the product of larger negotiations than
were agreements requiring consensus (M = 14.78, SD = 8.03); the mean difference in
size of negotiations was 5 1 states, with a 95% C.l. of 3 1-71 . Since the number of states
negotiating agreements (NSTNEGOT) is not normally distributed, a Mann-Whitney
test was conducted to verify these results. The results were statistically significant, and
matched the results of the t-test.
In summary, this study finds strong support for hypothesis IF3. Nearly all
surveyed agreements permit amendments, either by consensus or with supermajority
support. Negotiators are less likely to require consensus to adopt amendments as the
size of negotiations increases. Additionally, there is some evidence that negotiators are
less likely to limit agreement duration as the number of negotiating states increases.
However, the low number of limited duration agreements means that statistical results
are very sensitive to individual cases, and would be susceptible to change given
additional observations.
These results provide strong support to the rational institutionalist claim that
transaction costs influence negotiators' choice of flexibility provisions. The empirical
analyses above demonstrate that there is a significant relationship between the size of
negotiations and the choice of decision rules governing the adoption of amendments.
Specifically, the theoretical significance of these findings is to highlight the way in
which transaction costs influence negotiators’ choice of decision rules. The text of
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nearly every surveyed agreement makes reference to the value of consensus in decision
making, providing evidence of a general norm of consensual decision making in MEAs.
However, larger negotiations tend to relax this requirement by stipulating a super-
majontarian decision rule in the event that reasonable attempts to reach consensus fail.
Thus, increasing numbers lead negotiators to alter the general norm and practice of
consensual decision making.
Realist Hypotheses on Flexibility
Whereas rational institutionalism generally treats efficiency as a goal of
institutional design, realism is more concerned with sovereignty, relative gains, and,
especially, coercive power. The first realist hypothesis concerning flexibility (RF1
)
expects that hegemon-led negotiations will produce agreements with little
transformative flexibility. Hegemonic states are unlikely to design sunset provisions,
and they are unlikely to choose amendment decision rules that do not provide them a
veto over potential changes to the terms of an agreement. The logic behind these
expectations is that hegemonic states sometimes use multilateral processes because they
are an efficient means of internationalizing their preferred policy on an issue or
problem. If a state exerts hegemonic influence over the course of negotiations, it is
reasonable to expect that it will secure its desired terms of cooperation. Transformative
flexibility provisions add little value in such situations because to the extent they
decentralize control over an agreement, they can be used against a hegemon's interests.
The first test of hypothesis RF1 is to see whether restrictive amendment rules
are, in fact, more commonly used in hegemon-led negotiations. To do this a new
measure was constructed to indicate whether the multilateral agenda (HEGAGEND)
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and negotiating process (HEGEMON) both reflect hegemonic influence. This new
indicator was cross tabulated with AMEND Table 6.7 presents the results.
The bimodal distribution of decision rules is still present when controlling for
hegemony. The most common decision rule among agreements negotiated by
hegemonic actors is consensus/unanimity, as expected by hypothesis RF1 . However,
one-third of such agreements require the less demanding standard of supermajority
support, failing to ensure that the hegemon possesses veto power over unwanted
changes.
Table 6.7 Cross tabulation of AMEND x HEGEMON
HEGEMON
No Yes Total
AMEND No Provisions 4 1 5
Permitted with Simple Majority 2 0 2
Permitted with Supermajority 15 6 21
Pennitted with Qualified Supermajority 1 0 1
Penmtted by Consensus or Unanimity 13 1 1 24
Total 35 18 53
Next, SUNSET was cross tabulated with the indicator of hegemony to
determine whether hegemonic actors were less likely to limit the duration of
agreements. Results are printed in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8 Cross tabulation of SUNSET by HEGEMON
HEGEMON Total
No Yes
SUNSET No 30 18 48
Yes 3 0 3
Total 33 18 51
None of the agreements driven by a hegemonic state incorporated a sunset clause
However, given the rarity of such clauses among surveyed agreements, the significance
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of this finding is modest; there is such little variation in the use of sunset clauses among
surveyed MEAs that there is very little for hegemony to explain.
In summary, these findings cast doubt on the accuracy of hypothesis RF1.
Although both findings are in the right direction, there are too many unexplained cases
for this study to place confidence in RF1 . The most plausible explanation for the findings
is that there is no significant relationship between hegemony and transformative
flexibility. To the extent that states have exerted hegemonic control over some
negotiations, those states may not have been worried about their ability to control later
developments. Prohibiting amendments or requiring consensus are blunt instruments of
institutional design, and they may not be appropriate in some cases.
The second realist hypothesis on flexibility (RF2) expects that agreements
negotiated among relative equals will feature generally high levels of adaptive and
interpretive flexibility. Without a hegemon to coerce agreement or present an agreement
as afait accompli , relatively equal states will act out of concern for maintaining
sovereignty when designing cooperative arrangements.
The first way to test hypothesis RF2 is to determine whether adaptive and
interpretive flexibility provisions are actually less frequent among agreements negotiated
by equals. To do this, the indicators of sunset and withdrawal clauses were cross
tabulated with the indicator of hegemony, The results offer little support to hypothesis
RF2. There is no significant relationship between hegemony and provision for
withdrawal; the few agreements that do not explicitly provide withdrawal clauses are
divided evenly on hegemony. Agreements negotiated among relative equals included
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escape clauses less frequently than those negotiated primarily by a hegemonic actor,
contradicting hypothesis RF2.
Next, this study compared the precision of agreements negotiated among relative
equals with those negotiated by a hegemonic state, to determine whether the former
offered greater levels of interpretive flexibility. Figure 6.2 presents a boxplot of the
distributions of rule precision for the two categories of agreements.
Figure 6.2 Distribution of PRECISE by HEGEMONY
As Figure 6.2 makes clear, agreements negotiated among relative equals provide
substantially greater interpretive flexibility, on average, than do agreements negotiated
mainly by a hegemonic state. A t-test comparison of means ( t( 44 ) = 2,026, p = ,049) and
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the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test (z = -2. 1 12, p = .035) both found that the
difference in distributions is statistically significant.
Finally, rule precision (PRECISE) was regressed on the original, ordinal measure
of hegemony (HEGEMON) to determine whether hegemony is a significant predictor of
rule precision. Table 6.9 presents the linear regression results.
Table 6.9 Regression of PRECISE on HEGEMON
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
HEGNEGOT
-.946 .409 -.329 -2.313 .025
(Constant) 2.475 .209 1 E855 .000
Dependent Variable: PRECISE
Hegemony is a significant predictor of rule precision, though it explains only a modest
. 1
amount of variation in rule precision (R~ = .108).
Taken together, these results provide substantial support for hypothesis RF2.
Their overall theoretical significance is to highlight the types of institutional flexibility
that are relevant to hegemonic diplomacy. Interpretive flexibility, rule precision in
particular, is the only type for which there is significant evidence of hegemonic influence.
Adaptive flexibility and transformative flexibility most likely have less relevance for a
hegemonic actor. Very few MEAs incorporate sunset provisions or escape clauses to
begin with. Since these institutional mechanisms do not further hegemons’ interests,
there is no reason to expect such mechanisms to be more common among agreements
driven by hegemonic influence.
Constructivist Hypotheses on Flexibility
The constructivist hypotheses examined in this Chapter focus on the significance
of knowledge/uncertainty and consensus/disagreement for the design of multilateral
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agreements. The first constructivist hypothesis expects that negotiators will respond to
uncertainty by providing transformative flexibility. Although observationally similar to
the second rational institutionalist hypothesis, the two spring from very different causal
mechanisms. Hypothesis IF2 conceptualizes uncertainty as an exogenous, stochastic
shock to states' utility from participating in a cooperative agreement. Constructivists, on
the other hand, consider uncertainty as endogenous to institutional design. For
constructivists, uncertainty is not simply an exogenous constraint to which negotiators
must respond Rather, negotiators may use institutional design to influence the presence
and extent of uncertainty in the first place. Constructivism envisages a reflexive
relationship between uncertainty and institutional design where rational institutionalism
envisages institutional design primarily as a reactive activity.
Consistent with their more dynamic view of institutional design, constructivists
emphasize negotiators’ ability to (re)shape agreements in light of new knowledge, rather
than their ability to “limit the damage” of uncertainty by limiting agreement duration
Thus, a constructivist theory of institutional design would be concerned not only with the
origination of agreements but with their evolution over time. While definitely a
worthwhile possibility for extending the current project, such an endeavor lies outside the
scope of this project. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive specific expectations about
‘original’ institutional design from a constructivist perspective.
First, one should expect negotiators to include formal amendment provisions,
particularly when designing agreements in the face of uncertainty. The ability to change
institutions over time in response to learning is a hallmark of this strand of constructivist
thought. Second, one should expect negotiators to avoid requiring unanimity or
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consensus to adopt amendments to an agreement. As the uncertainty surrounding the
nature of a problem and the effects of policy interventions lessens, the clearer the
distributive consequences of policy choices become, and the more likely it is that
distributive conflict will inhibit consensus. Therefore, hypothesis CF1 expects that
negotiators will respond to uncertainty by including formal amendment provisions in the
design of agreements. Furthermore, although consensus is important for the initial
adoption of an agreement, hypothesis CF1 expects that negotiators will not require
consensus or unanimity for the adoption of amendments.
The first way to test hypothesis CFT is to recode the indicator AMEND to create
two groups of agreements: those that include formal amendment procedures and those
that do not. Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted for each of the several indicators of
scientific knowledge/uncertainty. For each indicator, agreements establishing an
amendment procedure ranked higher on uncertainty than did agreements that did not
provide an amendment procedure. However, the only difference that was statistically
significant involved SCIENTIF, uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a
problem. Agreements with an amendment procedure had a mean rank on SCIENTIF of
28.5, compared to a mean rank of 12.2 among agreements without an amendment
procedure (z = -2.405, p = .016).
As a next step, logistic regression was conducted to see if any of the uncertainty
indicators (especially SCIENTIF) were significant predictors of negotiators' choice to
provide for amendments. Backward selection starting with all indicators was chosen, on
the chance that there were significant interactions among indicators that were not
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individually significant. The results show that SCIENT1F is, indeed, a significant
predictor of the decision to provide for amendment.
Table 6.10 Logistic Regression Coefficients for AMEND
Dependent Independent B Wald df Sig. Odds Ratio
AMEND
SCIENTIF 1.777 4.837 1 .028 5.911
Constant
-1.349 .830 1 .362 .260
Variables entered on step 1 : SCIENT1F, OPTIONS, EFFECTS
The second implication of hypothesis CF1 is that negotiators will adopt less
demanding decision rules governing the adoption of amendments as uncertainty
increases. To test this conjecture, Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted for each
indicator of uncertainty, to compare mean ranks on uncertainty between agreements
requiring supermajority approval and agreements requiring consensus to adopt
amendments (the two modal observations). None of the tests showed substantial
differences, and none were statistically significant.
In summary, this study finds mixed support for hypothesis CF1. There is
evidence that scientific uncertainty significantly predicts negotiators’ decision to provide
a formal amendment procedure. This supports the causal mechanism posited by
hypothesis CF1, that uncertainty is endogenous to institutional design. However, the
logistic regression results on which this conclusion rest are sensitive, given the low
number of agreements that do not include a formal amendment provision In contrast, the
results of the second test cast doubts on the theoretical significance of the second
implication of hypothesis C’Fl . The strongest explanation so far for negotiators’ choice
of decision rules governing amendments is not uncertainty but, rather, the size of
negotiations, as suggested by hypothesis IF3.
245
Whereas hypothesis CF1 considers qualitative measures of the extent of different
aspects of uncertainty, hypothesis CF2 starts by considering the existence of consensus
among negotiating states concerning the state of knowledge concerning the problem and
the consequences of different policy choices. The expectation here is that negotiators
will respond to dissensus by providing for amendments, and by choosing more lenient
decision rules to permit implementation review and facilitate learning.
To test this, the indicators for agreement concerning policy options and effects
were cross tabulated with the indicator for formal amendment provisions.
Table 6. II Crosstabulation of AMEND x OPTAGREE and EFFAGREE
Disagreement
Concerning Options
Disagreement
Concerning Effects
No Yes No Yes Total
AMEND No 5 0 4 1 5
Yes 30 18 25 23 48
Total 35 18 29 24
As Table 6.1 1 shows, negotiators nearly always provided for amendment in cases in
which there was disagreement concerning the reliability of knowledge concerning policy
options or disagreement about the likely consequences of different options. However,
there is not a statistically significant relationship between the presence of either type of
disagreement and the decision to provide for amendment. Neither type of disagreement
is a significant predictor of the decision to provide for amendment. This lack of
significance may be a product of the low number of cases that do not provide for
amendment
The second implication of hypothesis CF2 is that negotiators will respond to
disagreement concerning policy options and effects by choosing less demanding decision
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rules for adopting amendments. To test this, amendment rules were cross tabulated with
the two indicators of policy disagreement. Table 6.12 presents the results.
Table 6.12 Crosstabulation of AMEND x OPTIONS and EFFECTS
Amendment Rules
Disagreement Concerning Disagreement Concerning
Policy Options Policy Effects
No Yes No Yes
No provisions 5 0 4 1
Permitted with simple majority 2 0 2 0
Permitted with supermajority 13 8 8 13
Permitted with qualified supermajority
1 0 0 1
Pennitted by consensus or unanimity 14 10 15 9
Total 35 18 29 24
The bimodal distribution of agreement rules among surveyed agreements essentially is
reproduced even if one controls for the existence of policy disagreement. Among
negotiations in which parties disagreed concerning the adequacy of information about
policy options, a majority produced agreements that required consensus for the adoption
of amendments, contrary to the expectations of hypothesis CF2. Among negotiations at
which there was substantial disagreement among parties concerning the likely outcomes
of different policy choices, a majority produced agreements that required only
supermajority support to adopt amendments. While this result is consistent with
hypothesis CF2, there is not a statistically significant association between disagreement
about policy effects and the choice of a supermajority rule for adopting amendments.
Though this could change with the addition of more cases, the observed relation among
surveyed agreements is so modest that this study cannot infer much support for
hypothesis CF2 from the data presented in Table 6.12.
Hypothesis CF2 proceeds from the belief that negotiators will be reluctant to
solidity the terms of cooperation when negotiating parties disagree about the adequacy of
information about different policy options, or about the probable consequences of
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choosing different policy options. Rather, negotiators will respond to such disagreement
by designing agreements that are relatively easy to modify in light of experience, new
information, or other changes in circumstances. Although the surveyed agreements
generally do not contradict hypothesis CF2, they provide only very modest support for
the hypothesis. Taken together, the empirical analyses of hypothesis CF2 suggest that
policy consensus probably is not a significant influence on negotiators’ design of
amendment rules. To the contrary, the strongest evidence this study found supports the
rational institutionalist hypothesis that the size of negotiations largely dictates the choice
of amendment rules.
Ultimately, the weak support for hypothesis CF2 may not challenge constructivist
explanations of multilateralism as much as it challenges the particular significance of
consensus claimed here. Indicators of disagreement may be less useful as a guide to
understanding institutional design than indicators of general knowledge and uncertainty.
This is because disagreement concerning the adequacy of knowledge may itself be
motivated by other considerations, such as anticipated distributional consequences.
Without any way to ascertain the “true” source of disagreement concerning the adequacy
of policy-relevant information, constructivist approaches may be better off focusing on
more general indicators of knowledge rather than manifest indicators of
consensus/dissensus.
Summary of Findings
The results of the empirical analyses of rational institutionalist, realist, and
constructivist hypotheses concerning flexibility are summarized below in Table 6. 13.
To recap, this study found very mixed support for the rational institutionalist
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hypotheses. Contrary to rational institutionalist expectations, this study found no
evidence that negotiators provided flexibility mechanisms to mitigate the heightened
distributional bargaining created by enforcement mechanisms (1F1 ). Likewise, this
study found no evidence that negotiators responded to uncertainty by limiting the
duration of agreements (IF2). In contrast, this study found strong support for the third
rational institutionalist hypothesis (1F3). The size of negotiations is the most
convincing explanation for negotiators’ choice of decision rules governing the adoption
of amendments to an agreement.
The statistical findings provide similarly mixed support for the two realist
hypotheses. Sunset clauses were extremely rare among surveyed agreements.
Although none of the three that did include them were negotiated by a hegemonic actor,
the great majority of agreements negotiated among relative equals did not incorporate
them, either. Therefore, there is no ground to draw a strong conclusion that hegemonic
agreements are distinctive for their indefinite duration (RF1 ). On the other hand,
hegemony was a significant predictor of decreased transformative flexibility.
Finally, the empirical results provide very modest support for the constructivist
hypotheses. There is significant evidence that uncertainty about the causes and extent of
a problem is a significant predictor of the decision to provide for amendment. However,
there is no significant evidence to support the second implication of hypothesis CF1, that
negotiators choose less demanding decision rules in response to uncertainty. Similarly,
although the observed cases are consistent with hypothesis CF2, this study did not find a
statistically significant relationship between policy dissensus and the choice to provide
for amendment Indeed, the fact that the great majority of agreements provide for
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amendment, regardless of uncertainty or policy dissensus, casts doubt on our ability to
infer strategic design from the simple provision for amendment. While constructivist
theory may have much to say about other aspects of institutional design, it does not
appear that the constructivist mechanisms discussed here explain negotiators’ choice of
institutional flexibility. These results are summarized in Table 6. 13. The next section
examines these hypotheses in light of two specific cases: the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Table 6.13 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings on Flexibility (continued on the next page)
Hyp Description Support Notes
IFI Adaptive flexibility will
increase with the use of
enforcement mechanisms.
None
There is no evidence of
adaptive flexibility increasing
with enforcement.
In fact, enforcement
may be associated
with less flexibility.
IF2 Transformative flexibility
will increase with
uncertainty.
None.
There is no systematic
evidence of negotiators
limiting agreement duration
in response to uncertainty.
Limited duration
agreements were very
rare regardless of
uncertainty.
IF3 Transformative flexibility
will decrease with the
number of parties.
Strong.
Supermajority rule is
associated with larger
negotiations, consensus with
smaller negotiations.
However, many small
negotiations make no
provision for
amendment.
RF1 Transformative flexibility
will decrease with
hegemony.
Weak.
Data are consistent with
RF1, but no significant
relationship exists.
Sunset clauses are
rare among surveyed
agreements,
regardless of
hegemony.
RF2 Agreements negotiated by
relative equals will feature
higher levels of adaptive
and interpretive flexibility
Strong.
Hegemony is a significant
predictor of greater rule
precision
Nevertheless,
hegemony leaves
substantial amount of
variance in precision
unexplained
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Table 6.13 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings on Flexibility (continued)
Hyp Description Support Notes
CF1 Transformative flexibility Moderate. Empirical results
will increase with Uncertainty is a significant based on a small
uncertainty. predictor of the decision to
provide for amendment
number of cases that
do not provide for
amendment; results
may be sensitive
CF2 Transfonnative flexibility Weak. Since the great
will increase with policy Nearly all cases of policy majority of
dissensus. dissensus provide for
amendment. However,
policy dissensus is not a
significant predictor of
provision for amendment.
agreements provide
for amendment, there
is little variation for
dissensus to explain.
Exploring Institutional Flexibility: Case Studies
The object of this section is not to choose a representative sample of all
multilateral environmental agreements but, rather, to illuminate the hypotheses under
consideration by searching for theoretically interesting differences between two similarly
structured cases. These cases are especially well matched because recent studies of the
design of the Kyoto Protocol commonly use the Montreal Protocol as a benchmark for
comparison (e.g., Barrett 2003). Victor (2001 ) emphasizes the design of flexibility
provisions, in particular, as one reason for the agreements’ varying effectiveness.
Kyoto Protocol
Article 7.2 (a) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
created a Conference of Parties to the Convention that would
Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the
institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the light of
the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its
implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological
knowledge.
251
As mandated by Article 7.4 of the FCCC, the First Conference of Parties (COP-1) was
held in Berlin from 28 March - 7 April 1995, one year following the Convention’s
entry into legal force in 1994. The parties’ review of the institutional arrangements of
the FCCC yielded two major outcomes. First, delegates to COP-1 adopted decision
1/CP.l, which later became known as the “Berlin Mandate.” Essentially, the Berlin
Mandate charged that the FCCC’s voluntary commitments and mechanisms had not
been effective in limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions among Annex I
(industrialized) parties. To remedy this situation, the Berlin Mandate called on parties
to the FCCC to “take appropriate action beyond 2000, including the strengthening of
the commitments of Annex 1 Parties . . . through the adoption of a protocol or another
legal instrument” that would “set quantified emission limitation and reduction
objectives” (DePledge 2000, 6). The second major outcome of COP-1 was the
establishment of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), charged with the
task of developing a formal legal instrument to institutionalize the policy objectives
expressed in the Berlin Mandate.
The AGBM met eight times between COP-1 (Berlin) and COP-3 (Kyoto).
Negotiation of what would become the Kyoto Protocol began in earnest at AGBM 4 in
July 1996. At this meeting, state delegates charged the chair of the meeting with the
task of producing a “Synthesis of proposals” in time for the fifth AGBM meeting in
December. True to its name, this document collected in one place all the various
proposals that delegates had advanced in the first four AGBM meetings and provided
the menu of choices from which negotiators produced the Kyoto Protocol. Another
significant development occurred at AGBM 6, when delegates charged the chair of the
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meeting, Raul Estrada, with the task of producing a negotiating text in time to distribute
to FCCC parties before AGBM 7 in July 1997, This deadline was significant because
the FCCC requires proposed amendments or protocols to be communicated to parties at
least six months prior to a vote on adoption, and COP-3 was scheduled for December
1998. Following the review of the negotiating text at AGBM 7, Estrada drafted a
‘consolidated negotiating text’ initiating a new phase of discussions by setting out his
view of a possible compromise text for consideration at AGBM 8 in October 1997
(Depledge 2000, 10). At AGBM 8, negotiators revised the consolidated negotiating
text, and forwarded it for consideration at the Kyoto conference (COP-3), concluding
the AGBM’s work.
The Kyoto Protocol provides no insight into the first rational institutionalist
hypothesis, that when negotiators choose enforcement mechanisms to promote
compliance, they will also provide adaptive flexibility mechanisms to make the
agreement easier to conclude, because it does not adopt an enforcement approach, As a
previous study put it:
During the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, it seems to have been accepted that
the tenns of any new compliance institutions would have to be deferred to the
future. The main controversy concerned the possible inclusion of
“consequences” (beyond the predictable list of cautions, suspension of privileges,
etc.) (Sands and Linehan 2004, 107).
Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol - the primary compliance article - sidesteps questions of
enforcement by postponing them until the first meeting of Parties after the Protocol’s
entry into force.
The measures included in the Protocol provide a strongly managerial approach
to compliance Article 5 facilitates implementation review by directing parties to
develop national systems for estimating GHG emissions Article 7 directs Annex 1
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(industrialized) countries in particular to provide “supplementary information” as
needed for the Conference of Parties to assess compliance. Article 8 establishes that
the Conference of Parties will assign “expert” review teams to assess national reporting.
Article 9 requires the first meeting of parties to the Kyoto Protocol to review the
agreement’s terms “in light of the best available scientific information.” Article 13
directs the Conference of Parties to (a) assess parties’ implementation of the protocol,
(b) re-examine parties’ obligations in light of experience and evolving scientific
knowledge, (c) facilitate the exchange of information concerning specific measures
adopted by parties, (f) make recommendations concerning implementation of the
protocol, and (g) secure financial resources for the FCCC’s financial mechanism. Each
of these measures is indicative of the concern for capacity-building emphasized by a
‘managerial’ approach to compliance.
In summary, the Kyoto case sheds little light on the rational institutionalist
hypothesis (IF1 ) that negotiators will supply flexibility mechanisms to mitigate
distributional problems created or exacerbated by enforcement mechanisms. Parties to
the Kyoto negotiations bargained ‘hard’ despite the protocol’s lack of enforcement
provisions.
The Kyoto case generally supports the second rational institutionalist
hypothesis, that negotiators will be increasingly likely to provide transformative
flexibility when they are faced with uncertainty. The most direct way for negotiators to
provide transformative flexibility is to specify that the agreement shall be in force for
only a limited duration, i.e., including a ‘sunset clause’, thus requiring renegotiation to
sustain cooperation While the Kyoto Protocol does not include a sunset clause, it does
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incorporate an equivalent provision. Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol directs Annex 1
parties to reduce their emissions by 5 percent from a 1990 baseline in the 2008-2012
‘commitment period’. The concept of a commitment period, as opposed to a
conventional deadline, provides parties with flexibility in meeting their obligations in at
least two ways. It sidesteps the possibility that unanticipated shocks, such as extreme
weather, may require abnormally high energy use, preventing a state from achieving
compliance in a specific year. States may exceed their emissions target in one year
provided they accommodate this in other years. Second, requiring reductions in a
limited period grants states flexibility in choosing specific policies to meet those
targets.
Additionally, as discussed in the preceding section, the Kyoto Protocol contains
several provisions designed to facilitate periodic amendment and review. The protocol
requires parties to establish national reporting systems to estimate emissions, provides
for expert review of national communications, and delegates authority to the
Conference of Parties to assess implementation, compliance, and to adopt amendments
and annexes to the Protocol (for those parties that have accepted them) in light of
implementation review.
Since the Protocol incorporates a limited commitment period, requires
implementation review, and permits amendments and annexes in response to review, it
may seem odd to argue that the Kyoto case provides only moderate support for
hypothesis IF2. The reason for this surprising assessment lies in a necessary tension
between the two provisions just described Permitting parties to achieve compliance
within a five-year commitment period grants them extra flexibility in determining how
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to meet emissions targets. However, as Oberthiir and Ott (1999, 127-8) have noted,
“under a commitment period of several years, half of the following period will have
passed by the time the results of the compliance assessment of any given period
become available.” Other proposals, such as the one advanced by Germany at AGBM
3, incorporated two single year targets for 2005 and 2010. Under this system, the
Conference of Parties could review compliance with the first deadline in time to
recommend measures to facilitate compliance by the second deadline. Under the actual
Kyoto review mechanism, knowledge gained from a review of the first commitment
period could only be used to inform policies for a third commitment period. The
review process likely could not provide timely information for use in negotiating a
second commitment period. Therefore, despite the profusion of formal flexibility
provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, Oberthiir and Ott ( 1999, 127-8) predict that the
agreement is “likely to be a rather clumsy and slow to develop treaty . . . because of its
inflexible structural design.”
The third rational institutionalist hypothesis expects that, other things equal,
negotiators will be less likely to provide transformative flexibility as the number of
parties to a negotiation increases. In the Kyoto case, this hypothesis cuts against
hypothesis IF2, which expects negotiators to provide transformative flexibility in
response to uncertainty. In evaluating these hypotheses, it seems reasonable to place
greater weight on the second Because of the scientific uncertainty surrounding climate
change, and the ultimate consequences of different mitigation options, mechanisms for
periodic review and amendment are unavoidably central to the design of the agreement.
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Despite creating obvious burdens, there is little evidence in the diplomatic
history suggesting that negotiators designed formal provisions of the protocol to
minimize transaction costs created by the large number of participants. A possible
exception might be the Protocol’s requirement of three-fourths voting approval, rather
than consensus, for the adoption of amendments and annexes. Nevertheless, even this
requirement is quite strict given the number of states participating in the Kyoto process.
Rather, it seems that the most direct responses to the problem of transaction costs were
informal: state preferences routinely were consolidated in voting blocs (e.g., AOSIS,
JUSSCANNZ, G-77, etc.), and states routinely delegated considerable discretion in
agenda management and resolving impasses to chairs of negotiating sessions (Depledge
2000; 2005). In summary, the Kyoto case is neither inconsistent nor completely
consistent with hypothesis IF3.
The first realist hypothesis on flexibility expects that hegemonic actors will not
provide transformative flexibility when using multilateral processes. While this is an
interesting claim, as with the first rational institutionalist hypothesis, it is not relevant to
this case. The Kyoto Protocol does not reflect hegemonic diplomacy. Though
individual states exercised significant influence over the design of various aspects of
the agreement, no single actor dictated the terms of the entire agreement.
The second realist hypothesis expects that multilateral agreements negotiated
among relative equals will emphasize the use of adaptive flexibility mechanisms (i.e.,
escape clauses, withdrawal clauses) and interpretive flexibility provisions (e.g.,
reservations). The Kyoto Protocol provides only very modest support for hypothesis
RF2. Although rife with flexible provisions, the Kyoto Protocol is not strong on
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adaptive flexibility. It incorporates no escape clause to speak of. Article 27 of the
Kyoto Protocol does provide a formal mechanism for withdrawal. However, as this
chapter explained earlier, nearly all surveyed agreements do so. What might provide
further support for hypothesis RF2 would be evidence that negotiators consciously
designed the withdrawal mechanism to serve the purpose claimed by the hypothesis.
Actually, however, the Kyoto Protocol's withdrawal clause occasioned very
little discussion during the entire negotiation process. There was little variation among
the withdrawal proposals contained in the “Framework compilation” document
reviewed at AGBM 6. Later, when designing the first consolidated negotiating text,
Estrada simply “chose to repeat [FCCC] provisions on withdrawal” (Depledge 2000,
96). This language remained unchanged throughout AGBM 8 (October 1997) and the
Kyoto Conference (COP-3, December 1997), and is reflected in the text of the Kyoto
Protocol. It is difficult to find any evidence in the diplomatic history that suggests that
the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol attached a great deal of significance to the
withdrawal clause, other than there being one. The direct carryover of the withdrawal
clause from the FCCC to the Kyoto Protocol suggests, instead, that most negotiators
treated the withdrawal clause more as diplomatic boilerplate than as a central aspect of
institutional design.
Contrary to the expectations of the second Realist hypothesis, negotiators did
not permit reservations to the Kyoto Protocol; Article 26 expressly forbids states from
attaching reservations to their signature of the Protocol This clause, like the
withdrawal clause (Article 27), remained unchanged throughout the negotiation of the
Protocol. None of the proposals contained in the “framework compilation” reviewed at
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AGBM 6 permitted reservations. At AGBM 8, the negotiating text was revised to
indicate that one party [the US] disagreed with the article. This note was subsequently
withdrawn during the Kyoto Conference. The final text of Article 25 of the Kyoto
Protocol mirrors Article 24 of the FCCC. Again, the diplomatic history surrounding the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol’s reservation clause does not support hypothesis RF2.
At no point during the negotiations did a substantial number of parties express interest
in permitting reservations. Arguably, only the United States acted consistently with
hypothesis RF2. The most that can be claimed for the hypothesis is that, after securing
favorable terms of cooperation, the US delegation to the Kyoto negotiations no longer
had any incentive to support a provision allowing reservations.
In summary, the Kyoto Protocol does not offer much support for the Realist
hypotheses on flexibility. With respect to adaptive flexibility provisions, the protocol
does not incorporate an escape mechanism. It does permits formal withdrawal from the
Protocol, but withdrawal provisions are theoretically less flexible than escape
mechanisms because the latter permit cooperation to continue after the event that
triggered the escape mechanism passes. Ending participation in a cooperative
agreement - withdrawing - is less significant still for Realists, who assume that states
are free to stop compliance in any event. Moreover, the Protocol does not offer much
interpretive flexibility; it specifically forbids states from attaching reservations to their
signature of the agreement
Mostly, however, the Kyoto Protocol offers little support for the Realist
hypotheses because there is so little evidence in the diplomatic history that negotiators
actually bargained over these provisions in the manner envisaged by the Realist
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hypotheses. To the contrary, most of the formal flexibility provisions were not
seriously debated at any point during the negotiations, and some appear to be
boilerplate common to numerous agreements. If these provisions were as significant to
negotiators as these hypotheses predict, one would expect to find much more discussion
of them during the preliminary meetings and the Kyoto conference itself. That there
was so little constitutes a strong argument against the Realist hypotheses on flexibility.
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol is consistent with both constructivist hypotheses
concerning flexibility. The first constructivist hypothesis is similar to hypothesis IF2 in
that it focuses on the significance of uncertainty for institutional design. As explained
previously, however, constructivism departs from rational institutionalism by
considering uncertainty to be endogenous to institutional design. Negotiators do not
merely react to uncertainty, they respond to uncertainty by designing institutions to
reduce it. As is readily apparent from the preceding discussion, the Kyoto Protocol is
very consistent with hypothesis CF1. The Kyoto Protocol’s procedure for
implementation review focuses not simply on state compliance, but also the adequacy
of the protocol's terms. It specifically emphasizes the importance of expert review, and
emphasizes the importance of using the best available scientific knowledge,
incorporating new knowledge as it becomes available.
Likewise, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated amid considerable dissensus
concerning both ( 1 ) the adequacy of scientific knowledge concerning policy options,
and (2) the likely consequences of choosing different options. Indeed, the flexibility
mechanisms themselves were the subject of serious disagreement among negotiators.
In almost every case, however, negotiators chose flexibility over specific, but disputed,
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standards, including the decisions to maintain the common but differentiated approach
delineated in the FCCC; to adopt a basket approach to greenhouse gases; to permit joint
implementation and emission trading; and the decision to specify compliance windows
rather than single-year targets. However, although the Kyoto case provides
considerable support for the claim that negotiators provide interpretive flexibility in
response to uncertainty and policy dissensus, it provides little support for the claims
that negotiators will provide formal flexibility mechanisms (e.g., reservations, escape
clauses) in response to uncertainty or disagreement concerning policy.
Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was
negotiated fairly rapidly. Preliminary negotiations activity took place from May to
November, 1996. Formal negotiations took place in four rounds between December 1996
and September 1987. During much of this time, discussion of final clauses such as
signature, reservations, entry into force, and withdrawal took a back seat to more
substantive concerns, as consensus developed around the scientific basis for the
Protocol’s measures (Anderson and Sarma 2002; Benedick 1998; Haas 1992).
The first rational institutionalist hypothesis expects that negotiators will
supplement enforcement mechanisms with institutional flexibility to make international
agreements easier to conclude. As with the Kyoto Protocol, this hypothesis is not strictly
applicable to the Montreal Protocol because negotiators adopted a managerial, rather than
punitive, approach to dealing with noncompliance. The Protocol contains fairly
extensive reporting requirements (Articles 4, 7, 9, and 1 I ), provides for assessment and
review (Article 6), and emphasizes technological and financial transfers to promote
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capacity building (Articles 5 and 10). Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol, which deals
directly with compliance, postpones the consideration of compliance mechanisms until
the first Meeting of Parties. As a result, hypothesis IF1 makes no determinate prediction
with respect to the Montreal case.
Hypothesis IF2 expects that negotiators will respond to uncertainty by requiring
frequent re-evaluation of the terms of the agreement. The Montreal Protocol provides
moderate support for this hypothesis. Clearly, the designers of the Protocol provided
for frequent review of the terms of the agreement. Article 2.9 (a) establishes that the
parties to the Protocol can adjust both the ozone-depleting potential ratings for the
substances listed in Annex A and the levels of permitted consumption of controlled
substances. Article 2. 10 (a) permits parties to add additional substances to Annex A.
Articles 6 and 7 establish a through review process for assessing the adequacy of the
Protocol and its implementation by the parties. Article 1 1 delegates sufficient authority
to the Meeting of the Parties to adopt measures in accordance with these provisions.
Yet the Montreal Protocol must be judged to be only moderately consistent with
hypothesis 1F2 because of its duration. Since, in this view, uncertainty is exogenous to
institutions, it makes sense for designers to limit the duration of agreements to force
regular renegotiation. Only by doing this can states ensure that the actual utility of
their participation in the agreement will not vary too greatly from their anticipated
utility from participation. Although it facilitates information review and provides
mechanisms for change, the Montreal Protocol was not written in such a way as to
require regular renegotiation. Rather, it prescribes a number of successive reduction
targets for parties, the last of which continues indefinitely beyond the July 1998 - June
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1999 compliance period (Article 2.4). Accordingly, this study finds only very modest
support for hypothesis IF2.
Finally, the third rational institutionalist hypothesis expects that increasing
transaction costs will motivate negotiators to provide less transformative flexibility as
the number of parties to a negotiation increases. The Montreal Protocol, like the Kyoto
Protocol, does not appear to be consistent with this projection. The negotiators of the
Montreal Protocol simultaneously sought ( 1 ) to maximize participation in the
agreement (particularly, by granting concessions to developing states), and (2) to create
strong mechanisms for implementation review and amendment of the agreement. The
simultaneous presence of these factors makes it difficult to accept hypothesis IF3’s
explanation that transaction costs create an inverse relationship between participation
and transformative flexibility. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, negotiators clearly
were concerned to maximize both. They provided for flexibility to accommodate
adjustment of the agreement in response to evolving scientific knowledge and shifting
political climates, and they were concerned to maximize participation to guard against
the leakage of CFC production to states outside the Protocol Accordingly, this study
concludes that the Montreal case does not support IF3.
The first realist hypothesis (RF1 ) expects that hegemonic negotiators will not
provide transformative flexibility, to prevent favorable terms of cooperation from being
altered against their interests. The Montreal Protocol provides no support for this
expectation. As mentioned earlier, the U.S, was prepared to take unilateral measures to
internationalize ozone protection if negotiations failed, and the U.S exercised great
influence over the Montreal negotiations (DeSombre 2000). Flowever, rather than try
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to solidify cooperation on one particular set of terms, the United States supported an
agreement that provided for extensive transformative flexibility.
The Montreal Protocol provides more support for constructivist than for either
rational institutionalist or realist approaches. Negotiators consciously designed the
Protocol as a work in progress; they developed a framework for the international
regulation of ozone-depleting substances but intentionally left many specific aspects
vague and in need of further development. Consistent with constructivism’s
understanding of uncertainty as endogenous to design, negotiators did not simply
provide a sunset clause to safeguard against unanticipated developments; they
institutionalized processes for review and scientific input to serve as the basis for
subsequent negotiations.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored claims that negotiators design three types of
institutional flexibility under certain conditions and in response to certain problems.
Specifically, it evaluated explanations of institutional flexibility drawn from three
theoretical orientations: rational institutionalism, realism, and constructivism. Finally, it
examined these expectations in light of two specific cases.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. First, the
primary source of variation among surveyed agreements derives not from provision of
formal adaptive or transformative flexibility mechanisms but from interpretive flexibility
— the leeway they provide to states in complying with agreement rules. Nearly every
agreement surveyed in the 1RD included a formal provision for denunciation or
withdrawal. Almost none permitted reservations to states’ signature. Almost all
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provided for amendment. Few incorporate escape mechanisms and even fewer are of
limited duration. In contrast, the surveyed agreements vary widely in their precision and
in the leeway they provide to members in complying with agreement rules. This lack of
variation in adaptive and transformative flexibility provisions may support constructivist
arguments of increasing institutional isomorphism (Finnemore 1996) or the strength of
previously-established international diplomatic practices functioning as default rules.
Second, none of the three theoretical approaches fares consistently well in
explaining institutional flexibility. Moreover, the hypotheses considered in this chapter,
taken together, have varying success in explaining the three types of institutional
flexibility. Rational institutionalism fails to explain adaptive flexibility and has only
modest success explaining transformative flexibility. Realism fares poorly at explaining
adaptive and transformative flexibility but succeeds in explaining interpretive flexibility
Finally, constructivism has little to say concerning adaptive and interpretive flexibility,
but fares moderately well in explaining transformative uncertainty.
Fhe strongest explanation for interpretive flexibility is provided by the realist
hypothesis (RF2) that interpretive flexibility will be higher among agreements negotiated
by relative equals and lower among agreements negotiated by hegemonic actors No
hypotheses were found to explain negotiators’ decision whether to permit reservations.
There was almost no variation on this issue; only one agreement (CITES) permits
reservations.
Constructivism and rational institutionalism combine to provide strong
explanations of what variation exists in interpretive flexibility First, consistent with the
first constructivist hypothesis, uncertainty is a significant predictor of negotiators’
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decision to provide for amendment. However, neither uncertainty nor policy dissensus
predict negotiators’ choice of decision rules governing the adoption of amendments. The
only explanation for this that receives significant support is the size of negotiations. As
expected by the third rational institutionalist hypothesis (IF3), consensual or unanimous
decision rules are significantly less likely among large negotiations.
Finally, none of the hypotheses examined in the chapter adequately explain
variation in adaptive flexibility. In part this is because there is very little variation to
explain; nearly all surveyed agreements provided for withdrawal. On the other hand,
there was variation in the provision of escape mechanisms among surveyed agreements.
Nevertheless, escape mechanisms were far more infrequent than realism would expect.
Similarly, escape mechanisms were not found to be significantly associated with the
provision of enforcement mechanisms, as the first rational institutionalist (IF1
)
hypothesis expected.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
It is time to draw together the many strands of analysis that this study has
produced. This chapter offers conclusions and suggests productive avenues for future
work on institutional design. It proceeds in four sections. The first summarizes the
results presented in the last three chapters and identifies patterns in those results. Thus it
completes the “y centered,” “causes of effects” analysis of the factors that influence
negotiators' choice of institutional forms. The second section reverses the perspective by
adopting an “effects of causes,” or “x-centered” approach to delve more deeply into the
question of which explanatory variables are meaningful for design (Gernng 2007). This
perspective is particularly useful because it emphasizes the fact that negotiators usually
can select among several design options that negotiators in responding to a given
problem. Building on this, section three examines which aspects of agreements
negotiators actually design, and which are artifacts of custom or habit. Section four
concludes the chapter by exploring avenues for future research on institutional design
Causes of Effects: Membership, Delegation, and Flexibility m MEAs
This section reviews the findings of the previous three chapters regarding use of
membership, delegation, and flexibility provisions and searches for interaction effects
that may have been hidden by each chapter’s focus on an individual aspect of institutional
design.
Membership
267
Table 7.1 summarizes the hypotheses advanced concerning possible influences on
membership criteria chosen by negotiators.
Table 7.1 Summary of Findings Concerning Membership
Number Hypothesis Empirical Support/Cases
IM1 Negotiators will restrict membership when
designing agreements providing excludable
benefits.
Modest/Weak
Cases do not provide leverage on 1M 1
.
IM2 Negotiators will respond to use entry into force
conditions to create a tipping effect, encouraging
participation.
Modest/VVeak
Case studies are inconsistent with 1M2.
RM1 Negotiators will design inclusive membership
rules in response to distributional problems.
Strong
However, LRTAP represents a deviant
case, membership influenced by other
criteria.
RM2 Negotiators will design demanding entry into
force conditions in response to
distributional/relative gains concerns
Mixed/Strong
Cases support hypothesis RM2,
CM1 Negotiators will be less likely to restrict
membership when responding to perceived crises.
Mixed/Strong
Cases do not provide strong leverage.
CM2 Negotiators will prioritize breadth of participation
over depth of cooperation when tradeoffs are
necessary.
Mixed/Modest
Cases are somewhat inconsistent. The
LRTAP negotiations show signs of a
‘sequential’ approach; Vienna and
Montreal negotiations were parallel.
This study finds very modest support for hypothesis IM1, which expects that
negotiators will not provide excludable benefits without restricting membership. To the
contrary, among surveyed agreements that provide such benefits, more agreements are
open than are restricted. Nevertheless, the majority of surveyed agreements, including
those chosen for case study analysis in Chapter 4, do not involve potentially excludable
goods. Therefore, this study’s findings concerning 1M1 remain preliminary.
This study also finds modest support for hypothesis IM2, which expects that
states confronting enforcement problems will not promise to comply with an agreement
prior to its entry into force The logic behind this claim is that negotiators faced with
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enforcement problems can use entry into force conditions to set minimum participation
thresholds (Barrett 2003). Unlike normative accounts which emphasize
“appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998) as a guide to behavior, this rationalist
explanation emphasizes that the perceived benefits of environmental cooperation
sometimes depend on the number of parties participating. If this is the case, one would
not expect states to promise compliance before entry into force.
In fact, states did not agree to comply prior to entry into force in any of the
surveyed agreements that addressed the problem of ensuring that all important states
would join by stipulating substantive conditions for entry into force. In general, states
promised to comply prior to entry into force for nearly half of agreements characterized
by no or low enforcement problems, but for only one-eighth of agreements coded as
having moderate or higher enforcement problems. Nevertheless, although these
preliminary results are consistent with IM2, this study found no statistically significant
relationship between severity of enforcement problems and early compliance.
This study finds greater support for the two realist hypotheses. First, there is
strong empirical support for hypothesis RM1, that negotiators will choose inclusive
membership criteria in response to distribution problems. Logistic regression shows that
distributional conflict during negotiations is a strong predictor of negotiators’ decision
not to restrict membership in multilateral agreements. However, distribution problems do
not explain all variance in membership rules, and the case discussion identified a
discordant case, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution regime. In these
negotiations the same membership criteria were used for each protocol, regardless of
underlying distributional politics. The balance of the evidence shows that increasing
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membership may be a relevant strategy for negotiators in dealing with distributional
problems, but distributional conflict is not the only factor influencing negotiators’
decision whether to restrict membership.
This study also finds generally strong support for hypothesis RM2, which expects
that negotiators will respond to enforcement problems by requiring strict conditions for
entry into force. Though there is no evidence to suggest that negotiators require
ratification or approval by a higher proportion of signatories when faced with concerns
such as free riding, there is strong evidence that negotiators are more likely to design
substantive criteria for entry into force (such as participation by parties representing a
certain percentage of the behavior in question) when enforcement problems are salient..
It appears that simply requiring a larger number of ratifications is too crude an instrument
to mitigate concerns about cheating or free riding. The two case studies provide mixed
results. The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer are consistent with RM2, though the LRTAP regime is not. Since logistic
regression shows that the salience of enforcement problems is a strong predictor of the
negotiators’ decision to design substantive entry into force criteria, it is possible that the
LRTAP regime simply is an outlier on this issue.
In summary, there is strong statistical evidence to support both Realist
hypotheses. Further case studies will be necessary to demonstrate the causal validity of
RM 1 Though there is evidence that negotiators do not choose to restrict membership in
response to distributional conflicts, there is less evidence that they actively seek to
expand membership to minimize relative gains concerns. There is even stronger
quantitative evidence that RM2 accurately describes the design of entry into force
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conditions. Moreover, Benedick’s (1998) diplomatic history of the Montreal Protocol
shows that major proponents of the Protocol (and the United States, in particular)
understood entry into force conditions as significant largely for the same reasons posited
by RM2.
This study finds mixed support for the constructivist hypotheses. It found partial
support for hypothesis CM1, that negotiators motivated primarily by a perceived shock or
crisis generally will be less likely to restrict membership. The presence of an external
shock or perceived crisis appears to have no influence on negotiators’ decision to restrict
membership or participation in an agreement. Rather, among the surveyed agreements,
geographic location is by far the most commonly used basis for restricting membership.
Most of these agreements are otherwise unrestricted in membership. Inspired by the
results of tests on the realist hypotheses, this study examined a corollary that arguably
better expresses the original insight behind hypothesis CM 1 . This corollary holds that
negotiators will choose less demanding entry into force conditions when they are
responding to a perceived shock or crisis. This study finds significantly more support for
this hypothesis. There were no surveyed agreements in which negotiators responding
primarily to a shared sense of crisis designed substantive conditions for an agreement’s
entry into force. While statistical tests showed that agreements motivated by a perceived
crisis required, on average, ratification by a lower percentage of signatories to enter into
force than did agreements that were not negotiated in response to a perceived crisis, the
difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, this study cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the two group means.
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Finally, this study finds mixed support for the CM2 claim that negotiators will
prioritize breadth of participation over depth of cooperation when designing agreements.
There is strong evidence that negotiators do not restrict participation in MEAs on
political or economic grounds. Thus, this study finds evidence that there may be a
general norm of non-exclusion among negotiators of multilateral agreements, such as
Ruggie ( 1 993b) suggests. However, this study found very little support for the part of
hypothesis CM2 that suggests negotiators choose a pathway to cooperation that
emphasizes breadth of participation over depth of cooperation in the design of
agreements. The logic behind this hypothesis is that such an approach to membership
maximizes the nonnative power of agreements, the substantive content of which can be
deepened through the use of transfonnative flexibility provisions. However, this study
found no significant evidence or a tradeoff between participation and depth of
cooperation. Some restricted agreements entail only shallow cooperation and some open
agreements entail fairly deep cooperation. Since the primary of observed variation in
membership is geographical, this is not surprising.
In summary, the design of membership rules in MEAs generally seems consistent
with a norm of non-exclusion. The few exceptions to this rule generally restrict
membership on geographic or practical criteria; membership in MEAs generally is not
restricted on political or economic grounds. This study also found that negotiators
generally do not restrict membership when strong distributional problems are present.
Indeed, as the IWC example in Chapter 4 shows, distributional conflict can lead states to
recruit new members to an agreement if those new members will reinforce the recruiting
state’s influence over decisions. Entry into force criteria are generally consistent with
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realism's focus on free-riding and incentives to ‘cheat’ on commitments. This study
found that negotiators designed specific thresholds for entry into force in response to
such enforcement problems.
Delegation
Table 7.2 summarizes the hypotheses advanced concerning possible influences on
delegation in multilateral environmental agreements.
Table 7.2 Summary of Findings Concerning Delegation
Number Hypothesis Empirical Support / Cases
ID1 Delegation increases with the severity of the
enforcement problem.
Mixed / Moderate
Cases are consistent with ID 1
ID2 Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state of the world.
Moderate
LRTAP is consistent; Basel case provides
little leverage.
ID3 Delegation increases with the number of relevant
parties.
Strong
Cases provide less support, demonstrating
the potentially mitigating influence of
coalitions on ID3
ID4 Delegation increases with complexity (when
distributional conflict is low).
Weak
Cases do not provide leverage on 1D4,
RD1 Multilateral agreements generally will feature low
levels of delegation.
Moderate
Basel case is generally consistent with
RD1
RD2 In hegemon-led negotiations, delegation will be
accompanied with high precision
Strong
Cases provide little leverage.
CD1 Multilateral agreements generally will feature
high levels of delegation.
Weak
Though the “norm of multilateralism” is
supported by the Basel negotiations, which
were more norm-driven than science-
driven.
CD2 Delegation will increase with uncertainty when
expert groups supply policy knowledge states.
Strong
Though 11ASA involvement failed to
produce deep cooperation in LRTAP
Convention.
This study finds varying levels of support for the institutionalist hypotheses
There is mixed support for hypothesis ID 1
,
that negotiators readiness to delegate
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authority increases in response to greater enforcement problems. In many agreements
that face little or no enforcement problem, negotiators simply delegate administrative
responsibilities to one of the state parties. In absolute terms, agreements involving more
salient enforcement problems more commonly involved delegation of administrative
power to an independent body (usually a secretariat). However, the difference in mean
salience of enforcement problems across various institutional choices (no secretariat,
state party performs secretarial duties, administrative duties delegated to existing 10,
agreement creates new administrative body) was not statistically significant.
Similarly, this study finds modest support for the second rational institutionalist
hypothesis (ID2), that delegation will increase with uncertainty about the state of the
world. Although it did not find evidence that negotiators were increasingly likely to
delegate decision making or dispute resolution authority in response to uncertainty, it did
find evidence that, in designing agreements, negotiators responded to uncertainty by
delegating resources for specific functional purposes. Specifically, it found a significant,
positive association between complexity and uncertainty about policy options and
delegation of problem monitoring functions. Additionally, as Table 5.6 shows, it found
that various elements of uncertainty were significant predictors of negotiators' decision to
delegate resources for ( 1 ) researching problem causes and effects, (2) compliance
monitoring, (3) managing financial and technological transfers, and (4) providing an
information clearinghouse for relevant knowledge.
This study found strong support for hypothesis 1D3, that delegation increases with
the number of parties. Unlike previous work, which has tended to conceptualize this
variable simply as the number of ‘relevant’ parties (parties significant in causing the
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problem), this study found evidence that it is primarily the number of states affected by a
problem, not the number of states responsible for creating or contributing to a problem,
that influences negotiators. It also found that the scope of agreements is strongly
associated with the number of states affected by a given problem. This is congruent with
the rational institutionalist belief that as the number of parties to a negotiation increases,
so, too, does the potential for conflicts of interest among the parties. Conflicts of interest
spur negotiators to broaden an agreement to facilitate logrolling and gains from
exchange.
There is modest support for the rational institutionalist hypothesis ID4, that,
absent strong distributional conflict, increasing complexity will lead negotiators to
increase delegation High complexity and low distributional concerns may combine to
make it prohibitively costly for states to develop strong policy preferences. In these
cases, 1D4 suggests they will delegate greater decision or policy making authority to an
administrative body. This study found that such a combination was significantly
associated with negotiators’ decision to create a new administrative body, rather than
delegate administrative authority to an existing IO or state party. However, it also found
that the cases coded as having the highest levels of complexity were associated with
negotiators’ decision not to delegate any administrative capacity at all.
According to realists, the primary influence on negotiators’ decisions regarding
delegation when designing MEAs is a concern for upholding state sovereignty In
negotiations conducted among relative equals, hypothesis RD1 expects that sovereignty
concerns will prevent negotiators from delegating significant levels of authority This
study found modest support for hypothesis RD I Although many surveyed agreements
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go beyond simple cooperation to establish administrative bodies, these generally enjoy
little independence from member states.
This study also supported Hypothesis RD2, that the delegation of significant
implementation or enforcement power is strongly associated with the hegemonic
influence during negotiations. In particular, hegemon-led negotiations are strongly
associated with higher levels of rule precision than are negotiations conducted among
relative equals.
The first constructivist hypothesis on delegation, CD l, is derived from the
argument that multilateralism involves a commitment to general principles and impartial
rules. It expects both that the rules governing delegation in a MEA will accord with these
principles and that multilateral negotiations would involve delegation of authority to third
parties since they are better able act on impartial, general principles. Insofar is this is the
case, this study finds little evidence in favor of hypothesis CD1 . Although surveyed
agreements frequently create administrative organizations, they delegate very little
discretion and endow generally meager resources to such bodies. As a result, the
empirical evidence in favor of hypothesis CD1 is broad, but very shallow.
This study finds stronger support for hypothesis CD2, that delegation will
increase with the combination of expert group participation and the existence of policy-
relevant knowledge. Ordinal logistic regression demonstrated that three variables in
particular are significant predictors of an agreement’s depth: knowledge concerning
specific policy options (the strongest and most significant effect), the presence of an
external shock or crisis, and provision of expert advice to states. Notably, expert group
participation, by itself, is not associated with deeper agreements. They appear to foster
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deeper cooperation only in combination with the provision of expert advice to states.
This is consistent with hypothesis CD2, and with sociological approaches that suggest
that expert group participation may be strategically selected by states that already hold
strong policy preferences.
In summary, this study finds that although negotiators readily created
administrative organizations to oversee agreements, they generally delegated low levels
of resources, authority and independence to these bodies. The specific functions that
negotiators delegate are generally consistent with institutionalist and constructivist
expectations. Additionally, in examining the hypotheses on delegation, this study found
that the functional breadth of agreements generally increases with size of negotiations,
consistent with rational institutionalism, and that states generally negotiate deeper
agreements when they seek out policy advice. Expert group participation, by itself, does
not influence either the breadth or depth of cooperation.
Flexibility
Table 7.3 summarizes the hypotheses concerning influences on institutional
flexibility. This study found little support for two of the rational institutionalist
hypotheses, but strong support for the third. Neither statistical analyses or nor the case
studies supported hypothesis IF 1
,
that negotiators will provide institutional flexibility to
mitigate distributional conflict arising from the provision of enforcement mechanisms.
None of the surveyed agreements with the strongest enforcement mechanisms included
escape mechanisms. Conversely, they were most common among agreements with the
little or no enforcement mechanisms.
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Table 7.3 Summary of Findings Concerning Flexibility
Number Hypothesis Empirical Support / Cases
IF1 Adaptive flexibility will increase with the use of
enforcement mechanisms.
None
Cases do not support hypothesis IFF
IF2 Transfonnative flexibility will increase with
uncertainty.
None
Although empirical analyses found no
significant relationship, Kyoto is consistent
with limiting agreement duration.
IF3 Transformative flexibility will decrease with the
number of parties.
Strong
Although Kyoto and Montreal provide for
amendment, neither uses a bargaining-
intensive requirement of consensus
RF1 Hegemonic agreements will use little
transfonnative flexibility.
Weak
Kyoto case provides little leverage,
Montreal case contradicts RF1
RF2 Agreements negotiated among relative equals will
use high levels of adaptive and interpretive
flexibility.
Strong
Kyoto provides little support; Montreal's
escape clause is inconsistent with RF2.
CF1 Transfonnative flexibility will increase with
uncertainty.
Moderate
Both Kyoto and Montreal are consistent
with CF1
.
CF2 Transfonnative flexibility will increase with
policy dissensus.
Weak
Both Kyoto and Montreal are consistent;
Kyoto also provides considerable
interpretive/means flexibility.
Likewise, this study finds no support for hypothesis IF2, that scientific
uncertainty drives negotiators to limit the duration of multilateral environmental
agreements. While uncertainty may influence the negotiation and design of MEAs, it
does not appear to influence the decision to limit an agreement’s duration; sunset clauses
are extremely rare among all IRDB agreements, irrespective of scientific uncertainty.
In contrast, this study does find support for hypothesis 1F3, which expects that
transformative flexibility decreases with the number of parties. Although there is little
variation concerning the choices to provide formal amendment procedures (nearly every
surveyed agreement does) or to provide sunset clauses (very few do so), there is variation
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in the choice of decision rule governing the adoption of formal amendments. Most
surveyed agreements require either supermajority support or consensus to adopt an
agreement. The primary difference between the two groups lies in the number of states
participating in negotiations. The mean number of states involved in negotiating
agreements requiring consensus (13) was only one-fifth that for agreements requiring
only supermajority support (65). Although statistical analysis identified correlations
rather than causes, this difference, combined with the negative results of the several
realist hypotheses concerning decision rules, suggests that the transaction cost
explanation advocated by rational institutionalists provides the most plausible account of
negotiator’s choice of decision rules governing amendments.
The results for realist hypotheses are similarly mixed. This study finds little
support for hypothesis RF1, that flexibility provisions will feature prominently in the
negotiation and design of MEAs. Concerning adaptive flexibility, although nearly every
surveyed agreement includes a formal withdrawal clause, only one in five includes an
escape mechanism. Similarly, with respect to interpretive flexibility, most agreements
include fairly precise rules. Only one agreement in the database explicitly permits
reservations. Finally, although most agreements incorporate passive transformative
flexibility (formal amendment provisions), very few incorporate a ‘sunset clause' to
actively require renegotiation.
In contrast, this study found greater evidence in favor of a second strand of realist
thought concerning international cooperation. It found significant support for hypothesis
RF2, that negotiations driven by a hegemonic state produce more precise agreements
(with less institutional flexibility) than do negotiations conducted among relative equals.
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This is consistent with the realist view that hegemons, who have less use for institutional
flexibility, can use multilateral diplomacy as a tool of coercion. However, there was little
evidence to suggest that negotiations driven by hegemonic actors produce agreements
with lower levels of adaptive or transformative flexibility. The major reason for this is
lack of variation in these formal mechanisms. For example, although not a single
‘coercive’ agreement included a sunset clause (consistent with hypothesis RF2), such
provisions were so rare among all agreements that it is impossible to find significant
support for the claim that coercive negotiators will be less likely to limit the duration of
an agreement.
Finally, this support finds only weak support for the two constructivist hypotheses
on institutional flexibility. Hypothesis CF 1 , that negotiators will increase transformative
flexibility in response to scientific uncertainty, runs into difficulty because of the lack of
variation in formal flexibility provisions. The case study of Kyoto notwithstanding,
sunset clauses are extremely rare among surveyed agreements, regardless of uncertainty.
Likewise, almost every agreement includes a formal amendment procedure regardless of
uncertainty. There is neither any evidence that negotiators relax requirements for
adopting amendments (by not requiring consensus or unanimity) in response to scientific
uncertainty nor evidence that negotiators are more likely to require consensus in the face
of uncertainty.
Similarly, this study finds little support for hypothesis CF2, that negotiators are
increasingly likely to provide transformative flexibility in response to policy dissensus.
The presence or lack of political consensus on the menu of available policy options, and
their likely consequences, is not a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to provde
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for amendment. With respect to decision rules governing the adoption of amendments,
the most plausible explanation found for the observed variation is the number of states
actively participating in negotiations.
This is not to say that scientific uncertainty and policy consensus do not influence
the negotiation of MEAs, nor is it to deny the relevance of constructivist arguments
concerning international policy processes. Rather, it may be that the two hypotheses
advanced here do not adequately represent the significance of uncertainty and policy
consensus. In short, while uncertainty may influence the negotiation of MEAs, formal
flexibility provisions do not appear to be negotiators’ the vehicle of choice for responding
to these concerns. Whether they are provided (e.g., withdrawal) or prohibited (e.g.,
reservations), formal institutional flexibility appears to follow custom or habit. Insofar as
negotiators provide flexibility in response to specific problems, they generally choose
interpretive, or means flexibility (as in the Kyoto Protocol).
Effects of Causes: Power, Interests, and Knowledue
As mentioned above, another way to interpret the results of this study is to focus
attention on independent variables of interest and to search for patterns or regularities in
the multilateral agreements that negotiators have designed in response to them. This
section briefly reconsiders the foregoing results from this perspective. Consistent with
the ‘y-centered’ analysis, this section focuses attention on three broad categories: (1
)
power-based variables, (2) interest-based variables, and (3) ideational variables.
The Influence of State Power
This study has considered the influence of three independent variables related to
state power: hegemony, sovereignty, and concern for relative gams. The most direct test
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of hegemonic influence on the design of MEAs would consider the extent to which
specific agreements correspond to the interests of the hegemonic state, if one is present.
However, such a test is empirically intensive; it requires reliable information about
specific state preferences for each of the surveyed agreements. Nevertheless, this study
provides leverage on the question by deriving and testing two general hypotheses
concerning a hegemon’s behavior. Hypothesis RD1 expects that delegation in MEAs
negotiated under hegemony will be sharply delimited, or ‘precise’. Similarly, hypothesis
RF2 expects that hegemon-led negotiations will produce relatively inflexible agreements.
Conversely, it expects that agreements negotiated among relative equals will feature
relatively high levels of institutional flexibility. This study found significant empirical
support for each of these hypotheses. While it is impossible to predict the substantive
content of an agreement, hegemonic influence over negotiations is strongly associated
with the design of precise, relatively inflexible agreements among the agreements
analyzed in the IRD.
Preservation of state sovereignty also factored into a number of design hypothesis.
Hypothesis RF2 expects that non-hegemonic negotiations will emphasize adaptive and
interpretive flexibility. Further, hypothesis IF1 expects that negotiators will not design
strong enforcement provisions without also providing adaptive flexibility mechanisms.
This study found very little support for these hypotheses as a group, other than the
support for RF2, mentioned above. Contrary to expectations, adaptive flexibility
provisions such as escape clauses are rare among surveyed agreements. Similarly, formal
interpretive flexibility (e.g., reservation provisions) is relatively low among surveyed
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agreements. This suggests that, contrary to the Realist expectations, enforcement
concerns trumped sovereignty concerns in the negotiation of the majority of agreements.
Finally, hypothesis RM2 expects that concern for relative gains will lead
negotiators to design strict entry into force conditions for multilateral agreements when
enforcement concerns are relevant. This study found mixed support for hypothesis RM2.
Among surveyed agreements, negotiators did not respond to enforcement problems by
requiring ratification by a greater percentage of signatories for entry into force.
However, they were more likely to require ratification by signatories constituting a
specific proportion of rule-governed activity.
Overall, the several hypotheses driven by power-based independent variables
have a very mixed empirical record when judged against surveyed agreements. There is
consistently low support for the sovereignty-driven hypotheses. Concern for preserving
sovereignty did not influence negotiators to provide adaptive flexibility. The hypotheses
that find the most support are those concerning the effect of coercive diplomacy on
agreement design. There is substantial evidence that hegemon-led negotiations produce
agreements with more precise rules and with less flexibility than agreements negotiated
among relative equals. These results are consistent with Realist accounts of hegemon-led
cooperation: assuming that an agreement’s rules already reflect the hegemon’s
(perceived) interests, there will be little incentive for a hegemon to provide institutional
flexibility or to delegate discretion in interpreting or applying rules.
The Influence of Interests
The second set of explanatory variables considered here includes distribution
problems, enforcement problems, and the number of parties actively participating in
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negotiations. This study considered three hypotheses concerning the influence of
distributional conflict. First, hypothesis RM 1 expects that increasing salience of
distributional conflicts during negotiations will lead negotiators to adopt inclusive, if not
expansionary, criteria for membership or participation. Hypothesis ID4 expects that
negotiators will be more likely to delegate authority under conditions of high complexity
and low distributional conflict. Finally, hypothesis IF1 expects that distributional conflict
will influence negotiators to provide greater institutional flexibility.
This study finds generally weak support for these hypotheses as a group. The
only individual hypothesis that receives substantial empirical support is RM1; logistic
regression shows that distributional conflict is a significant predictor of negotiators’
decision to choose open membership rules. While this result is consistent with RM 1
,
choosing not to restrict membership is not the same as pursuing expansionary
membership. The cases examined in Chapter 4 do not find evidence of the latter. In fact,
the cases dampen empirical support for RM2 by demonstrating that negotiators do not
necessarily design membership criteria cle novo. Rather, different agreements within a
single regime may share identical membership criteria regardless of underlying
differences in problem structure.
Hypothesis ID4 receives modest support. Among surveyed agreements
negotiated under conditions of high complexity and low distributional conflict, states
were relatively more likely to delegate rule making authority to an external body.
However, the relationship is not perfectly linear. Agreements concerning problems
coded at the highest degrees of complexity involved very little delegation of authority,
suggesting that there are limits or constraints to states’ willingness to cede policymaking
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authority. In cases of moderate complexity, states may find it too costly to develop
policy preferences on their own; in cases of very high complexity, states may be more
concerned about unknown distributive consequences, and therefore less willing to
delegate authority.
Finally, this study found no support for hypothesis IF 1
,
that negotiators seek to
facilitate agreement by providing institutional flexibility to mitigate the distributional
bargaining caused by anticipation of enforcement. To the contrary, none of the
agreements that included enforcement mechanisms included escape mechanisms. The
few agreements that did include escape mechanisms did not include enforcement
mechanisms. Contrary to the premise of IF 1
,
negotiators did not hedge by coupling
enforcement with flexibility. Among surveyed agreements, as often as not, negotiators
bolstered enforcement mechanisms by choosing not to provide adaptive flexibility or did
not provide for enforcement at all.
Likewise, this study finds only modest support for the several hypotheses that
focus on the influence of enforcement problems. This study finds no support for
hypothesis 1M 1, that negotiators will restrict membership in response to enforcement
problems. This logic behind this hypothesis is that negotiators will seek to restrict an
agreement’s benefits only to its members. For this to work, benefits must potentially be
excludable. This is not always the case with international environmental agreements.
Moreover, restricting membership often is problematic with respect to the provision of
the good in the first place (e.g., pollution abatement).
Hypothesis IM2, that enforcement problems will lead negotiators to design
specific entry into force criteria, receives greater support There is evidence that
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negotiators routinely address enforcement concerns by designing substantive criteria
(e.g., participation by parties representing x percent of regulated activity) for the entry
into force of MEAs. The moderate empirical support for hypothesis IM3, that negotiators
will not promise compliance prior to an agreement's entry into force, reinforces that
conclusion. This is significant because it strengthens the strategic interpretation of entry
into force conditions that underlies hypothesis IM2. Finally, this study finds only weak
support for hypothesis ID1. that negotiators will increase delegation in response to
enforcement problems. As mentioned above, among surveyed agreements surrounded by
enforcement problems, there is evidence of increased delegation of basic administrative
functions. For example, in such cases it is uncommon for negotiators simply to delegate
administrative responsibilities to a single state party. However, the logic behind the
hypothesis is that negotiators will be increasingly likely to create or delegate authority to
external bodies for rule enforcement or dispute resolution. There is very little evidence
of this among surveyed agreements, substantially dampening support for hypothesis 1D1
The last two hypotheses primarily address the rising transaction costs created by
increasing numbers of parties. As the number of parties to a negotiation increases,
hypothesis ID3 expects that negotiators will be increasingly likely to delegate authority,
and hypothesis IF3 expects that negotiators will be less likely to provide transformative
flexibility. This study finds strong support for both Negotiators are increasingly likely
to delegate administrative authority as the number of parties increases. The hypothesized
explanation for this is that negotiations become more complex as more parties become
involved, which creates incentives for negotiators to centralize negotiations. In fact,
among surveyed agreements, “number” is a strong predictor of the scope of an
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agreement, giving further support to hypothesis ID3, Likewise, this study finds
substantial support for hypothesis IF3. Although sunset clauses are extremely rare
among all agreements, regardless of number, negotiators were significantly less likely to
require consensus for the adoption of amendments as the number of parties involved in
negotiations increased. The lack of empirical support for other hypothesized
explanations for amendment procedures provides further support for hypothesis IF3.
In summary, evidence for the interest-based hypotheses is mixed. The hypotheses
concerning the influence of the number of parties on formal agreement design, through
increasing transaction costs, find strong support among surveyed agreements. There is
strong evidence that increasing the number of parties leads to broader agreements, and
that these are significantly more likely to centralize negotiations and delegate
administrative functions. Likewise, the number of parties appears to provide the best
explanation for negotiators’ choice of decision rule governing the adoption of
amendments. On the other hand, the hypotheses concerning distribution and enforcement
problems receive much more limited support. Evidence that these concerns directly
influence membership criteria is tenuous, and is undermined by the apparent path
dependency of such criteria within specific regimes (e.g., LRTAP). Likewise, the
relative scarcity of enforcement mechanisms among IRDB agreements dampens support
for those hypotheses that suggest negotiators will delegate authority to overcome
distribution or enforcement dilemmas.
The Influence ofN onus and Knowledge
The third set of hypotheses this study considered focus on ideational explanatory
variables. Specifically, it considered hypotheses concerning the influence of:
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( 1 ) perceptual framing (shocks and crises), (2) scientific knowledge and uncertainty, and
(3) international norms. With respect to perception and issue framing, this study
considered two hypotheses concerning the influence of a shared sense of urgency on
agreement design. First, hypothesis CM1 expects that negotiations responding to a
perceived crisis will be less likely to restrict membership. Here, the logic for inclusive
membership is not the rationalist process of maximizing gains from exchange. Rather, it
is that the symbolic political value of responding quickly to a crisis generally is
incompatible with rationalist strategies of excluding benefits. This study found little
support for hypothesis C'Ml, not because of the existence of crisis negotiations restricting
membership. Rather, very few agreements restrict membership, regardless of whether
there existed a shared sense of crisis at the time of negotiations. The actual membership
criteria chosen by the negotiators of the surveyed agreements are more consistent with a
general norm of non-exclusion (hypothesis CM2) than they are with hypothesis CM1.
An additional hypothesis this study considered was that negotiators responding to a
shared sense of crisis would choose less strict entry into force conditions. This
proposition finds more empirical support among surveyed cases: negotiators responding
to a perceived crisis did not create substantive conditions for entry into force, and, on
average, they required ratification by a lower proportion of participating countries for
entry into force.
This study also examined a number of hypotheses concerning the influence of
scientific knowledge and uncertainty on agreement design. With respect to delegation,
hypothesis 1D2 expects that scientific uncertainty will influence negotiators to delegate
greater resources, and hypothesis CD2 expects that the participation by expert groups in
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the design stage will produce agreements that are broader in scope than those designed
without the input of such groups. This study found empirical support for both
hypotheses. Concerning ID2, this study found that negotiators were systematically more
likely to delegate resources for specific, functional purposes in response to given
environmental factors. Greater uncertainty concerning policy effects was associated with
increased delegation of resources for monitoring. Increasing issue complexity was
associated with delegation of resources to support original research. Likewise,
concerning hypothesis CD2, ordinal regression showed that expert group participation
was a strong predictor of agreement depth, but only in conjunction with the variable
indicating that expert groups provided specific policy advice to states. This result is
consistent both with sociological approaches to knowledge that emphasize the political
selection of scientific knowledge, and constructivist accounts of learning.
This study also considered three hypotheses concerning the influence of
uncertainty on institutional flexibility. Hypothesis IF2 expects that scientific uncertainty
in general will lead negotiators to provide greater (transformative) flexibility.
Hypotheses CF1 and CF2 predict that transformative flexibility will increase with
scientific uncertainty and policy dissensus, respectively. The surveyed agreements
provide no support for a strict reading of hypothesis 1F2 In designing these agreements,
negotiators did not include sunset provisions in response to scientific uncertainty. Such
provisions were extremely rare among surveyed agreements, regardless of the level of
uncertainty surrounding negotiations. There is not much more empirical support for
hypotheses CF1 and CF2. The general lack of variation in institutional flexibility among
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agreements makes it very difficult to establish support for the causal influence of specific
explanatory variables.
In brief summary, this study finds mixed empirical support for the proposition
that negotiators responding to a shared sense of crisis will choose inclusive membership
criteria. Upon further scrutiny, however, this relationship seems to be an artifact of
negotiators' general reluctance to restrict membership in MEAs. In many cases, this is
because agreement benefits are non-excludable public goods. In other cases, negotiators'
reluctance to restrict membership seems guided more by a general norm of non-exclusion
than by strategic calculation of interest. Interestingly, this study also finds support that
expert group participation in the negotiation and design of agreements is not directly
linked to increasing depth of cooperation but, rather, is contingent on states' recognition
of their policy expertise. This finding supports both sociology of science and social
learning accounts of the role of scientific knowledge in international cooperation.
However, this study finds surprisingly little support for hypotheses linking uncertainty
and institutional flexibility. There is remarkably little variation in institutional flexibility
mechanisms among surveyed agreements. While it would be an exaggeration to
conclude that scientific uncertainty does not influence agreement design, it appears that
flexibility mechanisms were not negotiators’ tool of choice for responding to uncertainty
when they designed the surveyed agreements.
Rational Institutionalism, Realism, and Constructivism
As the preceding discussion suggests, none of the three theoretical approaches
examined in this study can claim a monopoly of truth concerning the negotiation and
design of multilateral environmental agreements. This study found substantial empirical
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support for the realist hypotheses concerning membership and, to a lesser extent,
delegation, but not institutional flexibility. This study found generally strong support for
the rational institutionalist hypotheses on delegation, but significantly less for those
concerning membership and flexibility. Finally, this study found reasonably strong
support for a constructivist account of membership, but less for those concerning
delegation or flexibility.
Though tempting, it would be entirely too facile simply to ascribe causal priority
to an individual approach in explaining one of the primary elements of institutional form.
Neither the three elements of institutional form, nor the various hypotheses examined in
this study are exhaustive. Moreover, the research design employed here provides more
leverage on some questions than others. Specifically, it is better suited to address
synchronic processes than diachronic, or longitudinal questions. It is better at
discovering broad empirical patterns than it is at identifying and tracing the
microfoundations of a specific hypothesis. Studies such as the present one are essentially
stock-taking exercises that identify general strengths and weaknesses of current
explanations of international environmental cooperation. In considering a multitude of
specific hypotheses, this study has uncovered a number of additional puzzles and
questions for future research. These will be addressed in the next section of the chapter.
The remainder of this section focuses on this study’s strongest findings
concerning membership, delegation, and flexibility in MEAs. First, concerning
membership, maybe the most significant finding is the general lack of variation in
membership criteria. While participation in some agreements is restricted to parties to a
previous (framework) agreement, most surveyed agreements do not restrict membership
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in any way. The majority of those that do restrict membership do so by simple
geographic criteria (e.g., the 1976 Rhine Chloride Convention, participation in which is
restricted to riparian states). While there are exceptions (e.g., the 1959 Antarctic Treaty),
a general norm of nonexclusion does seem to have influenced negotiators.
With respect to delegation, this study’s strongest findings are ( 1 ) that there is a
substantial, and statistically significant, positive relationship between the number of
participating states and the scope of agreements, and (2) broad agreements with high
participation are associated with generally greater levels of delegation to agreement-
related bodies. It is also very plausible that the norm of nonexclusion (mentioned above)
reinforces this. In contrast, individual state control over administrative responsibilities is
much less common among larger, broader agreements. An important exception to this
trend is that, among surveyed agreements, delegation of enforcement powers is low
across the board. This runs counter to rational institutionalist expectations, and suggests
that aversion to enforcement may also reflect norm-driven behavior by negotiators.
Finally, given the lack of variation among formal flexibility provisions, it seems
clear that negotiators do not strategically manipulate flexibility mechanisms in response
to strategic interests or knowledge-related factors. Instead, the primary source of
variation in institutional flexibility consisted of rule precision. This strongest relationship
this study found in this area was a positive association between coercive diplomacy and
increased rule precision. The academic literature on international cooperation has also
conceptualized rule precision as an element of delegation - discretion (Hawkins et al
2006). Thus, this study can be interpreted as supporting hypotheses that hegemonic
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actors (presumably having succeeded in establishing favorable terms) will seek to
minimize discretion in rule implementation.
How do Negotiators Design MEAs?
One general conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that
theoretical explanations of institutional design specify more design variables than are
actually used in practice. In other words, there is less purposive design in the actual
negotiation of MEAs than realist, institutionalist, and constructivist scholars collectively
suggest. This section reviews which design features among the many examined in this
study appear to be meaningfully designed, and which appear to be artifacts of habit.
Membership
The first choice states have in designing an agreement is whether or not to restrict
membership. Figure 4. 1 shows substantial variation in membership criteria among
surveyed agreements; nearly three-fourths restrict membership according to some criteria.
However, closer scrutiny casts doubt on the significance of this observation. The most
common criterion for membership among surveyed agreements is membership in another
(framework) agreement. Agreements such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1997
Kyoto Protocol have formally restrictive membership However, these and several other
agreements are restricted only to members of other agreements with unrestricted
membership. Thus, many agreements with formally restricted membership are, for all
practical purposes open. The great majority of the remaining agreements that restrict
membership do so on geographic or function, as opposed to political or economic
grounds.
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This contradicts the argument that multilateral agreements are designed more to
“screen” members than to constrain them (von Stein 2005). The rationale for restricting
membership based on geographic or functional (i.e., users of a regulated good) criteria is
not to reveal unknown preferences. Rather, it is to maintain existing preferences, and to
avoid vote-stacking, such as in the International Whaling Commission example noted in
Chapter 4. The statistical evidence bears this out; the only hypothesis concerning
membership restriction that received strong support was hypothesis RM 1 , which expects
negotiators to choose open membership rules in response to distributional problems. The
desire to exclude non-members from enjoying the benefits of cooperation (hypothesis
1M 1 ) was not an important factor influencing membership rules among surveyed
agreements.
Given the prevalence of open, or virtually open, membership rules among
surveyed agreements, and the lack of evidence of negotiators using membership rules to
exclude benefits (IM1), the most plausible reading of the evidence is that negotiators
generally choose open membership; that something like a norm of non-exclusion may
operate in the design of global-level multilateral environmental agreements. Some
agreements that govern strictly regional goods (e.g., the MEAs governing the pollution of
the Rhine River) are restricted on geographic grounds. However, agreements that restrict
membership rank significantly lower than open agreements with respect to distributional
problems. This suggests that states are reluctant to limit participation when it may be
their benefit to recruit new, sympathetic members.
The second decision states make concerns the minimum level of participation
necessary for agreements to take effect. Rational institutionalists claim that negotiators
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can set thresholds strategically to encourage participation (1M2); realists hold that strict
entry into force conditions can ease concerns about free-riding; constructivists expect
relatively permissive entry into force conditions because the quicker agreements take
effect the earlier norm entrepreneurs can begin shaming laggards.
This study found substantial variation in the entry into force conditions among
surveyed agreements. As Figure 4.2 shows, some required participation by only a small
proportion of signatories; others required nearly unanimous participation. Still others
incorporated conditions requiring participation by specific states. The statistical and case
evidence show that this observed variation in entry into force conditions is not random;
entry into force conditions of surveyed agreements do reflect deliberate design.
However, some of the observed variation in entry into force conditions is not
theoretically significant. For example, this study found that increasing distribution
problems were significantly associated with greater numbers of required ratifications for
entry into force. There is a further correlation between stronger distribution problems
and larger negotiations. As a result, when controlling for the number of states eligible to
sign and ratify an agreement, this study finds no significant relationship between
distribution problems and the number of ratifications required for entry into force.
This negative result probably results from the simplifying assumptions made in
the formal models from which rational institutionalist hypotheses are derived. In actual
negotiations, there are usually strong asymmetries among participating states in terms of
resources and responsibility for causing an environmental problem. Therefore, requiring
a simple number of ratifications may be too blunt a design instrument for negotiators
seeking to establish meaningful minimum participation thresholds to ease fears of free-
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riding. Instead, this study found that negotiators were significantly more likely to design
specific criteria when facing serious enforcement problems. The diplomatic history of
the Montreal Protocol shows that states did, in fact, understand that agreement’s entry
into force conditions as a way to mitigate fears of free-riding. Furthermore, the statistical
evidence examined here is consistent with the institutionalist claim that negotiators can
use minimum participation thresholds as tipping points (I M2). Substantiating this claim
will require further research, however, and at least one surveyed case contradicts
hypothesis IM2: the members of the Thirty percent club’ made vocal commitments prior
to the conclusion and entry into force of the second sulfur protocol to the LRTAP
Convention.
Delegation
The second group of decisions this study examined concerned states’ delegation
of functions and authority in MEAs. It found substantial variation in a number of aspects
of delegation; creation of administrative organizations (Figure 5.1 ), discretion of
administrative organizations (Figure 5.2), funding for these organizations and their
programs (Figures 5.3 and 5.4), as well as specific functional tasks (Figure 5.5).
This study found preliminary evidence that negotiators tend to respond to
enforcement problems by delegating administrative authority either to a new secretariat
or to an existing IGO (hypothesis ID1). Though the results of statistical analysis were
consistent with this hypothesis, the results were not statistically significant. The case
discussion highlights one possible reason why. The logic underlying hypothesis ID1 is
that groups of relatively equal states will delegate administrative and enforcement
capabilities to third parties when states have incentives to “cheat” on obligations.
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However, in some cases, negotiating states may be strongly asymmetrical, both in terms
of material resources and in responsibility for the environmental problem. Under such
conditions, some states will find it in their interests to block the delegation of significant
levels of resources or authority. This was precisely the case in the Basel negotiations.
Though negotiators created an independent secretariat, developed states, who were net
exporters of hazardous wastes, successfully thwarted developing states’ attempts to
delegate substantial resources or authority to the secretariat. This dynamic is much more
consistent with the realist approach of hypothesis RD1, which expects generally low
levels of delegation in MEAs, except in cases of hegemonic coercion.
Although the surveyed agreements generally delegated low levels of
independence to secretariats, there were some exceptions. One of the notable results of
the analyses in Chapter 5 was the failure to find any significant explanation for the
independence of secretariats. This study found no significant relationship between
enforcement or distribution problems and secretariats’ independence. Likewise, it found
no significant relationship between uncertainty/knowledge and independence.
Explaining variation in delegated discretion remains an opportunity for further research
The dimensions of delegation for which this study did find significant
explanations were the delegation of specific functional responsibilities. For example,
consistent with the expectations of hypothesis I D 1 , this study found enforcement
problems were significantly greater for agreements that delegated functions such as
compliance monitoring, implementation review, and compliance verification, designed to
mitigate states’ fears of cheating and free-nding. Likewise, this study found that certain
aspects of uncertainty/knowledge were significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to
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delegate problem monitoring, research into causes and effects of problems, compliance
monitoring, financial and technological transfers. It also found that consensus on policy
options and consequences is a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to delegate
informational clearinghouse programs.
In addition to finding significant explanations for the development of specific
functions, this study also found significant explanations for more general aspects of
programmatic delegation in MEAs. Consistent with hypothesis ID3, which expects
delegation to increase with the number of parties, this study found a significant, positive
relationship between the number of states actively participating in negotiations and the
programmatic breadth of negotiated agreements. Consistent with hypothesis CD2, this
study also found two significant predictors of the depth of cooperation: the provision of
expert advice to states and the shared perception of crisis.
Flexibility
Chapter 6 argued that there are three different types of institutional flexibility:
adaptive flexibility, interpretive flexibility, and transformative flexibility. Adaptive
flexibility provisions are prerogatives of state sovereignty; they can be exercised
unilaterally to suspend cooperation under certain conditions (escape clauses), or to
denounce or withdraw from a cooperative arrangement altogether (withdrawal clauses).
This study found some variation in provision of escape clauses among surveyed
agreements: roughly one-fifth of agreements included an escape mechanism. However,
this study did not find any convincing empirical support for either of the hypotheses
concerning adaptive flexibility. There was no relationship between the provision of
enforcement mechanisms and adaptive flexibility (IF I ). The realist hypothesis on
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adaptive flexibility (RF2) expects such mechanisms to be more common in agreements
negotiated among relative equals, due to heightened sovereignty and relative gains
concerns, and less common among hegemon-led agreements, in which they serve little
purpose. Among surveyed agreements, however, this study observed the opposite
tendency. Escape clauses were more common among hegemon-led agreements than
among agreements negotiated by relative equals.
In contrast to escape mechanisms, this study found very little variation in
withdrawal clauses. Nearly every surveyed agreement explicitly provided for
denunciation or withdrawal. The most plausible interpretation of some agreements’
failure to include such a clause is not that they preclude withdrawal but, rather, that
parties’ right of withdrawal remains implicit.
A similar situation obtains with respect to interpretive flexibility. Reservations
were almost universally prohibited among surveyed agreements. Moreover, the one
agreement that does permit reservations (CITES) restricts reservations to a specific pail
of the agreement only; CITES does not permit general reservations. In practice,
therefore, provisions for reservations do not appear to be a significant variable for
negotiators in designing MEAs.
The primary source of interpretive flexibility in MEAs lies not in the formal
provision for reservations but, instead, in the precision of agreements’ rules. Some
agreements advance specific and precise rules and obligations. Others articulate
relatively precise goals, but are silent with respect to specific policies and actions,
providing states flexibility in determining how to meet obligations. Others still advance
vague, even indeterminate rules, resulting in a de facto delegation of discretion to parties
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in interpreting and implementing an agreement. This study found that hegemonic
domination of negotiations is a significant predictor of increased rule precision (and thus
decreased interpretive flexibility), as expected by hypothesis RF1.
Finally, Chapter 6 considered two forms of transformative flexibility. Negotiators
can require renegotiation to sustain continued cooperation by limiting the duration of
agreements. This approach to transformative flexibility involves the inclusion of sunset
clauses in MEAs. In contrast to this active approach to transformative flexibility,
negotiators can take a permissive approach to transformative flexibility by designing
formal procedures for amending agreements.
This study found very little variation in the active provision of transformative
flexibility. Only six percent of surveyed agreements included a sunset clause. This
confounds the second rational institutionalist hypothesis (IF2). Given the omnipresence
of uncertainty in the negotiation of MEAs, this hypothesis expects that sunset
mechanisms would be prevalent features in environmental agreements (Harris and
Holmstrom 1987; Koremenos 2005a). However, the rarity of such clauses among
surveyed agreements suggests that sunset clauses are not a significant tool for negotiators
in designing MEAs.
Likewise, there is little variation among surveyed agreements concerning the
provision for amendment; more than ninety percent of surveyed agreements include a
formal procedure for amendments. The real variation here lies in the decision rules
governing the adoption of amendments. Surveyed agreements commonly required either
consensus or supermajority support to adopt amendments. A small minority of
agreements use different decision rules, like simple majority rule, or weighted voting.
300
It is questionable whether the observed variation in decision rules governing the
adoption of amendments reflects theoretically significant institutional design. This study
found no significant support for any of the hypotheses that linked amendment decision
rules to concerns such as enforcement problems or scientific uncertainty. Rather, the
strongest evidence that this study found concerning variation in amendment rules
suggests that such variation simply is a function of the size of negotiations. The surveyed
agreements that require consensus or unanimity to adopt amendments were negotiated by
less than fifteen states on average; agreements that required supermajority support were
negotiated on average by more than fifty states. Agreements that use supermajority
decision rules for adopting amendments commonly specify that such voting rules should
be used only after all reasonable attempts at consensus have failed. Thus, the most
plausible explanation for the observed variation in decision rules is consistent with that
suggested by hypothesis 1F3. Negotiators generally follow a norm of consensus, but
relax this requirement when large numbers of participants entail excessively high
transaction costs for reaching consensus. Negotiators do not manipulate amendment
rules in response to more specific, substantive concerns.
The Design of MEAs
In summary, this study has found that negotiators generally choose open
membership rules, particularly when responding to serious distribution problems. When
they do restrict membership, it is almost never on substantive political or economic
grounds. Rather, restricted membership almost always is either ( 1 ) geographic in nature,
or (2) is done to require participation in a parent, or framework, agreements. Negotiators
generally delegate administrative and programmatic functions to independent
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organizations. However, they usually delegate few resources and little discretion,
preferring to maintain close control over such organizations. This study has found much
more convincing evidence for explanations of which functions negotiators delegate than
for explanations of how much independence negotiators delegate. Finally, this study
found little variation in the provision of formal flexibility mechanisms. Adaptive
flexibility mechanisms, and withdrawal clauses in particular, seemed to follow customary
usage. Almost all agreements allow amendments. Negotiators’ choice of rules governing
the adoption of amendments is more a function of the size of negotiations than a strategic
response to any substantive concerns. Finally, negotiators almost invariably do not
choose to allow reservations to MEAs. Rather, the form of flexibility that negotiators do
manipulate is rule precision/specificity.
Looking Back: Contributions of This Study
Studies of institutional design, particularly among rational institutionalists, have
proliferated over the past several years. Yet recent rational institutionalist approaches to
explaining institutional design have devoted more attention to developing formal models
of expected institutional outcomes under different circumstances than they have to testing
the accuracy of those explanations empirically. To date, empirical studies of institutional
design have suffered from a number of serious shortcomings that have hindered the
development of the research program. As discussed in Chapter 2, some of these
empirical studies have focused on a very small number of cases that are ill-suited to
capture the full range of variation in institutional design. Much of the rational
institutionalist literature on institutional design has focused on the design of international
trade institutions, in many cases the same agreements that inspired the development of
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rational institutionalist theories of international cooperation. Additionally, many of those
studies of institutional design test hypotheses against much of the same data that inspired
the development of those hypotheses; the results may be somewhat endogenous. Finally,
previous empirical studies of institutional design have focused on one specific theoretical
orientation to international cooperation - usually rational institutionalism - without fully
engaging alternative explanations.
More recently, institutional design hypotheses have begun to be tested against
larger datasets, e.g., Koremenos (2005a). However, the sampling procedures used in
more recent studies have biased results in favor of bilateral agreements, which far
outnumber multilateral agreements in international law. Yet in international
environmental law, many of the highest profile and most salient agreements are
multilateral in form. If scholars want eventually to link research on institutional design
choices to research on institutional effectiveness, then for the most part they will be
examining multilateral agreements, not bilateral ones.
This study was designed to overcome these shortcomings, and has found a
number of ways to do so. First, this study has performed empirical tests of theoretical
hypotheses concerning the design of MEAs; I hope that they are the first of many and that
there is a trend of such investigations. Second, this study has been able to explore the
strengths and weaknesses of the concepts that scholars have considered “design
elements" in formal models through the evidence of actual negotiations and multilateral
agreements. It has refined the concepts accordingly. Third, this study has examined a
large number of multilateral environmental agreements that, collectively, are
representative of the larger universe of MEAs. Most of the empirical work that has been
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performed before this study has focused on trade and security agreements, while data
concerning MEAs has been understudied. This study’s basis in environmental agreements
creates fodder for comparison with other sorts of agreements, and is a critical element in
a more comprehensive theory of the design of international institutions more broadly.
Fourth, this study’s use of the combination of statistical analyses and case studies
has allowed it some leverage to understand not only what happens in the negotiation of
MEAs, but whether the causal chain that the statistical tests indicate makes sense in light
of the information that we have about the actual negotiations. Fifth, rather than narrowly
addressing the rational institutionalist research program, this study has incorporated and
tested causal mechanisms that would be predicted by the realist and constructivist
research programs. This comparative approach has allowed for the consideration of a
broader range of causal mechanisms and greater empirical validity for the results of the
tests. It has also provided some insight into the evidence for each theory in institutional
design. Its conclusion, that power-based, interest-based, and norm-based explanations all
hold some weight, has implications for the relationship between the theories in 1R more
generally.
The sixth contribution of this study comes in the intensive work done to consider
each of the three dependent variables that it has covered: membership, delegation, and
flexibility. Through descriptive statistics, hypothesis testing, and case studies, this study
has been able to clarify these ideas conceptually, determine their applicability to the
surveyed agreements, and gain some understanding of how and why states use them.
This can be informative both for the study of institutional design more generally, and for
emergent research programs studying one element of design or another (see, e.g..
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Boockmann and Thumer 2006; Koremenos 2005a). Finally, the “y-centered” portion of
this conclusion includes provides an important direction for future research: the study of
explanatory variables themselves, their interactions, and their meaning for institutional
design.
Looking Ahead
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the design of MEAs in light of
hypotheses drawn from recent research on international cooperation. However, the
pursuit of this goal has yielded insights that speak directly to other, related controversies
in the academic literatures on global environmental politics and knowledge in
international cooperation. Future research may productively explore links between
different aspects of uncertainty and the specific forms of institutional flexibility described
in Chapter 6. A second productive avenue for future research will be to compare the
breadth and depth of international cooperation among different institutional pathways
(e.g., the convention-protocol approach vs. the plurilateral approach), and to explore
whether this study is correct to find that the depth-breadth tradeoff in international
environmental law is overstated. In addition to these, this section briefly examines two
additional possibilities for further research: exploring potential interactions among
explanatory variables and exploring the implications of this study’s findings for the
reform of existing international environmental institutions.
Interactions in Institutional Design
It was beyond the scope of this study to explore fully the interactions between
explanatory variables. Nevertheless, this study’s dataset is uniquely well suited among
existing sources for exploring links between explanatory variables. For example, the
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surveyed agreements suggest that there may be theoretically interesting interactions
between distribution and enforcement problems, between number of states and
distribution problems, between number and uncertainty and, especially, between
scientific knowledge/uncertainty and distributional problems. This study concludes by
demonstrating the potential for investigating theoretically interesting interactions,
specifically an interaction between uncertainty/knowledge and distribution problems.
Dimitrov (2003) criticizes previous research on international environmental
regime formation (e.g., Andresen et al 2000) for adopting a one-dimensional view of
scientific knowledge, and for assuming the existence of a positive relationship between
knowledge and international cooperation. He suggests that disaggregating the concept of
scientific knowledge into three constituent elements - “( 1 ) knowledge about the extent of
the problem, (2) knowledge about the causes of the problem, and (3) knowledge about its
consequences - would better account seeming irregularities in the empirical record of
international environmental regime formation (Dimitrov 2003 128).
Because of the complexity of current ecological problems, it seems unlikely that
different types of knowledge will develop at the same rate. Thus, the nature of ecological
problems themselves provides further justification for the analytic disaggregation of
scientific knowledge and uncertainty. tkIf the state of knowledge on different aspects of a
problem vary independently from each other, then literally speaking, they are discrete
variables and should be examined separately” (Dimitrov 2003, 129). Though this claim
seems reasonable enough on face, ultimately whether these different types of knowledge
vary independently is an empirical question. Fortunately, it is an empirical question that
the International Regimes Database (IRD) is uniquely well-positioned to address. The
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IRD contains indicators that map onto Dimitrov’s three types of knowledge.
Additionally, it contains indicators that capture the “malignancy” of environmental
problems, as described by Underdal (2000).
Dimitrov’s claim can be explored by using Mplus 4.2 to specify and test a simple
structural equation model of uncertainty and distributional conflict. The model assumes
that distributional conflicts - which dampen the influence of epistemic communities,
hamper processes of social learning, and make difficult the conclusion of multilateral
agreements - are influenced by two underlying factors: problem malignity and scientific
uncertainty. The underlying concept of problem malignity is indicated by the measures
of issue complexity (COMPLEX) and technological difficulty of policy implementation
(1MPLEMEN). Following Dimitrov (2003), the underlying concept of uncertainty is
indicated by scientific uncertainty (SCIENTIF), knowledge of possible policy options
(OPTIONS), and knowledge of the probable consequences of policy interventions or
inaction (EFFECTS). If Dimitrov is right, we should expect the model to fail standard
goodness-of-fit tests, because there is too much unique variance among the three
indicators, i.e., there is too much dimensionality for one factor by itself to account for the
different indicators of uncertainty.
Figure 7.1 depicts the model, provides unstandardized coefficients for
relationships between the two underlying factors, their indicators, and the dependent
variable. It also reports two goodness-of-fit scores. In brief summary, there is sufficient
covariance among the three indicators to discard the claim that they vary independently
from one another and therefore must be analyzed as discrete variables. However it does
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not necessarily follow from this that Dimitrov is wrong to argue that different aspects of
knowledge carry different weight with respect to different elements of regime formation.
RMSEA = 0.089
EFFECTS * SRMR = 0.073
In fact, in the model specified below, the three indicators constituting uncertainty
do not carry equal weight in influencing distributional conflict. Specifically, uncertainty
with respect to policy consequences makes the greatest contribution to general
uncertainty’s negative effect on distributional conflict. Uncertainty concerning possible
policy options is nearly as important; general uncertainty about the extent of the problem
carries the least weight. Thus, this study contributes to existing debates by clarifying that
it is not necessary to posit independence for multiple indicators of a construct to claim
that they carry differential weight in explaining a given phenomenon. Although it is
beyond the scope of this study to pursue this line of inquiry further, it is easy to imagine
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that future research combining these analytic techniques and this study’s data can make
significant, substantive contributions to debates on the role of scientific knowledge in
international environmental cooperation.
Such research represents one way to usefully extend the findings established here.
Another would be to broaden the analysis to facilitate comparisons across issue-types, to
assess whether different logics drive negotiations on different issues. Expanding the
number of cases also will allow us to have greater confidence in the results of many of
the statistical procedures employed here. Finally, it is important to stress that, although
this study has found empirical support for a number of hypotheses, future case work
incorporating process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) or analytic narratives (Bates
1998) will be necessary to evaluate whether there is empirical support for the specific
causal mechanisms implied by the hypotheses, or whether the cases are merely congruent
with hypothesized expectations.
Institutional Reform in Global Environmental Governance
In recent years, dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of existing international
environmental agreements and institutions has fueled a persistent debate concerning the
desirability of reforming existing international environmental institutions, such as the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). A multiplicity of institutional reforms
have been suggested to improve the effectiveness of global environmental governance
(see, for example, Biermann and Bauer (eds) 2005; Kanie and Elaas (eds) 2004; Esty and
Ivanova (eds) 2002; Whalley and Zissimos 2002).
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to review these in detail here, it is
possible to offer some conjectures concerning the likely trajectory of institutional reform
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based on this study’s findings. With respect to proposed institutional reforms, most
proposals currently on offer demand far greater delegation than states are likely to
provide, if the findings of this study are any guide. This study has shown that, although
states have not been reluctant to create independent bodies to administer MEAs, they
have been reluctant to endow such bodies with substantial financial resources and policy
discretion. The likelihood of a secretariat depending on assessments on member states to
fund functional activities is significantly predicted by the presence/absence of
distributional problems among states. Where such problems are substantial, states are
significantly less likely to consent to mandatory assessments. Since such assessments
would be necessary to support all but the most modest proposed institutional reforms, it is
difficult to argue that states would consent to mandatory assessments on a larger scale.
Another possible implication for institutional reform is that this study has also
found a significant relationship between hegemonic influence and agreement depth.
However, while hegemonic influence has occasionally facilitated issue-specific
international environmental cooperation, the prospects for hegemonic leadership at a
global level are much dimmer. Currently, there exist strong conflicts of interest
concerning global environmental politics both among great powers and between great
powers and developing states. This suggests that the prospects for a new institution with
strong monitoring and enforcement powers are exceptionally low. More likely, the
raison d’etre for any new institution created under such conditions will be to provide
political cover for states vis-a-vis domestic constituencies (Drezner 2007).
Given these constraints, the prospects are poor for substantial institutional reform
in the near future. As certain strands of thought suggest, a focusing event (e.g., a crisis or
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shock) may be necessary if a change in states’ perceptions of their interests in global
environmental governance is to occur in the short term.
Conclusion
In summary, this study contributes to the literature on institutional design by
examining existing hypotheses and assessing which are promising for further study, by
doing so with the aid of the most sophisticated and information-rich dataset currently
available, and advances the research frontier by demonstrating potential gains from using
recent methodological innovations permitting computational analysis of causal pathways
involving unobserved variables and ordinal indicators (structural equation modeling with
ordered categorical dependent variables). Ultimately, by increasing our understanding of
the circumstances under which MEAs have been designed, and why they take the form
that they do, we may be in a better position to judge the effectiveness of design
alternatives and to provide practical advice to future multilateral environmental
negotiations.
APPENDIX 1
LIST OF VARIABLES AND INDICATORS USED IN THIS STUDY
Independent Variables
Distribution Problems
COMONINT How compatible were the interests of the negotiating states concerning the
primary issue under consideration?
Measure: ordinal
6 - Very strongly incompatible
5 - Strongly incompatible
4 - Minor incompatibility
3 - Minor compatibility
2 - Strongly compatible
1 - Very strongly compatible
Source: 1RD variable 101
1
DISTBEN How were agreement benefits distributed among parties?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Agreement provides benefits to all
3 - Agreement provides benefits broadly
2 - Agreement provides benefits narrowly
1 - Agreement concentrates benefits to very few
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 103B (NARRATIVE BENEFITS)
D1STCONF How salient was distributional conflict to the negotiation of the agreement?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong relevance
3 - Strong relevance
2 - Medium relevance
1 Low relevance
0 - Not relevant
Source: IRD variable 10 IF (INTEREST COSTS)
DISTCOST How were the costs of implementing the agreement distributed?
Measure: ordinal
4 - All parties incurred costs equally
3 - Costs were distributed widely
2 - Costs were distributed narrowly
1 - Costs were concentrated in a few parties
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Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 103B (NARRATIVE COSTS)
Enforcement Problems
ENFORCEM How strong were incentives to disobey agreement rules after entry into force?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
3 - Strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
2 - Medium relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
1 - Low relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
0 - No relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
Source: IRD variable 101G (INTEREST DISOBEY)
Hegemony
ISSUEE1EG Were the negotiating states roughly symmetrical or was there an issue-specific
hegemon?
Measure: ordinal
5 - Issue-specific hegemon present: One single actor can get all other actors to do things
that they otherwise would not do with regard to nearly all issues at stake in the
issue area.
4 - Highly uneven distribution: Very uneven distribution of power resources can lead to
more powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something that they
otherwise would not do with regard to a significant number of issues in the issue
area.
3 - Considerable unevenness: Uneven distribution of power resources can lead to more
powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise
would not do with regard to a limited number of issues in the issue area.
2 - Slightly uneven distribution: Besides a slightly uneven distribution, no single nation
has a greater ability to get other nations to do something they otherwise would
not do.
I - Completely even distribution: Issue-specific power resources are evenly distributed
among nations.
Source: IRD variable 102C (POWER SETTING SYMMETRY)
HEGAGEND Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a single stale or a small
group of states?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime
members: A single state or a small group of potential regime members
dominated agenda formation. The main issues on the agenda were imposed on
other actors. One or more dominant powers succeeded in setting the agenda in
the issue area.
3 - Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: Between 2 and 4 on
the scale.
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2 - Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime
members: One or more states tried to dominate agenda formation and to impose
the main issues on the agenda on other actors, but the dominating states were
only partly successful in forcing the others to agree to the main issues on the
agenda.
1 - Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of potential regime
members: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members not at all
relevant: Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime
members did not play a role during negotiations
Source: 1RD variable 108D (AGENDA STATE DETERMINED)
HEGEMON Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small group of states?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: A single state or
a small group of states dominated the negotiations. Negotiations consisted of a
process in which a single state or small group of states imposed the main regime
provisions on other actors.
3 - Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: Between 2 and 4 on
the scale.
2 Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: One or more
states tried to dominate negotiations and to impose the main regime provisions
on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in
forcing the others to agree to the main regime provisions.
1 - Minor relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: Between
0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - Domination by a single state or a small group of states not at all relevant: Domination
by a single state or a small group of states did not play a role during
negotiations
Source: IRD variable 109J (STATE DOMINATION)
Number of Relevant States
NCAUSERS How many nations were important because of their role in causing the problem?
Measure: ordinal
6 - More than 1 20 states
5-61-120 states
4 - 31-60 states
3 - 16-30 states
2 6-15 states
1-1-5 states
Source: IRD variable 101 A (NUMBER CAUSERS)
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NAFFECT How many nations were important because they were affected by the problem?
Measure: ordinal
6 - More than 120 states
5-61-120 states
4 - 31-60 states
3 - 16-30 states
2-6-15 states
1-1-5 states
Source: IRD variable 1 0 1 B (NUMBER AFFECTED)
Uncertainty/Knowledge
COMPLEX How complex was the primary issue-area under negotiation ? Draw your
judgment on the following items: 1=N umber of single issues to be regulated;
2=Number of states involved; 3=Number of different state interests;
4=Implications of regulations for other issue areas.
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong complexity
3 - Strong complexity
2 - Medium complexity
1 - Low complexity
0 Not at all complex
Source: IRD variable 101 H (INTEREST COMPLEXITY)
EFFECTS How well established was knowledge of the probable consequences of different
options for solving the problem?
Selecting different options involves considering future consequences. States
must first develop a clear understanding of the future consequences of doing
nothing about the problem. They must then develop a clear understanding on
outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the other options at hand These
consequences can occur within as well as outside the issue area.
Measure: ordinal
4 - Strongly established understanding: States are aware of the possible outcomes,
outputs, and impacts of doing nothing as well as of other available options
3 - Mostly established understanding: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Partially established understanding: Despite the achievements of a partial
understanding of these consequences, there are still some major uncertainties
with regard to possible consequences of doing nothing and consequences of
other options.
1 - Weakly established understanding. Between 0 and 2 on the scale
0 - No established understanding: States do not have an understanding of the possible
consequences of doing nothing or of the consequences of other possible options,
Source: Computed by author from IRD variable 104D
(KNOW CONSEQUENCES OPTIONS)
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EFFAGREE Did the parties disagree about the probable consequences of different options?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong disagreement
3 - Strong disagreement
2 - Medium disagreement
1 - Low disagreement
0 - No disagreement
Source: Computed by author from 1RD variable 104E
(CONSEQUENCES OPTIONS DISAGREE)
EPICOM The following four communities should be understood as social groups
consisting of transnational networks of experts: science-based communities,
bureaucratic communities, principled belief communities, legal beliefs
communities. Each group is held together through shared beliefs (e.g., about the
causes and consequences of the problem, or about necessary policies, or
normative and principled beliefs, or legal instruments for a regime). More than
one of these groups may exist during regime formation, and there may also be
overlaps between the four different kinds of expert groups.
Were transnational scientific expert networks present/active during
negotiations?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 104F (EXPERT GROUPS)
IMPLEMEN Were the proposed solutions difficult to implement (technological or cost-
intensive)?
Measure: ordinal
5 - Very difficult: Some or all of the following difficulties occurred; l=Proposed
solutions were cost-intensive; 2=Financial/technological capabilities were not
available; 3=Solutions involved many different sectors within domestic societies
and/or affected a significant portion of domestic populations; 4=Solutions
included new policies not implemented before; 5=Domestic interest groups had
negative views about implementation.
4 Difficult: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3 - Balanced: Some implementation problems were present, but were far less
pronounced.
2 - Relatively easy: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
1 - Easy: No implementation problems occurred.
Source: IRD variable 101 L (SOLUTIONS IMPLEMENT)
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INTSCI What types of non-state actors were actively involved?
Were international scientific organizations present/active during negotiations?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 106A (NONSTATE GROUP)
NATSCI What types pf non-state actors were actively involved?
Were national scientific organizations present/active during negotiations?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable I06A (NONSTATE GROUP)
OPTIONS How complete was the information about the options available for dealing with
the problem?
Options for tackling a problem may focus on measures taken within different
sectors. Options for tackling an international problem are based on information
about the variables most important for solving the problem
Measure: ordinal
4 Very high completeness: All necessary information on the different options was
available.
3 High completeness: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Medium completeness: Despite the availability of information on available options
there was still a lack of certain kinds of information for some or all options.
1 - Low completeness: Between 0 and 2 on the scale
0 - Very low completeness: Information on most of the possible options was not
available and even the options themselves may not all have been identified.
Source: Computed by author from IRD variable 104B
(INFORMATION OPTIONS PROBLEM)
OPTAGREE Did the parties disagree about the completeness or accuracy of information
about the options?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0 - No
Source: IRD variable 104C (INFORMATION OPTIONS DISAGREE)
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SCIENTIF Was the extent and causes of the problem well understood?
The degree of uncertainty in an issue area depends on consensus about solutions
and what should be maximized in the issue area (e.g., whether the actors value
protecting fish resources or harvesting a resource to provide food).
Measure: ordinal
5 - Not at all established: Understanding was not established with regard to nature,
causes, and consequences of a problem, or to solutions or what should be
maximized in the issue area.
4 - Low established understanding: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3 - Partially established understanding: Consensus was partially achieved, either by
consensus on some but not all of the different variables (nature, causes, and
consequences of the problem as well as solutions and what should be maximized
in the issue area) or by generally growing, but still not fully developed
consensus on all the different variables.
2 - Strongly established understanding: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
1 - Very strongly established understanding: There was general consensus regarding
nature, causes, and consequences of the problem, as well as regarding solutions
and what should be maximized in the issue area.
Source: 1RD variable 104A (PROBLEM UNDERSTAND)
SHOCKNEG Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by factors largely outside
deliberate efforts of potential regime members?
To what extent was the negotiating agenda driven by a shared perception of
crisis?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime
members: Agenda formation was driven by factors largely outside deliberate
efforts of potential regime members (e.g., external shocks, actions of
nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual experts,
or actions of states considered as not being potential members of the regime).
3 - Strongly determined by factors outside the deliberate efforts of potential regime
members: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime
members: Agenda formation was only partially determined by factors largely
outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members (e.g., external shocks,
actions of nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual
experts, or actions of states considered as not being potential members of the
regime).
1 Minor relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential
regime members: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
0 Determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members not at
all relevant' Agenda formation by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of
potential regime members did not play any role.
Source: IRD variable 108D (NEGOTIATION OUTSIDE DETERMINED)
318
Dependent Variables
Membership
ACTEARLY Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in force before it
became operational?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: IRD variable 1 10D (OPERATIONAL ALREADY)
BENEXCLU Does the problem involve trying to supply a collective good?
Collective (or public) good: No one can be excluded from the use of the good.
Even if some actors try to define rules for the use of the collective good, actors
outside such a system can behave as free riders without complying with such
rules.
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable I01N (GOOD TYPE)
EIFCOND Did the agreement specify substantive conditions for entry into legal force
(i.e., conditions beyond a simple minimum number of ratifications)?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0 - No
Source: Coded by author from treaty text.
ELIGIBLE How many states meet the criteria for membership in the agreement?
Measure: ratio
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 208B
(NARRATIVE MEMBER CRITERIA)
MEMCRIT What criteria govern eligibility for membership?
Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
No criteria
Geographic
Status as user of a good
Membership in another (prior) agreement
Domestic government type
Domestic economy type
Role in causing a problem
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Potential to help solve problem
Expertise in issue area
Source: IRD variable 208A (MEMBER CRITERIA STATE)
NRATIFY How many ratifications are needed for the agreement to enter into force?
Measure: ratio
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
NSTNEGOT How many states actively participated in negotiating the agreement?
Measure: ratio
Source: Computed by author from 1RD variable 109D (NEGOTIATE ACTORS)
PCTRATIFY What percentage of eligible states are required to ratify an agreement for it to
enter into legal force?
Measure: ratio
Source: Computed by author using ELIGIBLE and NRATIFY
RESTRICT Is membership in an agreement open or restricted?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Restricted
0 - Open
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 208A (MEMBER CRITERIA STATE)
Delegation
ADMFUND How are the agreement’s administrative activities funded?
(Check as many as apply)
Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
Nationally funded activities
National contributions
Assessments on members
In-kind contributions
Relies on voluntary contributions
Has independent source of income
Source: IRD variable 2 1 1 A (FUNDING ACTIVITIES)
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AGRDEPTH Is the agreement shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of
its rules?
Measure: ordinal
5 - Very deep: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a very comprehensive set of
rules and/or established rules are rather strong compared to the specificity of the
rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area [e.g., the
adjustments to the Montreal Protocol ( 1987) adopted in London (1990) and
Copenhagen (1992) led to a rather deep regime with comprehensive and strong
rules],
4 - Deep: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3 - Medium: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a sizable number of rules to
manage the problem and/or established rules have developed some strength
compared to the specificity of rules considered necessary for managing the
problems in the issue area.
2 - Shallow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
1 - Very Shallow: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing
the problems in the issue area, the regime comprises only a very limited number
of rules, and/or established rules are rather weak compared to the specificity of
rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area (e.g. the
1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals is a very shallow regime with a very limited number of weak rules).
Source: IRD variable 205G (REGIME SHALLOW)
AGRSCOPE Is the agreement narrow or broad as measured by the functional scope of its
rules?
Measure: ordinal
5 - Very broad: The regime has a very comprehensive functional scope and covers all
important issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime
includes regulations about all important pollutants contributing to pollution of a
transboundary river; regime for conventional arms reductions includes
regulations about all major types of weapons considered necessary for
inclusion).
4 - Broad: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3 - Medium: The regime covers some important issues compared to the range of issues
considered necessary for inclusion in the regime. For instance, several issues
considered necessary for inclusion in the regime are regulated (e.g., regime
includes regulations about several substances contributing to pollution of a
transboundary river, but still other important pollutants are not regulated; regime
for conventional arms reductions includes regulations about several types of
weapons, but other major weapons are not included)
2 - Narrow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
1 Very Narrow The regime has a very limited functional scope compared to the
specific issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime and covers only
a limited number of important issues. For instance, only a very small number of
issues are regulated compared to a large number considered necessary for
inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations about a single
substance contributing to pollution of a transboundary river, but regulations
about a large number of other substances of similar or even greater importance
are lacking; regime for conventional arms reductions includes only regulations
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about a single type or a small number of weapons, but other major types of
weapons are not included).
Source: 1RD variable 205F (RULES NARROW)
ENFORCE To what extent does the agreement adopt an ‘enforcement’ approach to rule
compliance?
Measure: ordinal
2 - Strong enforcement
1 Weak enforcement
0 - No enforcement
Source: Coded by author from IRD variable 212C (COMPLIANCE)
IRD variable was originally expressed as nonexclusive dichotomous indicators, which
were interpreted as follows:
l=No compliance mechanisms (no enforcement)
2=Issuance of notices of violations (no enforcement)
3=Suspension of membership rights (weak enforcement)
4=Exclusion from membership (weak enforcement)
5=Imposition of military punishments (strong enforcement)
6=Imposition of financial/economic punishments (strong enforcement)
7=Support for capacity building to achieve compliance (no enforcement)
8=Granting of a transitional period to achieve compliance (no enforcement)
9-Dissolution of linkages (weak enforcement)
PROGRAMS What programmatic activities (if any) does the agreement delegate?
Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
CLRNGHSE - Establish an information clearinghouse
C'MPLYMON - Monitor compliance with agreement
EXPERTAD - Provide expert advice to member states
MONPROB - Monitor problem causes and effects
RESEARCH - Research problem causes and effects
RVWADEQ Review adequacy of commitments
RVWIMPLM - Implementation review
VERIFY - Verification of parties’ compliance
Source: IRD variable 206A (PROGRAM ACTIVITIES)
PROGFUND How are the agreement’s programmatic activities funded?
Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
Nationally funded activities
National contributions
Assessments on members
In-kind contributions
Relies on voluntary contributions
Has independent source of income
Source: IRD variable 21 1 B (FUNDING PROGRAM)
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SEC1NDEP How much discretion have member states delegated to the secretariat?
Determine the independence of the secretariat according to the latitude the
secretariat has when performing its core tasks (e.g., arranging and servicing
meetings of the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary bodies; performing the
functions assigned by legal documents; preparing and submitting reports based
on the information received from the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary
bodies; preparing reports on secretariat implementation activities for the
Conference of the Parties; ensuring coordination with relevant international
bodies and NGOs; liasing/communicating with relevant authorities, non-parties,
and international organizations; compiling and analyzing data/information;
monitoring adherence to treaty obligations; giving guidance and advice to the
parties; and consulting/assisting) as well as when performing additional tasks or
roles (e.g., its political role as pusher or laggard for regime evolution/
ratification/compliance, its promotion of treaty to non-parties, public relations,
its influence on the agenda of the regime, etc).
Measure: ordinal
4 - Highly independent: The secretariat has broad latitude to take action independent of
member approval. Most of the important actions do not need state approval.
3 - Strong independence: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Some independence: The secretariat has some latitude to take action with regard to
some, but not all, important issues.
1 Less independence: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - No independence: The secretariat has no latitude to take independent action. All
action taken by the secretariat must have state approval.
Source: 1RD variable 209B (SECRETARIAT INDEPENDENCE)
SECRETAR Did the parties establish a secretariat to administer the agreement?
Measure: nominal
l=No secretariat established
2=Regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations
(e.g., secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change)
3= An intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions (e.g., ozone
secretariat operating under UNEP)
4=A nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions [e.g.. Article 8 of
the Ramsar Convention specifies that "the International Union for Conservation
of Nature shall perform the continuing bureau duties under this convention,”
IUCN is a nongovernmental organization with a membership of 526
nongovernmental organizations, 99 government agencies, and 62 states (in
1993)].
5=A nation state performs the secretariat’s functions.
Source: IRD variable 209A (SECRETARIAT)
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Flexibility
AMEND Does the agreement provide for amendment? What decision rule governs the
adoption of amendments?
Measure: nominal
No provision for amendment
Amendments require consensus or unanimity
Amendments require supermajority support
Amendments require weighted majority support
Amendments require simple majority support
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
ESCAPE Does the agreement include an escape mechanism?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
PRECISE Are substantive rules generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that
they call for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and indetenninate?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Precise and easy to interpret: (e.g., precise rules for emission reductions to achieve
a percent reduction goal within a certain timeframe and calculated from a base
year; rules that require the fulfillment of certain economic indicators to achieve
membership in the European Monetary System by the end of the decade).
3 - Relatively precise: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Medium: (e.g., exemption clauses that offer states latitude to interpret qualifying
conditions
1 - Relatively imprecise: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - Ambiguous and indeterminate: (e.g., rules to guarantee “access to appropriate means"
for the work ofjournalists).
Source: IRD variable 205D (RULE PRECISE)
RESERVE Does the agreement permit formal reservations?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
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SUNSET Does the agreement incorporate a sunset clause?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
WITHDRAW Does the agreement include a formal denunciation/withdrawal clause?
Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0-No
Source: Coded by author from agreement texts
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APPENDIX 2
SURVEYED REGIMES AND AGREEMENTS
Antarctic Regime
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1964 Convention on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna
1972 Convention on the Conservation of Seals
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection
Baltic Sea Regime
1974 Helsinki Convention
1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Biodiversity
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
Black Sea Regime
1992 Bucharest Convention
1996 Black Sea Strategic Action Plan
CITES Regime
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
Climate Change
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
1 997 Kyoto Protocol
Danube River
1 985 Bucharest Declaration
1994 Danube River Protection Convention
Desertification
1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
Hazardous Waste Regime
1989 Basel Convention
1 989 Lome IV Regulations
1991 Bamako Convention
1 995 Basel Amendment
1995 Waigani Convention
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APPENDIX 2 (continued)
IATTC Regime
1949 Conservation and Management of Tunas and Tuna-like Fishes
1976 Conservation and Management of Dolphins
1999 Protocol to the IATTC
ICCAT Regime
1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
London Dumping Convention Regime
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter
1978 Amendments to Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention ofMarine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter Concerning
Incineration at Sea
LRTAP Regime
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
1985 First Sulfur Protocol
1988 NO x Protocol
1991 VOCs Protocol
1 994 Second Sulfur Protocol
North Sea Regime
1972 Oslo Convention on Dumping Waste at Sea
1974 Paris Convention on Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution
1984 North Sea Conference
1992 OSPAR Convention
Oil Pollution Regime
1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
1978 MARPOL Protocol
1982 Regional Memoranda of Understanding
Ramsar Regime
1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
1987 Regina Amendments
Rhine River Regime
1963 Berne Convention
1976 Chemical Pollution Convention
1976 Chloride Pollution Convention
1987 Rhine Action Plan
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APPENDIX 2 (continued)
South Pacific Fisheries
1979 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention
Stratospheric Ozone Regime
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
1990 London Amendment
1992 Copenhagen Amendment
Tropical Timber Regime
1983 Tropical Timber Agreement
1994 Tropical Timber Agreement
Whaling Regime
1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
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